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United States health spending grew dramatically over the last several decades,
reaching approximately 18% of Gross Domestic Product in 2015. Much of these
rising costs can be attributed to consolidation of health care providers, the pro-
vision of generous insurance plans, and innovations in medical technologies
and pharmaceuticals. This dissertation studies how innovation in insurance
plan design and pharmaceuticals affect health care prices, consumer behavior,
consumer welfare, and the labor market. It also looks at whether certain policy
interventions might lead to increased efficiency in these health care settings.
In the first chapter, I study employer incentives to offer narrow-network
health plans to their enrollees, and the welfare effects of switching to these
plans. To do so, I estimate a model of supply and demand for health insurance
offered by a large benefits administrator in Massachusetts, where I endogenize
the product menu offered to consumers with respect to hospital and physician
networks. I then use these estimates to study how the employer’s number of
products, networks, premiums, and consumer welfare would respond to a hy-
pothetical tax on expensive health plans, in the style of the ACA “Cadillac Tax.”
I find that consumers’ plan choices are driven primarily by inertia rather than by
the value of the plan’s network, and that this inertia causes the employer to con-
tinue offering plans that add little value in a strict price-versus-provider-choice
tradeoff. A 60% tax on health plans in excess of $6,000 annually would cause
the employer to drop each of its broad plans in favor of more narrow-network
products, resulting in an approximately 21% reduction in health spending, or
$76 per-member-per-month (pmpm). Consumer welfare from being moved to
this new menu of products would decrease an average of $58 pmpm. I conclude
that incentivizing employers to eliminate broad network products through a tax
has the potential to increase social welfare.
While broad-network insurance plans are one source of rising health costs,
spending on pharmaceuticals has also increased over the last thirty years, ac-
companying large gains in life expectancy. The second chapter of this disserta-
tion addresses the question of whether the spending on medical care has been
worth the cost. Using discrete choice methods from the industrial organiza-
tion literature, I, along with coauthors Claudio Lucarelli and Sean Nicholson,
construct a series of quality-adjusted price indices for colorectal cancer treat-
ments, a condition for which the average price of treatment increased dramati-
cally from 1993 to 2005, largely due to the approval and widespread use of five
new drugs over that period. Of note, we estimate a price index using param-
eters from a pure characteristics model, a demand technique which drops the
idiosyncratic error term that produces undesirable switching patterns in tra-
ditional logit models. We find that the naive price index for these treatments
greatly overstates the true price increase. In contrast, indices that account for
the fact that consumers value the quality gains from pharmaceutical innovation
show much more modest price increases. We also find that the magnitude of the
price increase varies with modeling assumptions. Traditional logit models tend
to overstate the value of product innovation, whereas the pure characteristics
model implies a more substantial price increase. These results suggest the im-
portance of modeling assumptions when constructing quality-adjusted indices.
Chapter 3 turns its focus to the labor market, and examines the effects of
state mandated health benefits on job transitions and job separations. Specifi-
cally, it looks at variation in state mental health parity legislation throughout the
1990s and 2000s to assess whether the addition of a high-cost benefit mandate
has led to any significant displacement effect or treatment effect. While prior
studies on mental health parity have focused primarily on health outcomes and
the probability of having insurance following a mandate, few have paid atten-
tion to labor market outcomes. Those that did primarily reported the effects
on levels of employment, ignoring potential effects on job flows. I exploit state
variation in mandate passage by using restricted-access data from the Medical
Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS). The state identifiers in this data allow me
to estimate changes in both employment and job transitions for the population
most likely impacted by mental health mandates: employees with previously
held mental health diagnoses. Finally, I provide initial estimates of the effect
of the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 on these labor
market outcomes. I find that mental health parity has had little effect on em-
ployment levels, consistent with prior literature, but has caused a decrease in
job separations, primarily employment to employment transitions. I present
evidence that at least a third of this decline comes from a reduction in invol-
untary transitions, implying that mental health parity has a positive effect for
individuals with untreated illnesses. In addition, I find that mandates led to
increased expenditures for mental health services, further suggesting that the
involuntary decline was likely due to a treatment effect of the mandates.
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CHAPTER 1
CADILLAC TAX, NARROW NETWORKS, AND CONSUMER WELFARE
1.1 Introduction
As the market for health care becomes increasingly consolidated and med-
ical care prices continue to soar, health insurers and employers have started
offering so-called “narrow network” insurance plans as a means of controlling
costs and product differentiating. These plans achieve lower costs, and lower
premiums, by significantly limiting the set of hospitals and physicians that an
insurer will cover to only those with lower negotiated reimbursement rates.
Indeed, approximately 70% of the plans available on the Affordable Care Act
Health Insurance Exchanges have been found to be “limited network” plans,
covering fewer than 30% of the 20 largest hospitals in the market (McKinsey
Center for U.S. Health System Reform, 2013) and about 40% of the plans cover
less than 25% of the physicians in the market (Polsky & Weiner, 2015). Propo-
nents have argued that limiting networks could be an important way to reign in
health care cost growth. A recent study exploiting a natural experiment in Mas-
sachusetts showed that employees switching to narrow network plans spent
approximately 40% less on medical care with no discernible adverse effects on
health outcomes (Gruber & McKnight, 2016).
However, despite the increasing popularity of narrow network plans on the
Exchanges, employers have been slower to adopt, design, and offer narrow net-
work products. In 2016, only 7% of employers nationally offered a narrow net-
work as part of their plan menu (Hall & Fronstin, 2016). Moreover, most em-
ployers typically only offer one or two plans to their employees, which tend
1
to be come from the same insurer and have relatively comprehensive benefits
(T. Buchmueller, Carey, & Levy, 2013; Dafny, Ho, & Varela, 2013). One pos-
sible explanation for this is that consumers who have insurers through their
employer may not be very price sensitive, in part because employers subsidize
a large portion of employee premiums and in part because health benefits of-
fered by employers are tax-deductible (Powell, 2016). Another explanation may
be that consumers of employer-sponsored insurance may simply place high
value on access to a broad array of providers. Indeed, narrow network products
have generated significant controversy, with critics arguing that wider adoption
would represent a significant loss to consumer choice and has the potential to
adversely affect medical care.1 A third explanation may be that search frictions
and inertia prevent employees and firms from switching into narrow plans even
when they might benefit from the reduced cost of the smaller network. Finally,
offering a choice of plans may be costly for firms, who may face higher adminis-
trative fees and higher fixed costs from benefit design, negotiating with multiple
insurers, educating consumers, and collecting premiums (K. Bundorf, 2002). As
such, firms may be reluctant to offer narrow network products alongside broad
network products unless they can ensure a substantial share of workers will
take-up the plans.
In order to encourage larger firm take-up of lower cost insurance products,
policymakers have proposed a “High Cost Health Plan” tax, otherwise known
as the “Cadillac Tax.” This policy, which was initially set to begin in 2018 but
was delayed until 2020, imposes a 40% excise tax on all health plans with an-
nual premiums exceeding $10,200 for individuals and $27,500 for families. Pro-
ponents argue that this tax would curb health care cost growth by inhibiting
1See for instance, commentary in Politico. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/doctors-
the-new-gop-weapon-in-obamacare-fight-100617.html
2
employer and insurer ability to offer expensive insurance plans, and perhaps
even incentivizing them to make investments in more efficient products, such
as narrow networks. Critics argue, however, that the tax would instead result
in significant welfare loss, with consumers either being moved into plans that
they do not value or with firms passing on the additional costs of the tax in the
form of even higher premiums.2 Whether or not the welfare changes from being
moved to a new menu of products exceeds the change in health spending de-
pends critically on how sensitive consumers are to the price of their plans, how
much consumers value the networks of providers they have access to, and how
costly it is for firms to alter their product menu.
To study these issues, I estimate a model of supply and demand for health in-
surance plans for a large-group purchaser in Massachusetts, where I endogenize
the employer’s choice of menu of products (in particular, the insurers offered
and the networks of those insurers). On the demand side, I model consumer
demand for hospitals and physician practices, and then consumer demand for
insurance plans. On the supply side, I model the employer and insurer deci-
sion on a set of products and provider networks to offer to its enrollees and
customers, with employers incurring a fixed cost for each product combination
offered. After estimating these model primitives, I run the counterfactual: how
would the employer’s product offerings, plan premiums, and consumer welfare
change at various thresholds of a hypothetical “Cadillac Tax?”
To estimate the model, I use claims data from the Massachusetts All-Payer
Claims Database (APCD). These data provide detailed information on the med-
ical claims of each insurer licensed to operate in the state of Massachusetts, in-
2http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/upshot/the-cadillac-tax-loved-by-economists-
and-few-others.html
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cluding diagnosis and procedure codes for each provider visit, individual iden-
tifiers, provider identifiers, and a wide variety of payment variables. I focus
specifically on the claims and choices of one particular employer group: the
Group Insurance Commission (GIC). The GIC is a large purchaser of health in-
surance in Massachusetts, offering coverage to approximately 300,000 enrollees
a year, including active state government employees, as well as retirees and the
employees of several municipalities. In this way, it acts as both a type of social
planner and as a sort of employer Exchange, offering various products to all
employees who participate in the group. The GIC is an ideal setting for study-
ing the welfare effects of narrow network products for many reasons. First, the
GIC has, in the last several years, been active in encouraging the creation and
adoption of narrow network products, allowing me to estimate demand for in-
surance plans on a large section of the demand curve, rather than relying on
minor differences between coverage of broad network products. In addition, in
2012, the GIC offered a three-month “premium-holiday” offering all state em-
ployees three months of free coverage if they switched from a broad-network
to a narrow network product (Gruber & McKnight, 2016). This policy change,
along with a five-year sample of choices of both new and existing enrollees on
the GIC, allows me to separately identify consumer valuation of networks from
plan inertia (i.e. wanting to remain on the same plan year-after-year), which has
not previously been done in an employer market setting.3
This paper relates to several strands of literature. These include models of
product entry, innovation, and variety that endogenize firm product quality
choices (Nosko, 2014; Eizenberg, 2014; Mohapatra & Chatterjee, 2015), litera-
3The exception is Handel 2013, which studies the impact of plan inertia in an employer set-
ting. However, Handel studied a market in which the variation in networks between plans was
minimal, and thus was not considered explicitly in the analysis.
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ture on the growing consolidation and bargaining power of physician groups
(A. C. Dunn & Shapiro, 2014; Hausman & Lavetti, 2016; Kleiner, White, & Lyons,
2015; Baker, Bundorf, & Royalty, 2014), insurance plan choice, competition, and
provision (Ericson & Starc, 2015b, 2016; Dafny, 2010; Dafny, Duggan, & Rama-
narayanan, 2012; Dafny et al., 2013; Scheffler, Arnold, Fulton, & Glied, 2016),
network formation (Ho, 2006, 2009; Shepard, 2016; Lee & Fong, 2013), and the
effects of insurance plan networks (Gruber & McKnight, 2016; LoSasso & At-
wood, 2015; Dafny, Hendel, & Wilson, 2015; Ericson & Starc, 2015a). Of partic-
ular importance is Shepard (2016), who uses a similar model to study whether
adverse selection leads to the narrowing of networks on the individual market.
Also of note is Prager (2016), who uses the Massachusetts APCD to estimate a
bargaining model between insurers and hospitals and uses these estimates to
simulate the effect of raising GIC tier levels on negotiated prices between insur-
ers and providers (Prager, 2016).
I offer three main contributions to the existing literature. The first is that this
is, to my knowledge, the first paper to model consumer demand for insurance
plans incorporating valuations for physician practice networks in addition to
hospital networks. Much of the existing literature on networks has exclusively
focused on hospitals (Ho, 2009; Shepard, 2016; Prager, 2016) and has ignored
the role of physicians in determining consumer choice of insurance plans. This
is likely due to three factors. First, until recently, physician markets were of-
ten thought to be less interesting than hospital markets, as physicians had very
little bargaining power to leverage high prices from insurance plans. Second
is the sheer dimensionality of the problem: whereas there are typically a small
number of hospitals in any given market, there are often thousands of physi-
cians of various specialties, rendering the study of physician markets difficult
5
in structural IO models. Finally, there is the lack of available data allowing re-
searchers to both link individual physicians to their respective medical groups
and construct physician networks of insurance plans.
I circumvent these issues by merging the APCD with proprietary data from
the SK&A in order to create linkages between physicians and group practices,
hospitals, and health systems. Using these linkages as well as publicly available
data on hospital and medical group networks from the GIC, I am able to create a
dataset of physician networks on each insurance plan offered over time. More-
over, by affiliating each individual physician to a set of practice groups, I am
able to significantly reduce the dimensionality problem by estimating demand
on for larger physician entities rather than individual physicians themselves.
I model demand for physician practices of three different specialty groups:
primary care physicians, cardiologists, and orthopedists. Together, these spe-
cialties comprise approximately 65% of all physician office visits.4 The model
follows the existing literature in estimating network “willingness-to-pay” for
provider networks from a multinomial logit choice model (Capps & Dranove,
2004; Ho, 2006; Shepard, 2016; Prager, 2016; Gowrisankaran, Nevo, & Town,
2015). I construct such measures for each of these specialties separately, and
then use these measures to estimate consumer demand for health plans on the
GIC. I find that physician networks explain a considerable portion of consumer
valuations of overall plan networks, with plans that have larger physician net-
works attracting more consumers, even conditional on hospital network. On
average, single-member households are willing to pay between $19 and $50 per
month to move from a narrow network plan to a broad network plan, where ap-
proximately 80% of value comes specifically from the physician network. More-
4https : //www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ahcd/namcssummary/2013namcswebtables.pdf
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over, consumers are extremely loyal to their primary care physicians, with about
67% of consumers preferring to seek care from a physician they used previously.
These results imply that estimates of consumer price sensitivity may be biased
downward if physician networks are ignored. In other words, consumers of-
ten select into broad network plans, not because they are insensitive to price,
but because they wish to keep their physicians. This, in turn, gives employers
an incentive to offer narrow network plans that cut high-cost hospitals, but not
necessarily high-cost physicians.
A second contribution is that I use the differences in choices made between
new cohorts entering the GIC and existing members from prior years, along
with the changing plan choice set for consumers across years, in order to iso-
late the effect of plan inertia from the willingness-to-pay for provider networks.
The method for doing so is similar in spirit to previous work in Medicare Part
D (Polyakova, 2016), the employer insurance market (Handel, 2013), and the in-
dividual insurance market (Shepard, 2016). The main difference in my analysis
is that I provide dollarized switching cost measure in an employer setting with
varying provider networks, as opposed varying levels of deductibles and cost-
sharing. Indeed, I find that new consumers entering the GIC for the time make
very different choices from those who have been on the group previously, opt-
ing to select into narrower network insurance plans at much higher rates. My
model estimates that households, on average, would be willing to pay approx-
imately $272 per month to remain on the same plan they were in the previous
year, a considerable increase from existing estimates.
Finally, this paper is the first to endogenize employer choice of plans and
provider networks to offer to their enrollees, and the first that allows firms to
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adjust both the number of insurance plans offered as well as the provider net-
works of existing plans. This allows me to simulate the effect of policies not only
on premiums and consumer switching patterns, but also on plan choice sets and
the quality of insurance products. To do so, I specify an objective function for
both insurers and employers in choosing a set of plans, assuming that each plan
offered incurs a fixed cost of plan administration. I estimate the fixed costs
of offering multiple plans using a bounded estimation, revealed-preference ap-
proach (Pakes, Porter, Ho, & Ishii, 2015), and subsequently used in the in-
dustrial organization literature for markets including computers (Eizenberg,
2014; Nosko, 2014), pharmaceuticals (Mohapatra & Chatterjee, 2015), and smart-
phones (Fan & Yang, 2016). I find that fixed costs for the GIC range from ap-
proximately $1.15 to $6.64 million dollars per year. Though quite larger in an
absolute sense, these estimates are a small share of the GIC’s overall spending
on medical claims, and are within the range of published estimates reported by
insurers. They explain why firms may not offer narrow network products, even
when consumers would benefit from their inclusion in their choice sets. Indeed,
my model predicts that without fixed costs, firms would benefit by offering nar-
row network plans much earlier than they currently do. This is consistent with
results from previous literature showing that firms might improve consumer
surplus by expanding choice sets (Dafny et al., 2013).
I then use these estimates to conduct several policy-relevant counterfactual
exercises designed to incentivize employer groups to reduce health care expen-
ditures. The first is I simulate firm choices of insurance plans under various
assumptions on enrollee inertia. I find that a model of supply that assumes
the GIC considers enrollee inertia as welfare-relevant when choosing products
explains the products offered in the data quite well. For the most part, this
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model rationalizes the GIC’s choice on which insurers to offer, whether or not
to offer narrow network plans, and the relative size of those networks. How-
ever, a model in which the employer ignores enrollee inertia would lead the
GIC to drop all broad network plans and offer only the narrowest plans that
satisfy Massachusetts state law, as the cost savings associated with these prod-
ucts exceed the welfare loss that would be seen from a strict price-versus-choice
tradeoff.
I next simulate the effects of the proposed Cadillac Tax on expensive health
plans. The actual tax, as proposed in the Affordable Care Act (ACA), was set to
begin with its thresholds for individuals’ annual premiums at $10,200 in 2018.
Pizer et al. found that, assuming a 6% annual medical care inflation rate (which
is on the conservative side by historical standards), the 2009 value of this thresh-
old was approximately $5,845 for individual premiums (Pizer, Frakt, & Iezzoni,
2011).5 I therefore consider the effects of a tax levied on premiums exceeding
$6,000 annually (or an enrollee contribution of $125 per month) at 40% (the rate
proposed by the law), as well as 20%, 60%, and 80%. I find that, in the short-
term, a particularly large tax of 60% above this threshold induces the GIC to
move to the equilibrium described in the “no inertia” scenario above. In addi-
tion to dropping each of its broad network plans in favor of narrow network
products, the group also drops its overall number of products offered as the
fixed costs of offering multiple plans exceed the surplus gained by retaining
them. This results in an approximately a 21% reduction in total health care
spending, or $76 pmpm. Consumer welfare from a strict price-versus-choice
tradeoff (i.e. ignoring inertia or passivity) implies a welfare loss of $58 pmpm
on average.
5http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/how-a-cadillac-tax-becomes-a-chevy-tax/
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The implication of these results is that inducing employers to offer expanded
choice sets including narrow network products would require very large price
incentives to counteract substantial consumer inertia. Moreover, large fixed
costs of offering additional plans imply that firms are unlikely to offer narrow
network plans without also eliminating existing broad network ones. However,
from a social welfare perspective that views consumer inertia as inattentiveness,
such a tax may actually have potential to achieve social welfare gains of approx-
imately $18 per member per month, despite the elimination of broad network
products.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides some background on
provider consolidation in Massachusetts, as well as the increasing prevalence
of insurer innovation, narrow networks, and policy proposals to address ris-
ing health care costs. Section 3 outlines the data and sample selection for the
empirical analysis. Section 4 presents my model, estimation, and identification.
Section 5 details the parameter estimates, as well as the model fit. Section 6
presents the results of the effect of the Cadillac Tax on employer product choice,
medical spending, and consumer welfare. Section 7 concludes.
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1.2 Background
1.2.1 Provider Consolidation and the Rise in Medical Care
Prices
The Massachusetts health care market is one of the most prolific provider
markets in the U.S. Much of this is due to the presence of a large number of
elite providers, academic medical center, and provider practice groups. In re-
cent years, many of these groups have been consolidating into larger health
systems (including Partners healthcare, which owns many of the state’s aca-
demic medical centers such as Massachusetts General Hospital and Brigham
and Women’s Hospital), large provider groups (such Harvard Vanguard, Action
Medical Associates, and Atrius Health), and hospital-owned practices (such the
MGH Physicians Organization). This consolidation has resulted in a rapid in-
crease in the unit-price of health care, and has made Massachusetts not only one
of the most prestigious, but one of the most expensive markets in the country.
Figures 1 shows the variation in the average prices paid to physician prac-
tices and hospitals in 2011. The y axis in both figures represents the average
negotiated price paid to the particular practice or hospital relative to the mean
price paid across all providers. There is considerable variation in prices paid
in both figures, with the top providers able to negotiate rates that are approx-
imately 40-50% higher than the average in the market. It is also notable that
of the top 6 hospitals able to exercise this negotiating leverage, 4 of them are
owned by the Partners health system. The Mass General Physicians Organiza-
tion is also similarly able to charge higher prices, in part due to its affiliation
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with Mass General Hospital and ownership by Partners.
This consolidation is not just limited to Massachusetts, however. Across the
country, hospital systems have been merging and have faced a litany of fed-
eral merger litigation (Gowrisankaran et al., 2015; Gaynor & Town, 2012; Town,
Wholey, Feldman, & Burns, 2006). The effects of this hospital consolidation has
been extensively studied, with the literature overwhelmingly pointing to no-
table increases in negotiated prices between hospital and insurers in markets
with higher hospital concentration (Town, Wholey, Feldman, & Burns, 2008;
Melnick & Keeler, 2007; Moriya, Vogt, & Gaynor, 2010) and following hospi-
tal mergers (Gowrisankaran et al., 2015; Capps & Dranove, 2004; Dafny, 2009;
Town et al., 2006; Dafny, Ho, & Lee, 2016).
Similar to the hospital market, the physician market has also been consol-
idating in recent decades as solo-practitioners have either been abandoning
fee-for-service models in order to become salaried employees of hospitals, or
have otherwise been merging into large medical practice groups (Baker et al.,
2014; Kleiner et al., 2015). However, despite the fact that physician services
account for nearly the same proportion of national health expenditures as hos-
pital spending,6 there has been little research attempting to including physician
networks into a model of demand for health insurance.7
Physician markets, however, differ in critical ways from hospital markets.
While about 82% of Americans had contact with a health care professional in
6In 2014, hospital care accounted for approximately $972 billion (including out-
patient care) while physician expenditures accounted for approximately $604 bil-
lion. https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf
7Some studies have looked, however, at the effect of physician consolidation on negotiated
prices. See (Kleiner et al., 2015; Hausman & Lavetti, 2016; Baker et al., 2014; A. C. Dunn &
Shapiro, 2014) for such evidence.
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(a) Hospitals
(b) Medical Groups
Figure 1.1: Variation in Provider Prices per Visit
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2012, only about 7.6% had an overnight inpatient stay at a hospital.8 This
likely makes physicians network an important component of consumer de-
mand. Moreover, physicians interact with insurers in fundamentally different
ways than do hospitals. While hospitals’ reimbursements are determined based
on the diagnosis of the patient, most physicians and practice groups are paid
on a fee-for-service basis, and receive different negotiated amounts for each
procedure performed. This gives physicians an incentive to overprescribe ser-
vices, leading to overutilization of medical care, which is a significant driver
of health care costs. When forming networks, insurers may therefore take into
account not only the prices the practice groups would demand but also the av-
erage number of services per patient provided by the practice. Finally, insurers
may have an interest in spanning a characteristic space of procedures and ser-
vices within any given market. This means that oftentimes a smaller physician
practice that performs a highly specialized service may be able to extract higher
prices from insurers, despite attracting fewer patients than a larger practice that
performs more general services.
1.2.2 Insurer Innovation and Narrow Networks
In response to these rapidly growing health care costs, insurance plans have
increasingly turned to “value-based” insurance designs in an effort to steer pa-
tients towards lower cost providers. These designs include high-deductible
health plans (HDHPs), narrow networks, tiered networks, reference pricing, ac-
countable care organizations (ACOs), and others. The goal of such designs is
generally to steer patients to lower cost health care providers by either forcing
8http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/physician-visits.htm
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them to pay a higher out-of-pocket cost for care (HDHPs) or by actually pro-
hibiting them from visiting the most expensive providers (narrow networks).
While the popularity of narrow network plans has been growing in the indi-
vidual market and, in particular, in the health insurance exchanges (HIE), they
have not grown as rapidly in the employer market. However, certain large em-
ployer groups and benefit managers have begun offering their employees in-
creased choice of insurance plans and have pushed for the inclusion of more
narrow network products. The Group Insurance Commission (GIC) in Mas-
sachusetts, the market I study in this paper, is one of those employer groups,
and in recent years, it has aggressively encouraged participating insurers to de-
sign and offer narrow network products. Table 1 shows the plan offerings on the
GIC by year. Throughout my sample period (2009 through 2013), six insurers
participated on the GIC. In 2009 and 2010, four of those insurers offered narrow
network products with varying degrees of network breadth. In 2011, both re-
maining insurers (Harvard Pilgrim and Tufts Health Plan) introduced narrow
network products as well. These plans are approximately 20% cheaper on aver-
age than their respective broad network plans, though they are still fairly more
broad than narrow network products offered in other market segments (such as
Massachusetts’ individual exchange, the Connector) by the same insurers.
Though the GIC has promoted the adoption of narrow network products, en-
rollment in these products was fairly limited in 2011 and health care spending
continued to rise. As a result, in 2012, the GIC offered a three-month “premium
holiday” for all active state employees who chose to switch to a narrow network
plan. This premium holiday was fairly successful, resulting in approximately
10% of enrollees to switch (Gruber & McKnight, 2016). However, even with the
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Table 1.1: GIC Products By Year
Insurer Network 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Fallon Narrow x x x x x
Fallon Broad x x x x x
HPHC Narrow x x x
HPHC Broad x x x x x
HNE Narrow x x x x x
HNE Broad
NHP Narrow x x x x x
NHP Broad
Tufts Narrow x x x
Tufts Broad x x x x x
Unicare Narrow x x x x x
Unicare Broad x x x x x
Notes: GIC product offerings by year. “Broad”
refers to whether the plan covers every provider in
the state of Massachusetts and “narrow” refers to if
the provider contracts selectively with providers.
switch, the GIC had to implement several additional changes in the following
years to combat rising health care prices. In particular, in fiscal year 2015, the
GIC converted Tufts Navigator and Harvard Pilgrim Independence (both broad
network plans) from Preferred-Provider-Organization (PPO) plans to Point-of-
Service (POS) plans, the latter requiring patients to select primary care providers
and obtain referrals to specialists. They also raised deductibles for all plans by
$50 per year, raised copays for high-tiered providers, and raised the enrollee
share of premiums for employees hired prior to July 1, 2003 from 20% to 25%.
In the subsequent year, the GIC completely closed Harvard Pilgrim’s broad net-
work plan to new enrollment, due to overwhelming increases in premiums from
the plan. Executive Director Dolores Mitchell noted that “Harvard has been a
disappointment for the past two years, not only on their own terms, but in com-
parison to other plans as well.” She noted that over the past two years, Harvard
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had requested a 9% increase in premiums each year.9 This suggests that while
narrow network products may be effective at reducing health spending, while
offered alongside broad network plans, additional incentives might be neces-
sary in order to stimulate cost reductions.
1.2.3 Public Policy and Cadillac Tax
In an effort to stimulate cost reductions among insurers and employers, a
Cadillac Tax was passed as part of the ACA. The policy is an excise tax on
high-cost health plans (plans with premiums in excess of $10,800 for individuals
and $27,500 for families) aimed at the dual objective of raising government rev-
enues and also encouraging plan sponsors to develop and switch to less costly
health insurance. Although currently these thresholds are set quite high and
would likely only affect unusually expensive plans offered primarily by unions
and municipal governments (Claxton & Levitt, 2015), policymakers believe that
over time the tax would apply to a greater variety of health insurance products,
which would encourage insurers and employers to innovate more efficient, low-
cost products (such as narrow network plans) (Gravelle, 2015).
According to proponents of the tax, the widespread use of expensive health
insurance products by employers is in part due to the tax benefit received by
employers for offering more expensive insurance plans. However, it is likely
also due to the fact that purchasers of employer-sponsored tend to be older
and less price-sensitive than purchasers in other markets, and that enrollee in-
ertia in health insurance markets plans plays a critical role in driving demand.
The tax could, in theory, correct for this by making it more expensive to offer
9http://www.capeplymouthbusiness.com/news/show/7420
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such products, leading to a significant reduction in both health care spending
(through the use of less expensive providers) and health care prices (through
a bargaining effect that insurers would gain from enrollees switching to lower-
cost plans).10 Jason Furman, chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, wrote
of the tax, “Many employers will probably focus on encouraging more efficient
care delivery by deploying innovative payment models, directly complement-
ing public-sector efforts, and finding creative ways to steer patients towards
more efficient providers, investments that were often difficult to justify when
the federal government was picking up much of the tab for inefficient care.”11
Opponents, however, believe that the products that firms would switch to
would lead to significant reductions in consumer welfare, with losses that ex-
ceed the reductions in health care spending. Narrow networks, for instance, are
widely viewed as disruptive to patient care and as products that penalize pri-
marily older and sicker individuals. In addition, many commentators believe
that the tax would be primarily passed through to consumers in the form of
higher premiums (through increased enrollee share contributions) or higher de-
ductibles, rather than a move towards narrow networks or other forms of steer-
ing patients to more efficient providers. While certain forms of cost-sharing may
indeed induce welfare gains through reduced negotiated prices (Prager, 2016),
plans with higher deductibles often delay needed care rather than incentivizing
consumers to be more effective shoppers of health care (Brot-Goldberg, Chan-
dra, Handel, & Kolstad, 2015).
The GIC itself has commented on the impending Cadillac Tax: “There are
many ways an employer can reduce exposure to the Cadillac tax, but there are
10The focus of this paper is on the former effect (i.e. steering to low-cost providers), though fu-
ture work will consider the effect of the tax on negotiated rates between insurers and providers
11http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/04/25/about-that-cadillac-tax/
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some troubling policy implications. Limited networks, which exclude higher
cost facilities, are effective in reducing costs, but limited networks alone will not
solve the problem of high health care costs. Increasing employee cost-sharing
sharply reduces plan costs but leaves members exposed to financially ruinous
bills.”
The question, then, of how such a tax would affect social surplus is ambigu-
ous. It depends on (a) whether a tax is likely to cause firms to switch to low-
cost insurance plans rather than pass on the additional premiums to consumers
and (b) how consumers value counterfactual plans and networks relative to the
spending reductions they might achieve.
1.3 Data
I use two primary data sources to conduct the analyses in this paper: the
Massachusetts All-Payer Claims Database (APCD) and the SK&A database of
physicians. I now describe each of these datasets in detail.
1.3.1 Massachusetts All-Payer Claims Data
The APCD is a comprehensive database of medical claims from public and
private payers in Massachusetts from 2009-2013. It contains detailed informa-
tion on both hospital and physician visits, with variables indicating the patient’s
primary and secondary diagnoses (through ICD9 codes), procedures performed
(CPT codes), patient demographics (including patient and provider 5-digit zip
codes, which allow me to estimate the effect of distance on provider demand),
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longitudinal patient identifiers, physician and facility identifiers, physician spe-
cialty, insurance and plan identifiers, and a wide variety of payment variables.
Importantly, these payment variables contain not only the amount paid by the
insurer and the out-of-pocket amounts paid by the patient for the medical ser-
vice, but also the “allowed amount.” This variable refers to the maximum allow-
able payment the insurer can make to a provider for any particular service. In
other words, it is the negotiated rate between an insurance company and either
a physician or a hospital. Most hospital admission data contain only variables
depicting “charges,” or what the hospital’s list price is for a particular illness.
However, these are rarely the prices that are actually paid, and therefore are an
inaccurate representation of an insurer’s marginal costs. By observing the al-
lowed amounts, the APCD affords me the opportunity to more precisely depict
what insurers pay each provider, and therefore how insurer costs might change
under counterfactual networks.
I use the APCD to construct several different subsamples pertaining to dif-
ferent stages of the model that I then estimate.
Hospital Admissions
The first sample is the sample of hospital admissions, which I use to estimate
the patient demand for hospitals, described in more detail in the next section.
To construct this data, I limit the APCD to any facility claim flagged as an in-
patient admission between the five-year sample period and to any hospital that
is located within the state of Massachusetts. I therefore exclude any admission
of patients receiving hospital care outside the state (regardless of whether the
patient resides in Massachusetts or not). For each hospital, I used the organiza-
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tion’s National Provider Identification (NPI) number to match the hospital to a
set of hospital characteristics from the American Hospital Association (AHA)
Annual Survey. These characteristics include the type of hospital (teaching,
critical-access, academic medical center, specialty, etc.) and hospital amenities
(including number of beds and types of services offered). The data is aggre-
gated to the hospital admission level, and the “allowed amounts” are summed
over all service-lines for that particular admission, in order to construct a price-
per-visit. For each admission, I link the primary diagnosis (ICD-9 code) to a
set of Chronic Conditions Indicators (CCI) and Clinical Classifications Software
(CCS) categories. These are indicators provided by the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ) that allow me to aggregate diagnosis codes into
a set of 18 distinct groups, and also to flag which patients suffer from chronic
conditions.
Table 2 contains the hospital sample summary statistics for hospital admis-
sions from 2009-2013. On average, patients admitted to Massachusetts hospitals
are 52 years old, and about half of the patients suffer from a chronic condition.
Approximately 16% of patients are admitted with a primary cardiac condition,
while about 22% are admitted with an obstetrics-related diagnosis. Patients are,
on average, willing to travel approximately 10 miles to visit a hospital, and visit
teaching hospitals approximately 74% of the time, while visiting academic med-
ical centers approximately one-quarter of the time.
Physician Visits
The second constructed sample from the APCD is used to estimate the physi-
cian demand portion of the model. I construct it by limiting the data to pro-
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Table 1.2: Hospital Sample Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev
Patient Characteristics
Age 52.14 25.98
Female 0.58 0.49
Chronic 0.53 0.49
Neurological 0.02 0.15
Cardiac 0.16 0.37
Obstetrics 0.22 0.42
Imaging 0.27 0.44
Hospital Characteristics
Distance 9.95 12.06
NICU 0.87 0.33
Neuro 0.96 0.19
MRI 0.90 0.30
Critcal Access 0.01 0.08
Teaching 0.74 0.44
Specialty 0.02 0.14
Academic Medical Center 0.25 0.43
Would Recommend 0.74 0.12
Notes: Hospital sample summary statistics.
fessional claims only. These capture reimbursements specifically to medical
providers that are separate from reimbursements for facilities, even though the
particular service may have been performed in a facility. This includes patient
visits to independent offices, larger medical groups, or non-inpatient visits to
hospitals, outpatient centers, or clinics within hospitals such that a separate
claim is generated to pay individual physicians. The data is then merged with
SK&A data on physician affiliations (described in more detail below), and each
individual practitioner is assigned to their primary medical group. After con-
structing these practice groups, I then stratify the data into three different spe-
cialty groups: primary care physicians, cardiologists, and orthopedists. Pri-
mary care practices are defined as any medical group that contains at least one
physician that is either an internist, general practitioner, family practice doctor,
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pediatrician, or geriatric doctor. Similarly, cardiology practices and orthopedic
practices are defined as any practice that employs at least one physician of the
relevant specialty. I consider these three specialties in order to capture three
different component of medical care: primary care, which is the most common
type of visit to a health care provider (at about 55% of all office visits), medi-
cal specialty care primarily performed in office-based settings (exemplified by
cardiology), and surgical care primarily performed in facility-based settings (ex-
emplified by orthopedics).
For each service-line, I merge in Medicare Part B physician fee schedules
from CMS. These data contain annual federal updates to each procedure code’s
“Relative-Value-Unit” (RVU) weight. These weights are constructed in order
to assign each service an approximate measure capturing its relative intensity
to other procedures. They are subsequently used to determine Medicare pay-
ment rates (described in more detail in the next section), and are also an in-
put in determining private payer negotiated rates for physician care. I then
finally aggregate the data to the patient-visit level, summing over all the RVU
weights of each service provided during a visit and summing over all the “al-
lowed amounts” for each service to determine a total payment per visit.
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the physician samples. On average
patients going to see primary care physicians (PCPs) are younger and have a
higher likelihood of being female than those going to specialists or surgeons.
This is most likely due to the fact that OB/GYNs are considered primary care
practitioners. Average RVUs for orthopedic services are higher than for PCPs
and cardiologists, with significantly higher standard deviations. This reflects
the fact that while orthopedists often perform routine office-based procedures,
23
they also perform surgeries which are more resource intensive and thus are as-
signed higher RVUs. About 67% of primary care patients saw a doctor between
2009 and 2013 that they also saw in the preceding year, while this number was
about 38% for cardiologists and about 30% for orthopedists. Distance traveled
to any of the specialty groups are all about 10 miles. When seeing a PCP or
orthopedist, patients on average tend to go to sites with approximately 50 doc-
tors, whereas cardiologists tend to form into larger groups with an average of
153 doctors at a site. This likely reflects the fact that patients tend to see cardiol-
ogists not in office-based settings, but in hospital settings, even if those cardiol-
ogists submit professional claims to insurers (i.e. non-facility claims).
Table 1.3: Physician Sample Summary Statistics
PCPs Cardiologists Orthopedists
Age 34.32 52.81 45.85
(22.80) (15.59) (17.52)
Female 0.58 0.41 0.53
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50)
RVU 2.07 2.17 3.82
(2.37) (3.53) (6.37)
Used Doc Last Year 0.67 0.38 0.30
(0.47) (0.49) (0.46)
Distance 8.50 10.63 9.57
(9.49) (12.81) (10.19)
Medical Group 0.84 0.67 0.62
(0.37) (0.47) (0.48)
Doctors on Site 54.10 153.57 56.90
(105.37) (229.40) (148.02)
Number of Locations 23.45 24.83 15.34
(32.81) (37.26) (34.02)
Total Doctors 187.92 160.78 103.36
(245.54) (230.42) (208.19)
Share Specialty 0.70 0.40 0.66
(0.26) (0.40) (0.38)
Physician sample summary statistics for primary care physicians, cardiol-
ogists, and orthopedic surgeons.
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GIC Member Sample
The final subsample constructed is a sample of GIC members by year, which
is used to estimate the insurance demand portion of the model. In addition
to claims data, the APCD contains an enrollment file, where each insurer pro-
vides a list of each of its enrollees by market, plan, and year. These files also
come with a rich set of enrollee demographics, including 5-digit zip code, age,
gender, employer industry code, employer zip code, monthly plan premium,
annual plan individual and family deductible, enrollment start date, and enroll-
ment end date. I limit this file to all enrollees who are part of the GIC between
2009 and 2013. The file also allows me to link individual enrollees to their family
members when estimating insurance demand. Finally, I merge this list of GIC
members to external data on GIC annual plan premiums and hospital networks.
An advantage of studying this particular market is that plan premiums are the
same for each member across the state, and only vary by family type (“Indi-
vidual” versus “Family”). Each year, the GIC publishes these premium rates
for each family type. It also publishes an annual list of the hospitals included
in each plan’s network for each of the commission’s narrow-network plans. I
merge this public information onto the enrollee dataset in order to obtain a full
set of plan characteristics for each enrollee. For the year 2012, the year of the
premium holiday, I assume that each active employee under the age of 65 pays
only 9 of the 12 months of the annual premium if they switch to a narrow net-
work plan in that year.
Table 4 shows the market shares and premiums for all the plans offered on
the GIC in 2012, the year after Harvard and Tufts both introduced narrow net-
work products. This also coincides with the first year of the premium holiday.
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The most expensive plans on the market are Unicare’s Indemnity plan, as well
as Harvard Independence (broad network) and Harvard Primary Choice (nar-
row network). Each insurer’s narrow network plans are priced an average of
20% below their own broad plans. The broad plans have the highest market
shares, with Tufts and Harvard each making up about 25%-30% of the market.
Their narrow plans, however, had much more limited enrollment in 2012, with
about 5% for Harvard Primary Choice and 2% for Tufts Spirit. This is up from
2% and 1%, respectively, in 2011, due in large part to the premium holiday in-
ducing members to switch to these narrow plans. One interesting note is that
despite having lower out-of-pocket premiums, Tufts Spirit had a significantly
lower market share than Harvard Primary Choice.12 This is a point that I will
return to below.
Table 1.4: GIC Summary Statistics, 2012
Insurer Network Coverage Market Share Individual Premium ($PMPM)
Fallon Select Broad 0.03 139.39
Fallon Direct Narrow 0.02 112.97
Harvard Independence Broad 0.21 163.98
Harvard Primary Choice Narrow 0.05 131.50
Health New England Narrow 0.06 110.34
Neighborhood Health Plan Broad 0.02 113.02
Tufts Navigator Broad 0.27 148.43
Tufts Spirit Narrow 0.02 119.06
Unicare Indemnity Broad 0.13 247.07
Unicare Plus Broad 0.08 207.27
Unicare Community Choice Narrow 0.10 111.61
Number of Enrollees in GIC 293,125
Average Age 36.07
Average Subscriber Age 48.04
GIC plans for 2012. Average premiums refer to the enrollee share of the per-member-per-month
premiums (25% of the overall premium).
There is also significant heterogeneity in terms of who is enrolling in narrow
network plans. Figure 2 depicts the share of GIC consumers enrolling in nar-
12Though 5% versus 2% market share seems low, this represents a difference in almost 12,000
members
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row network plans by year and by whether they were new to the GIC that year
(i.e. “active choosers”) or whether they were existing GIC members who are
automatically re-enrolled in their current plan unless they take action (i.e. “pas-
sive choosers”). In 2010, the share of enrollment of active choosers and passive
choosers in narrow network plans both hovered around 10%. In 2011, once the
GIC introduced Harvard Primary Choice and Tufts Spirit narrow network prod-
ucts, enrollment in narrow network plans remained about 10% for those who
had been enrolled in 2010, but spiked to about 30% among new GIC members.
This suggests that the high enrollment in broad networks is in driven in part
by inertia. In 2012, the share of active choosers on narrow networks remained
the same as in 2011, but the share of passive choosers enrolling in narrow net-
work plans rose due to the implementation of the premium holiday. As this
was geared directly at passive choosers, it makes sense that the three-month dis-
count incentivized these members to switch towards the narrow network plans.
I use these sources of variation (within-year across-individual and across-year-
within-individual) to help identify consumers’ valuation of broad networks and
sensitivity to price separately from that of inertia or inattentiveness.
In addition to observing the choices of new members versus existing mem-
bers each year, the plan choice set for all enrollees changed considerably over
time. Between 2009 and 2010, the GIC converted both the Tufts and Harvard
broad network plans to “tiered network” systems, which increased the copay-
ments for members choosing expensive physicians and hospitals. The effects of
these tiering mechanisms on negotiated prices is explored in detail by Prager
(2016). In 2011, two new narrow network plans entered the market. In 2012,
the GIC introduced the premium holiday, which significantly discounted nar-
row network plans relative to broad network plans. Within narrow network
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Figure 1.2: Share of People in Narrow Network Plans by Year and Whether New
to GIC
products, the set of doctors and hospitals changed year over year.
The final change in choice set occurred in premiums between broad network
plans. In 2010, the premiums for Harvard and Tufts were fairly similar, while
beginning in 2011, the premium difference between the two plans began to rise.
Figure 3 shows the change in market share of enrollees in the Tufts broad net-
work plan over time by whether the enrollee was a new member to the GIC or
an existing member from a prior year. The lines report the family premiums for
the Harvard and Tufts broad network plans. It is notable that as Harvard’s pre-
miums rise relative to Tufts’ premiums, enrollment in Tufts rises dramatically
among new members to the GIC. By 2013, as the premium difference between
Harvard and Tufts reached about $30 per month, Tufts’ market share among
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new members increased to about 48%, significantly exceeding that of Harvard’s
21%. Existing members, however, exhibit no such changes in enrollment pat-
terns. Between 2010 and 2011, Tufts’ market share among existing members
falls, due primarily to the fact that Harvard saw a major spike in enrollment
among new members in 2010 (when premiums for each plan were nearly iden-
tical). Thereafter, Tufts’ market share among existing members barely budged,
even as the premium differences widened.
Taken together, these two figures provide some suggestive evidence that
new enrollees react more significantly to change in prices and choice sets than
existing members, and that consumers do exhibit a significant degree of price
sensitivity in these employer markets. These empirical facts motivate my inclu-
sion of inertia in the model, described in the next section.
1.3.2 SK&A
In order to link physicians to their practices, I use proprietary data from the
SK&A database for 2009 and 2013. The database includes information on each
individual physician’s name, location, specialty, NPI, affiliated medical group,
affiliated hospital, and affiliated health system. It also contains characteristics
for the site of the physician practice, including number of physicians on staff,
the specialty of the practice, and the number of physicians on staff across all the
locations of the particular medical group. The SK&A includes approximately
95% of all office-based physicians practicing in the United States, and the data
is verified by the proprietors over the telephone.
Given the breadth of the data as well as the inconsistencies in reporting be-
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Figure 1.3: Share of Members Enrolling in Tufts Broad Network Plan by
Whether New to GIC
tween the APCD and SK&A, linking the two datasets involved several steps.
First, I matched every available physician in the SK&A to the APCD via the
NPI variable and provider zip-code variables in each dataset. This ensures that
all the matches were not only to the correct physician, but also to the correct
practice location for each physician. In cases where this did not match, I then
matched only by the NPI and assumed that the closest location in the SK&A to
that where the service was rendered in the APCD was the correct practice.
However, not all insurers in the APCD report physician NPIs, opting instead
to bill using the organizational NPI. For instance, Health New England only re-
ports the NPI for the hospital or medical group when processing claims. Given
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that the SK&A only contains individual doctors’ NPIs, in instances where this
occurs, I conduct an iterative string-matching algorithm to match the medical
practice data. I use the first and last name fields in the APCD and match the
provider’s names and zip codes to the names and zip codes from the SK&A.
For all records that did not match, I then match only by first and last name.
Then I repeat this just for last name and zip code. These set of steps allowed
me to match approximately 80% of the claims from the APCD to an appropriate
physician from the SK&A.
After completing this procedure, I define two different variables. The first
is a “practice” variable, which is the unit used in the demand analysis. This
variable refers to any particular physician-medical group-location triple in the
data that billed more than 50 claims in any particular year. If a medical group
was not reported in the SK&A or if the particular physician did not work for
a medical group, I consider the physician-hospital-location triple as the prac-
tice definition. These are physicians who are employed by hospitals but may
be billed for physician services separately (for example if they take outpatient
or office visits in the hospital clinic). If there is no medical group or hospi-
tal reported, I consider this variable to be just the physician-location double,
and assume the physician is a solo-practitioner. I assume that when selecting a
physician, individuals choose at this “practice” level.
The second variable I define is an “ownership” variable, which is used in
defining networks. This refers to the highest level of vertical integration for the
physician. If a particular physician’s highest reported ownership in the SK&A
is a medical group, then this variable is coded as the group. If the highest level
of ownership, is a particular hospital (i.e. a hospital owned physician practice),
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then this variable is coded as the hospital. Finally, if the highest level of own-
ership is reported as a health system (i.e. Partners Health Care, Steward Health
System), then this variable is coded as the system. In considering counterfac-
tual networks that the GIC could offer, I make the assumption that the insurers
contract at the “ownership” level. Therefore, if the GIC chooses to eliminate a
Partners physician, it must eliminate all physicians employed by the Partners
health system.
I then assign each physician a specialty according to the specialty reported
in either the APCD or the SK&A. For example, if a particular physician is re-
ported as a cardiologist in either dataset, I flag that physician as a cardiologist.
I consider any practice a cardiology practice if it employs at least one physician
flagged as a cardiologist, or if the SK&A reports that the practice is a cardiology
practice. I limit the sample to the 100 largest physician practices in each spe-
cialty (primary care, cardiology, and orthopedics) in terms of number of claims
submitted in a given year. This reflects approximately 50% of primary care
claims in a given year, and approximately 85% of both cardiology and ortho-
pedic claims. The remaining practices are considered part of the outside option.
The final task involves determining which physician practices are in a par-
ticular insurance plan’s network. While some GIC insurers actually report the
medical groups that they cover in their narrow networks (i.e. Fallon), others
only report the list of hospitals. I therefore assume for simplicity that if a partic-
ular hospital is excluded from a particular plan’s network, then any physician,
physician practice, or medical group that is owned by that particular hospital is
also excluded from the network. Similarly, as bargaining between insurers and
providers is typically done as the system level, I assume that if any particular
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system is excluded from a plan’s network in its entirety (e.g. if a particular plan
excluded all Partners hospitals), I assume that any physicians or groups that are
owned by Partners (even though they may not be affiliated with any particular
hospital) are also excluded. For any large medical group that is not affiliated
with a particular hospital or system (e.g. Atrius Health, Reliant Medical Group,
etc.), I conduct manual checks on the insurers’ websites to see whether these
groups are covered by the plans. For all remaining practices, if they are not
owned by any hospital or system, I assume they are in each plan’s network un-
less a majority of claims that are processed for these practices by a particular
plan is flagged as being “out of network.”
Figures 4 and 5 shows the hospital and primary care practice networks for a
select group of products available on the GIC in 2011: Harvard Independence
(broad network), Harvard Primary Choice (narrow network), and Tufts Spirit
(narrow network). The colors of the points on the maps refer to physician prac-
tices that are owned by the largest health systems in Massachusetts: Partners,
Steward, Atrius, Umass, Lahey, Baystate, and all other practices. The sizes of
the points are in proportion to total market share of the practice for the par-
ticular physician specialty. Looking at primary care practices, it is clear that
Partners and Atrius Health dominate much of the primary care physicians in
Massachusetts, which Partners owning 172 practices and Atrius owning ap-
proximately 51. Panel (a) of Figure 5 shows that these practices are largely
concentrated in eastern Massachusetts, particularly around Boston and the sur-
rounding suburbs. However, Atrius Health also owns practices in central Mas-
sachusetts. This is the result of Atrius having purchased Reliant Medical Group,
a large physician practice, in 2011.
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(a) Harvard / Tufts Broad (b) Harvard Narrow
(c) Tufts Narrow
Figure 1.4: Hospital Networks by Plan, 2011
Panels (b) and (c) of Figures 4 and 5 reveals that the Harvard and Tufts nar-
row network plans still cover a large number of hospitals and physicians in
Massachusetts. Interestingly, the hospital networks of both narrow plans are rel-
atively similar. The only major difference in hospitals was the dropping of most
Partners hospitals from each plan. However, as noted in Table 4, Harvard’s nar-
row plan has a significantly higher market share than the Tufts narrow network,
with almost three times the number of enrollees in 2012. Given that Tufts cov-
ers a larger number of hospitals, it is therefore unlikely that hospital networks
explain this discrepancy in market shares.
Turning to physician networks, however, provides more clues that might
help to explain these plan choices. Figure 5 reveals clearly that the Harvard
narrow physician network is considerably more comprehensive than the Tufts
narrow physician network. This is largely due to the fact that Harvard cov-
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(a) Harvard / Tufts Broad (b) Harvard Narrow
(c) Tufts Narrow
Figure 1.5: Primary Care Practice Networks by Plan, 2011
ers Atrius health, which owns Harvard Vanguard Medical Group in Boston.
This demonstrates that physician networks may be an important determinant
of plan choice. Moreover, given that Partners physicians were primarily located
in the Boston metro area, which also faces competition from Atrius, Lahey, Care
Group, as well as many independent and solo practitioners, its removal from
the network has minimal impact for choice of provider (as is shown later in the
model).
Appendix A.1 shows additional networks from Fallon Direct and Health
New England, both of which are considerably narrower than Harvard and Tufts.
The Appendix also shows additional maps for cardiology and orthopedic prac-
tice networks.
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1.4 Model
The model proceeds in four stages. A brief summary of these stages is as
follows:
1. Employers select a number of products to offer to their enrollees and the
network design of the plan. In selecting these plans, employers incur a
fixed cost of adding each additional product.
2. Given the products selected, employers set premiums for self-insured
products. Insurers set premiums for fully-insured products.
3. Consumers in each market select from the menu of insurance plans given
their network breadth and composition, premiums, and various quality
characteristics.
4. Consumers face some probability of contracting an illness, and based on
that illness, along with individual and provider characteristics, patients
select a hospital or doctor from one among their chosen insurance plan’s
network.
I now describe the model in detail from the latest stage through the earliest
stage.
1.4.1 Patient Demand for Providers
The final stage of the model involves patient i enrolled in insurance plan
j choosing a provider. The patient either has a condition that requires hospi-
tal care, l, in which case he or she chooses a hospital h from among the set of
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hospitals in insurance network NjH , or the patient requires procedure r from
specialist type s, in which case he or she chooses physician practice d among a
set of practices within that specialty within the plan’s network NjS . Consumer
utility for patient of type i, with either illness l or procedure r, from visiting a
provider takes the following form:
uilh = Tihλ1 + Tihvilλ2 + Tihxhλ3 + xhvilλ4 + 1iht=iht<1λ5 + γh︸ ︷︷ ︸
φilh (Hospitals)
+ilh (1.1)
uirds = Tidsλ1 + Tidsvirλ2 + Tidsxdλ3 + xdsvirλ4 + 1idst=idst<1λ5 + γds︸ ︷︷ ︸
φirds (Physician Specialty s)
+irds (1.2)
where xh is a vector of observed hospital characteristics, xds is a vector of
observed physician practice characteristics for specialty type s, vil and vir are
observed characteristics of patient i with diagnosis l or requiring procedure r,
Tids and Tih is the distance in miles from patient i’s location to provider d or h’s
location, γds and γh are provider fixed effects, and  are Type 1 Extreme Value
error terms. Finally, 1iht=iht<1 refers to whether patient i has used hospital h in
any year prior to t, and 1idst=idst<1 refers to whether individual i saw physician
practice d for specialty care s in any year prior to t.
The patient characteristics include 5-digit zip code, age, an indicator for fe-
male, patient diagnosis (in the case of hospital care), patient procedure required
(in case of physician care), and whether the patient has ever been treated for a
chronic condition.
For hospital care, patient diagnoses, l, are grouped into 18 Clinical Classi-
fication Software (CCS) categories. Chronic conditions are grouped according
to HCUP indicators mapping chronic conditions from ICD9 diagnosis codes.
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Given that my data spans 2009-2013, I define patient i in time t as having a
chronic condition if that patient has gone to see any provider at any time prior to
t for a diagnosis that is considered to be “chronic.” Each of the 18 diagnosis cate-
gories are further assigned numerical weights that proxy for the intensity of the
particular diagnosis (the construction of these weights follow closely to work
by Shepard; a discussion of their construction follow in Section 4.4.1). Hospital
characteristics include location, location, number of beds, whether the hospi-
tal had a NICU, whether the hospital provided imaging services (including an
MRI), and whether the hospital included a catheterization lab. I include indica-
tors for whether the hospital is a critical access hospital, a teaching hospital, a
specialty hospital (such as cancer center or children’s hospital), or whether the
hospital is an academic medical center. I further interact these hospital charac-
teristics with each of the 18 disease categories. In addition, I include a full set of
hospital fixed effects in the model to account for any unobserved quality com-
ponents of hospitals not captured by the model. In order to capture additional
heterogeneity, I interact these fixed effects with the numerical weights for the
patient diagnoses, in effect allowing patients with different disease severities to
prefer seeking care from different hospitals.
For patients requiring care from physician, I match procedure (CPT code)
to a Medicare RVU weight, r, which serves as a proxy for procedure intensity.
As described in Section 3.1.2, these weights are used by Medicare to calculate
payments for physicians under the Part B schedule, and thus serve as an ade-
quate measure of the intensity of service that a patient might require. For physi-
cian practice characteristics, I include a number of variables from the SK&A in-
cluding the number of doctors at the particular practice’s location, the number
doctors across all the practice’s locations, the share of the doctors at the prac-
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tice who are specialists (relative to primary-care physicians), and the number
of unique procedures performed at the practice. I interact each of these with
patient characteristics, including the patient’s RVU weight. I also include a full
set of practice fixed effects within each specialty group, and interact those fixed
effects with RVU weights.
The probability that patient i and diagnosis l will choose hospital h is thus
given by:
σilh =
exp(φilh)
NiH∑
k=1
exp(φilk)
(1.3)
where NiH refers to the number of hospitals in individual i’s network. Sim-
ilarly, the probability that patient i needing a procedure with RVU r from spe-
cialist group s will chose physician practice d is:
σirds =
exp(φirds)
NiS∑
k=1
exp(φirks)
(1.4)
where NiS is the network of practices of type s in individual i’s network.
Estimation and Identification
The patient choice of providers is estimated using maximum likelihood.
The model includes patient characteristics interacted with provider character-
istics, travel time interacted with both patient and provider characteristics, and
a full set of provider fixed effects (interacted with diagnosis/procedure intensity
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weights) in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity across the providers
in the data.
I run the model separately for hospitals and physician practices of various
specialties. In particular, I run the model separately for primary care practi-
tioners, cardiologists, and orthopedists. These all can be thought of as separate
markets that do not compete with one another. For instance, patients who re-
quire a procedure for knee surgery would be unlikely to select a cardiology
practice for that procedure. One limitation of this approach is that it abstracts
away from referral networks across specialties and between physician groups
and hospitals. Indeed, patients often seek care initially from their primary care
physicians, who may subsequently refer them to a cardiologist or orthopedist.
My model, by treating these specialty groups as independent, does not capture
these behaviors. This may bias the parameter estimates, particularly in the hos-
pital and specialist models (unlikely, however, in the primary care model) as
choice may be driven not by, say, distance, but by the recommendation of a pre-
viously used provider. Future work aims to quantify these physician referral
networks, and to see how these drive demand for different specialties.
Another problem is that there are thousands of physician practices within
each specialty group in Massachusetts. To reduce the dimensionality of the
problem, I narrow the scope of the demand model to the top 100 practices
within each group (in terms of the market share). All other physician prac-
tices are considered part of the outside option. This not only has the benefit of
making the model more easily estimable, but also is indicative of the fact that
most physician practices outside the ones with the highest market shares are
generally included in all plans’ networks (including the narrow network plans).
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Therefore, estimating how consumers will react to an insurance plan dropping
a particular physician practice is the most relevant for the largest practices. For
hospitals, I define the outside option to be any hospital outside of the state of
Massachusetts. I normalize the value of the outside option in each demand
model to be 0.
Each of the coefficients are identified through within-provider variation in
patient characteristics. The parameter on distance, for example, is identified by
differences in choice of a particular provider across patients who live in different
zip-codes throughout Massachusetts. The identifying assumption is that patient
choice of where to live is orthogonal to their preferences for providers.
1.4.2 Expected Utility from the Provider Network
The coefficients estimated from the provider demand model are then used to
construct an expected utility variable, which is used as an input to the next stage
in the model. This variable measures patient i’s ex-ante willingness-to-pay for
a particular insurance plan’s provider network. The importance of this variable
is that it provides a measure of network breadth that is not only based on the
size of the plan’s network, but on the relative quality of the providers in the
network. A network may, for instance, be smaller in size, but still include many
of the high-demand providers in the market in which the plan is operating.
As demand for insurance plans is at the household level (i.e., households
choose one plan for all individuals in the family), I aggregate the expected
utility variable to the household level by summing over each individual i’s
willingness-to-pay for the provider networks.
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Specifically, household I’s expected utility from the network offered by plan
j in time t is given by:
EUIjt =
∑
i∈I

∑
l
fillog
 ∑
h∈NjtH
exp(φilh)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
EUijtH
+
∑
s
∑
r
firlog
 ∑
d∈NjtS
exp(φirds)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
EUijtS

(1.5)
Despite the fact that provider demand was estimated separately for hos-
pitals, primary care practices, cardiology practices, and orthopedic practices,
the expected utility variable defined above aggregates the utilities from each of
these different types of providers, with EUijtH representing consumer i’s utility
from the hospital network of plan j in time t, and EUijtS representing consumer
i’s utility from the physician network of plan j at time t, and this is summed
over all specialists s. This allows individuals to have different valuations of dif-
ferent types of providers, depending on their probability of contracting various
illnesses or requiring certain procedures.
Here, fil is the probability that individual i contracts diagnosis l (requiring
hospital care) and the frequency with which that individual needs to seek care
for that illness. fir is the ex-ante probability that individual i requires procedure
r (i.e. requires physician care). For the purposes of calculating these probabili-
ties, individuals are grouped into distinct age-sex-chronic condition categories,
with the following age bins: 0-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-64, 65+. fil and fir
are estimated directly from the claims data by averaging over the share of all
GIC members of type i who sought medical treatment for diagnosis l or pro-
cedure r. For hospitalizations, diagnoses were grouped into the 18 CCS cate-
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gories used in the demand estimation. For seeking physician care, diagnoses
were grouped first into the probability of requiring care from a cardiology, or-
thopedist, and primary care practitioner, and were subsequently grouped into
bins of RVU weights: 0-1; 1-2; 2-5; 5-10; 10-20; 20-40; 40+. This reflects the fact
that individuals of different ages, genders, and medical histories have differing
probabilities not only of needing to see certain specialists, but also of requiring
treatment of varying levels of complexities.
A more robust model would specify the probability of requiring more spe-
cific procedures, rather than the probability of requiring a certain RVU-weight.
Indeed, the probability of requiring knee surgery may be different than the
probability of requiring shoulder surgery. However, given the number of proce-
dures that any given specialists treats, this would present a significant computa-
tional burden. Grouping procedures into specialty-RVU categories is therefore
a simplification towards computing ex-ante probabilities of valuing an insurer’s
provider network.13
1.4.3 Consumer Demand for Insurance Plans
The utility of household I for plan j at time t is given by the following:
uIjt = −rIjtαI + EUIjtβ1 + 1Ijt=Ijt−1β2 + ηj︸ ︷︷ ︸
δIjt
+ωhjt (1.6)
Here, rIjt refers to the plan rate, or premium, which varies only by whether
13An alternative would be to explore models where patients choose their physicians based
on their diagnoses, rather than procedures required. These models will be explored in future
iterations of the paper.
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the consumer has purchased individual coverage or family coverage. I allow the
premium coefficient, αI , to vary by age of the oldest member of the household.
This is to reflect the fact that households with members of different age groups
may react differently to insurance plan prices than other households. EUIjt is
the expected utility from the plan’s network as defined above, which also varies
by household. ηj is the unobserved plan characteristics component, captured by
a full set of plan fixed effects, reflecting the fact that plan demand may be driven
by preferences for a particular plan unobserved by the econometrician, and ωIjt
is the idiosyncratic, Type 1 Extreme Value error. Plan inertia is captured by
1Ijt=Ijt−1 , which is an indicator function for whether household I was enrolled
in plan j in year t− 1.
The market share of households of type I for plan j in market t is derived as
the familiar logit share:
sIjt =
exp(δIjt)
J∑
k=1
exp(δIkt)
(1.7)
Estimation and Identification
The model is estimated in a similar fashion to the provider demand model,
using maximum likelihood through a multinomial logit model on the years
2009-2013. I do not observe Unicare products in my data, as the insurer does
not contribute to the APCD. I therefore run the insurance demand model on the
set of GIC enrollees who do not purchase Unicare products. A full set of plan
fixed effects are included. One important note, as mentioned above, is that I in-
clude in the model an indicator variable for whether a particular plan matches
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an enrollee’s plan choice from the previous year. This follows prior literature on
plan inertia (Handel, 2013; Polyakova, 2016; Shepard, 2016) and is designed to
capture enrollee switching costs from moving to a different plan. This variable
is extremely important towards matching observed choice behavior in the GIC.
Without it, the model would attribute what is really plan inertia to a low value
of αI (premium sensitivity parameter) or a high value for β1 (the network of the
plan itself). This inertia coefficient becomes extremely important in determining
employer choices of insurance plans as well.
For the year 2012 (the year in which the GIC began offering its premium
holiday), I adjust premiums to reflect the fact that members choosing a narrow
network plan would only pay for nine of the twelve months of the year. I do
not apply this price adjustment to families in which the eldest member is over
65 years old (as the premium holiday was not extended to retirees). One caveat
is that I cannot observe which members are active state employees and which
members are municipal employees from years prior to 2012. Therefore, my esti-
mates on the premium coefficient may be slightly biased due to this misassign-
ment of the premium holiday.14 However, running the model only on the set
of new enrollees each year (i.e. those making an active choice) yields a similar
premium coefficient and expected utility coefficient, indicating that any bias is
likely small.
The expected utility coefficient is identified from within-plan variation in
utility of provider networks across individuals. These differences in expected
utility stem from differences in household ages, locations (i.e. households that
live closer to more prestigious doctors and hospitals than others), and illness
14Future iterations of the paper will, however, include corrections for this by matching new
enrollees’ zip codes with publicly available data on which municipalities joined the GIC in
which year
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histories (i.e. individuals with a higher disease burden). The premium coeffi-
cient is identified through within-plan variation in premiums generated by dif-
ferences in family type. For households with only one member, individuals pay
a base premium, and for households with more than one member, the house-
hold pays a total of 2.4 times the base premium, a rate set exogenously by the
GIC. Though there may be some concern that base premiums are set endoge-
nously, which might bias my coefficient, premiums in Massachusetts adhere to
medical loss ratio laws, which require that plan premiums be set no higher than
prespecified amounts by the state government. The GIC is also quite active in
negotiating lower premiums with insurers, and has traditionally upheld a med-
ical loss ratio of approximately 90% on all plans (Prager, 2016). Therefore, I take
the plan premiums as effectively exogenous conditional on utilization of health
care services and expected plan costs, both of which are captured by EUIjt, and
controlling for unobserved plan characteristics that might be correlated with
ωIjt.
1.4.4 GIC Objective Function, Insurer Profit Function, and Pre-
mium Setting
I assume that the GIC (the employer), in selecting products and setting
prices, maximizes a measure of consumer surplus from the chosen plans less
the amount paid out in either medical expenditures (in the case of self-insured
products) or premiums to insurers (in the case of fully-insured products). The
consumer surplus measure is meant to capture the fact that employers, in part,
care about satisfying the health care needs of their employees. A product menu
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that can more closely match the needs of its employees would allow the em-
ployer to retain employees for longer periods of time, as well as attract new
enrollees from other firms. This implies that the more heterogeneous a firm’s
employees are in terms of demographics, geography, and health preferences,
the more employers should be willing to alter their product menu in order to
accommodate the needs of the diverse employee preferences.
On the other hand, offering plans that are more generous (i.e. broader net-
work) means that the firm pays out more in premiums, due to the presence of
high-cost providers in the network. Moreover, offering multiple plans is costly
for firms. I therefore assume that the GIC’s plan choices are subject to a fixed
cost for each additional product chosen. These costs reflect the fact that em-
ployers enjoy significant economies of scale in offering health plans, and that
offering multiple plans means that employers need to bear the additional ex-
penses of designing the products, informing consumers, collecting and setting
premiums, and negotiating with insurers (K. Bundorf, 2002; Moran, Chernew, &
Hirth, 2001). In my setting, the GIC weights the benefits of offering these plans
against these fixed costs.
Formally the GIC objective is:
Wt =
∑
I
1
αI
log
(
J∑
j
exp(δIjt)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CS(δJt)
−
∑
I
∑
j
(1− τ)sIjtRIjt −
∑
j
FCj (1.8)
Here, the term on the left-hand-side of the function, CS(δJt) is the consumer
surplus from the GIC offering J products to its employees. RIjt refers to the full
premium (i.e. the enrollee plus the employer share). The term τ represents the
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percentage of premium that is to be paid by the enrollee, set by the GIC. During
the years of my sample period, the GIC set its enrollee share for employees
hired prior to 2003 as 20%, while those hired after 2003 at 25%. In recent years,
the GIC increased the enrollee share for employees hired prior to 2003 to 25%
and is considering increasing all the enrollee shares to combat rising health care
costs. The second term in the equation represents the payment in premiums
to insurers the GIC contracts with. Note that for self-insured plans, this term
would be the full cost of medical care expenses, rather than the premium cost
to insurers. Finally, the third term, FCj represents the fixed cost to the GIC of
offering plan j to its enrollees.
Insurers, meanwhile, are assumed to set premiums to maximize profits. Let
the marginal hospital cost for plan j be given by:
mcjtH(NjtH) =
∑
i∈I
∑
l
filwlt
∑
h∈NjtH
σilth(NjtH)pjth (1.9)
And let the marginal physician costs for plan j be given by:
mcjtS(NjtS) =
∑
i∈I
∑
s
∑
r
firRV Urt
∑
d∈NjtS
σirtds(NjtS)pjtds (1.10)
Then MCO (insurer) m’s profits are given by:
pimt =
∑
j∈Jm
∑
I
sIjt(δJt)
RIjt[1, 2.4]−mcjtH(NjtH)−mcjtS(NjtS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
mcjt(Njt)

 (1.11)
In the equation above, Jm refers to the set of products offered by MCO m
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and Njt refers to the overall network of plan j in time t (where NjtH refers to
the hospital network of plan j and NjtS refers to the physician network of plan
j). The [1, 2.4] next to the premium variable, RIjt refers to the multiple of the
premium depending on the household type. These are assumed to be set ex-
ogenously, where if the household type is “family” the premium is 2.4 times the
base individual premium, regardless of family size. In equation (9), wlt refers to
the weight assigned to a particular hospital diagnosis. These weights were also
used in the hospital demand model in section 4.1 (a more thorough discussion
of their construction follows in section 4.4.1). In equation (10), RV Urt refers to
the RVU weight assigned to a particular physician procedure. Recall that fil and
fir are the probabilities that a type i individual contracts a particular diagnosis
l or requires procedure r. Finally, pjth is the negotiated base price between plan
j and hospital h in time t, while pjtds is the negotiated base price between plan
j and physician practice d for specialty s in time t. I define each of these price
and weight terms in the next section.
Assuming a multi-product Nash-Bertrand price-setting equation, the first-
order condition for the insurer profit function is:
0 =
∂pimt
∂Rjt
=
∑
I
(
sIjt(δjt) +
∑
n∈Jm
∂sInt(δnt)
∂Rjt
(Rjt[1, 2.4]−mcjt(Njt))
)
(1.12)
Equation (12) assumes that insurers have virtually full leeway to set premi-
ums on the GIC, and that each insurer m competes with others for enrollees.
Therefore, the more insurers the GIC chooses to contract with, the less any par-
ticular insurer will be able to mark up premiums over their marginal costs. If
there are fewer plans, then insurers will be able to mark up premiums higher.
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These assumptions are fairly strong for this setting, however, for several rea-
sons. First, two of the largest plans offered by the GIC (Harvard Pilgrim Inde-
pendence and Tufts Navigator, both broad network plans) are self-insured. For
these plans, insurers offer the GIC a “suggested” premium, but the GIC is free
to set them at whatever rate they want. This means not only that the GIC has in-
centives to keep premiums low (to increase the consumer surplus term, CS(δJt),
in equation (8)), but also that insurers have incentives to keep their “suggested”
premiums low. Self-insured plans, since they are merely paid for administrative
services, care less about markups over marginal costs and prefer to attract the
most enrollees possible. Second, the GIC, as a large employer group that covers
about 8-9% of the state’s employees, may have considerable bargaining lever-
age with insurers to reduce premiums, thereby inhibiting insurers from setting
markups that are too high.15 Finally, plans in Massachusetts are bound by state
medical-loss-ratio (MLR) regulation requiring that plans spend no less than 85%
of premium dollars on medical care expenses. For these reasons, plans on the
GIC are observed to set premiums, on average, at about 10% over their medical
expenditures.
Therefore, as an alternate pricing assumption, I allow the GIC/insurers to
set premiums at a fixed 10% markup over marginal costs. The pricing equation
then becomes:
∑
I
sIjt(δjt)RIjt[1, 2.4] = 1.10mcjt(Njt) (1.13)
In my results section, I report the results of both assumptions: Nash-
15See Ho & Lee (2016) for a model that incorporates employer-insurer bargaining over premi-
ums using data from CalPers (an employer group similar to the GIC) in California (Ho & Lee,
2016).
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Bertrand and a fixed-cost markup. I show in section 5.5.1 that the latter as-
sumption fits the observed price-cost margins in the data much more closely
than the former.
I now describe the construction of the negotiated price variable for physi-
cians and for hospitals.
Construction of the Negotiated Price, pjth and pjtds
In order to complete equation (11) above and in order to estimate insurer
marginal costs for counterfactual plans and networks, I need to construct a mea-
sure for the negotiated price between insurers and providers, or the base reim-
bursement price. I leverage the fact that insurers and providers do not typically
negotiate over a full menu of prices for different services, but rather negotiate
over a base price and then use a series of weights to scale the base price in order
to arrive at a payment for each diagnosis and procedure. These payments are
observed in the APCD as “allowed amounts,” or the maximum allowable pay-
ment that an insurer would be a particular provider for a particular episode of
care. I use these observed amounts to back out a negotiated rate for each insurer-
provider combination. Similar approaches have been taken by Gowrisankaran
et al. (2015), Prager (2016), and Ho & Lee (2016).
For physicians, who are typically reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis for
each procedure, r, I rely on observed RVU weights in addition to allowed
amounts, as in Kleiner et al. (2015). I assume that price takes the following
form:
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Airjtds = pjtds ∗RV Urt (1.14)
ln(Airjtds) = ln(pjtds) + ln(RV Urt) (1.15)
Airjtds refers to the allowed amount between plan j and physician practice
d of specialty s, for patient i getting procedure r in time t. Here, the allowable
amount is a function of the base negotiated price, pjtds between plan j and prac-
tice d, multiplied by the RVU weight for the procedure, RV Urt. The model I
estimate is:
ln(Airjtds) = ln(RV Urt)ρ+ γjtds + irjtds (1.16)
where γjtds refers to plan-practice-time fixed effects. After estimating this
model, I fix the RVU to 1 (i.e. ln(RV Ult=0). The resulting predicted payments
yield a price for each insurer-practice-specialty combination for a standardized
procedure, and these are used as pjtds.
In the case of hospitals, I assume that the negotiated amount is multiplied
by a weight related to the “Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG)” of the particular
illness that is being treated, as hospitals are reimbursed by diagnosis. These
weights are typically assigned annually by CMS. Unfortunately, the APCD does
not have a variable organizing the ICD-9 diagnosis codes into DRGs. Therefore,
I follow Shepard 2016 and take a reduced-form approach towards estimating
the hospital base price, by running the following model:
ln(Airjth) = γjth + ψlt + xilt + iljth (1.17)
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Here, Ailjtd refers to the observed allowed amount for patient i with diagno-
sis l on plan j in time t seeking care from hospital h. γjth are fixed effects for
every plan-hospital-time combination. Rather than incorporating a numerical
weight with an estimated linear parameter, as done in the physician model, I
proxy for diagnoses by including ψl. These are a set of fixed effects for the 18
CCS diagnosis categories used in the demand model for hospitals. The model
is therefore similar to the physician price construction model, except that by
including these fixed effects, I estimate weights for each diagnosis rather than
using observed weights. The model also includes Elixhauser comorbidity in-
dexes for each of 12 secondary diagnoses, xilt. This is meant to capture nu-
ances within diagnoses that may require heavier use of hospital resources than
in generic cases (such as comas, hypertension, etc.). I use the model to predict
prices for each insurer-hospital-year combination, pjth = exp(γjth) and to pre-
dict the weights for each diagnosis group, wlt = exp(ψlt). For each year, I then
take the average predicted weight across admissions and consider this to be the
“standardized diagnosis” for which base prices are negotiated between insurers
and hospitals. I scale the predicted price by this factor in order to achieve the
predicted base price for hospitals, pjth.
Table 5 reports the average negotiated base prices and average weights by
type of provider and facility type in 2013. Practices that are “office-based” are
defined as practices in which more than 70% of the claims are conducted in an
office-based setting. Any setting in which less than 70% of the claims are per-
formed in an office is considered a “facility-based” setting. These include group
practices in which services are primarily performed in outpatient settings of
hospitals, or physicians performing services within hospital settings, but billing
for professional services separately from inpatient admissions.
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Table 1.5: Estimated Price and Weight Measures, 2013
Variable PCPs Cardiologists Orthopedists Hospitals
Office-Based
Average Base Price 61.70 53.08 58.42 –
(17.07) (15.76) (24.56) –
Average Weight 2.74 3.24 4.46 –
(3.02) (3.31) (10.80) –
Facility-Based
Average Base Price 69.87 56.91 55.07 10,303.73
(28.56) (19.54) (16.82) (3,177.89)
Average Weight 2.91 2.07 5.31 1.00
(4.06) (3.61) (12.95) (0.34)
Standard deviations in parentheses. “Average base price” refers to the negotiated
price for a standardized unit of health care. In the case of physician practices, this
refers to a case whereRV Ul = 1. In the case of hospitals, this refers to the case where
wl = 1. Hospital weights are scaled so that the yearly average is one, meaning that
hospital base prices refer to the price fo a procedure of average weight.
The table suggests that negotiated prices do not vary considerably across
medical specialties in Massachusetts. Primary care practices do, somewhat sur-
prisingly, receive higher reimbursements per RVU on average than do special-
ists. However, this is most likely due to the fact that both OB/GYN doctors and
pediatricians are included in the PCP definition. Pediatricians, in particular,
charge extremely high base rates.16 Within specialty, there is considerable varia-
tion. The largest practices within a specialty receive more than $80 per RVU and
the smallest receive as little as $30 per RVU. In the hospital market, the maxi-
mum base price in 2013 was $17,306 while the minimum was $3,545. Addition-
ally, there are some notable differences in the average weights per procedure for
physicians. Most notably, although the negotiated price for orthopedic practices
appears lower per RVU, orthopedists tend to perform more labor-intensive pro-
cedures, and therefore have higher RVU weights per procedure performed. On
16The most expensive hospital in Massachusetts in terms of base price is Boston Children’s
Hospital. Both facility fees for this hospital and professional fees charged by physicians em-
ployed by it are considerably higher than the average.
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average, PCPs in office-based settings receive average reimbursements of $169
per visit. Orthopedists, however, receive approximately $260 per visit. Going
one standard deviation higher than the mean weight yields $355 per visits for
PCPs and $891 for orthopedists.
1.4.5 Product and Network Choice
Having demand and cost estimates in hand, I proceed with the first stage of
the model, where the GIC select a set of products to offer its enrollees and the
networks of those products. Specifically, the GIC chooses δJt to maximize:
max
δJt
E
CS(δJt, θ)−
∑
I
(1− τ)sIjtRIjt︸ ︷︷ ︸
S(δJt; θ)
−
∑
j
FCj
 (1.18)
Here, S(δJt) refers to the marginal social surplus from having product menu
J (in other words, the consumer surplus, CS(δJt, θ), minus payments to insur-
ers). The fixed costs in the equation refer to non-health-care or premium-related
costs associated with purchasing and offering multiple insurance products for
enrollees. These include administrative costs for maintaining multiple plans,
negotiating costs (each separate plan needs to be negotiated with insurers and
providers), informing consumers, printing costs, and any fees that the employer
pays insurers that increase with the number of plans purchased.17
As an alternate specification, I also run the model assuming that, rather than
17Bundorf (2002) notes that employers cite the administrative burden as a constraint on the
number of plans offered.
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the GIC selecting the number of products and the networks of the products
offered, that these decisions are made entirely by the insurers with whom the
GIC contracts. In other words, under the alternate model, the GIC engages in
long-term contracts with several insurers, but those insurers have full leeway to
decide which products are offered and which provider networks are included
in those products.
Under this alternate assumption, the fixed costs of designing and offering
plans are borne by the insurers rather than the employer, and the maximization
problem for insurer m in time t becomes:
max
δJmt
[
E (pimt(δJt, θ))−
∑
j
FCj
]
(1.19)
where δJmt is the “quality” of product menu J offered by MCO m. I report
the fixed costs under both sets of assumptions in Section 5.
Estimating the Fixed Costs
To estimate the fixed costs associated with offering additional plans, I follow
work by Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2015) in constructing moment inequali-
ties and bounding estimates on the fixed costs, rather than imposing an equi-
librium through distributional assumptions on the fixed cost parameter. This
procedure was subsequently adapted and used to estimate fixed and sunk costs
of product introductions in markets such as computers, pharmaceuticals, and
smartphones (Eizenberg, 2014; Nosko, 2014; Mohapatra & Chatterjee, 2015; Fan
& Yang, 2016).
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For this, I construct two counterfactual quality vectors associated with
adding and removing products to the GIC. I define δJ+j,t as the total product
quality that would result from offering an additional product j that is not cur-
rently offered. I define δJ−j,t as the total product quality that would result in the
GIC removing one of its currently offered products, j.
The estimation follows from a revealed preference assumption that the prod-
ucts I observe in the data are chosen in equilibrium. That is, the GIC selects
the products and networks of providers to offer its employees much as a social
planner would; by maximizing consumer surplus less payments to insurers and
fixed costs of offering multiple products. This establishes the necessary condi-
tions that the GIC would not choose to add a product (δJ+j,t) or remove a prod-
uct (δJ−j,t) unless these deviations increased its objective function, Wt. These
necessary conditions allow me to estimate bounds on the fixed cost parameter.
One side of the bound comes from the assumption that any product the GIC
chooses to offer must necessarily increase social surplus. Therefore, by remov-
ing a product currently offered and computing counterfactual surplus, I can
infer that the fixed costs for offering an additional product must be less than
the surplus gained by offering the product. Formally this upper bound on fixed
costs is given by:
FCj ≤ E [S(δJt; θ)− S(δJ−j,t; θ)] ≡ FCj (1.20)
where FCj refers to the upper bound on fixed costs. Similarly, we can obtain
the lower bound as follows:
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FCj ≥ E [S(δJ+j,t; θ)− S(δJt; θ)] ≡ FCj (1.21)
where FCj is the lower bound on fixed costs. This side of the bound implies
that if the GIC can offer a potential product, but is not observed to, then it must
be the case that fixed costs are larger than the change in marginal social surplus
from introducing it.
Assume that the GIC’s expectation of its total surplus from adding or remov-
ing products follows the following form:
E[S(δJt)] = O(δJt) + vfc (1.22)
Here, O(δJt) refers to the observed surplus from offering a certain combina-
tion of plans, and vfc is a mean-zero idiosyncratic error term.
As long as the GIC has correct expectations on average, vfc will go to zero as
the number of potential products, K, increases, leading to the following estima-
tion equation:
plim
K→∞
1
K
K∑
j
(O(δJt; θ)−O(δJ−j,t; θ)) ≥ FC ≥ plim
K→∞
1
K
K∑
j
(O(δJ+j,t; θ)−O(δJt; θ))
(1.23)
Eizenberg (2014) and Mohapatra (2016) describe in detail a potential selec-
tion problem that would arise out of this formation if the error term varied by
the type of product offered. Namely, the GIC may choose to contract with cer-
tain insurers, offer certain products, or offer certain networks for which the fixed
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costs of doing so are lower. In my setting, I circumvent this selection problem
by following Nosko (2014) and assuming the fixed costs of offering additional
plans is the same regardless of where the plan is in the quality space.
While this may be a strong assumption in other settings that have wide vari-
ation in fixed or sunk costs of product introduction, it is a more reasonable
approximation for this environment. For one thing, I am estimating the fixed
costs associated with introducing additional plans under the umbrella of one
large employer group. While such costs may differ across employers, it is un-
likely that there are substantially different fixed costs within employer group,
and therefore it is not likely that the GIC exhibits substantially different fixed
costs for plan introduction to its own employees. Moreover, whereas the fixed
costs of, for instance, introducing new pharmaceuticals into the market may
highly differ depending on the nature of the drug, it is unlikely that the added
administrative burden of offering an additional insurance plan depends signif-
icantly on the type of plan that is offered.
This assumption may be violated if, for instance, offering a product that was
broader in network size than another product also meant an increase the cost
of the negotiation process. However, this is unlikely to apply to the GIC for
two reasons. First, I do not allow the GIC to offer any plans that in which the
network is larger than the largest currently offered by the particular insurer any-
where in Massachusetts. In other words, insurers can only design plans that are
narrower than what they currently offer, but not broader. This implies that there
would be no additional contracting fixed costs for providers with whom any
particular insurer does not currently negotiate with. Second, while employer
groups negotiate premiums with different plans, they rarely ever negotiate base
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prices with providers. This task falls largely onto the insurers, and it is there-
fore unlikely that the added negotiation cost of offering broader network plans
would result in additional fixed costs for the GIC itself.
1.5 Results
I now describe the results of my model. I begin with the results of the physi-
cian and hospital demand section, followed by the results of the insurance plan
demand, and finally the fixed costs estimates from the supply side of the model.
1.5.1 Demand for Hospitals
Table 6 displays the results for the hospital demand model. The results are
displayed for a full sample of hospital admissions in Massachusetts for con-
sumers on the GIC between 2009 and 2013. The model is run on a flexible
set of interactions, including distance with patient characteristics, distance with
provider characteristics, and patient characteristics with hospital characteristics.
This is meant to capture heterogeneity in preferences for hospitals. In addition
to the reported coefficients, the model also contains a set of fixed effects for the
18 CCS disease categories interacted with distance, a full set of hospital fixed ef-
fects as well as hospital fixed effects interacted with disease weights, wlt. These
latter fixed effects are meant to capture unobserved hospital quality, as well as
allow patients with different disease severities to have differential preferences
for different hospitals.
Consistent with prior literature on hospital demand, the distance coefficient
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is negative and significant, implying that patients prefer to go to hospitals that
are close to where they live. While this coefficient is difficult to interpret (the
measure is in utils instead of a dollarized amount), comparing this coefficient
with other parameter estimates shed some light on its practical magnitude. For
instance, the estimates imply that hospital patients are on average willing to
travel approximately 20 extra miles to reach the hospital with the highest unob-
served quality parameter (i.e. the largest fixed effect estimate). This is indica-
tive of the fact that patients are “willing-to-pay” in terms of extra miles trav-
eled to access prestigious, academic medical centers, such as Mass. General and
Brigham and Womens (both owned by Partners), Beth Israel, Lahey Medical
Center, and others.
Table 1.6: Results of Hospital Demand
Variable Utility Parameter Standard Error
Distance -0.2650∗∗∗ 0.0072
Used Hospital 3.5664∗∗∗ 0.0273
DistxFemale -0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0011
DistxAge -0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0000
DistxChronic 0.0190∗∗∗ 0.0014
DistxCritAccess 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0038
DistxSpecialty 0.0631∗∗∗ 0.0024
DistxAcademic 0.0327∗∗∗ 0.0018
NeuroxNeuro 0.8089∗∗∗ 0.2382
CardiacxCathLab 0.4321∗∗∗ 0.0439
ObstetricsxNICU 2.2872∗∗∗ 0.0740
ImagingXMRI 0.2318∗∗∗ 0.0502
Hospital FE Yes
Obs. 2,815,140
Pseudo R2 0.54
Results from hospital demand model from years 2009-2013.
“Chronic” refers to having a chronic condition, “Specialty”
refers to being a specialty hospital, “NeuroxNeuro” refers to a
patient with a neurological disorder interacted with an indicator
for whether the hospital had a neurology unit. Omitted from the
table are distance terms interacted with each of 18 CCS diagnosis
categories and a full set of hospital fixed effects.
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A second important finding concerns the large positive and significant coef-
ficient on individuals who have used the hospital in the previous period. The
coefficient implies that conditional on age, disease, and hospital characteristics,
individuals would be willing to travel approximately 13 extra miles to be ad-
mitted to a hospital they have used previously.
Women are less likely to travel far to reach a hospital, and older individu-
als (conditional on diagnosis) also receive significant disutility from traveling.
Conditional on age, however, patients with histories of chronic conditions (i.e.
sicker patients) are willing to travel more to access a hospital of their choice. Peo-
ple are also on average more likely to travel to a hospital that has more beds, a
specialty hospital (such as a children’s hospital or a cancer center), or to travel
for an academic medical center. This reinforces the point that prestigious aca-
demic medical centers in Massachusetts are able to generate high demand for
their facilities.
Finally, I report the coefficients on a series of variables interacting patient di-
agnosis with hospital amenities. Each of these are, unsurprisingly, positive and
significant. Patients with a neurological disorder significantly prefer hospitals
that have neurology units. Patients with a cardiac CCS diagnosis significantly
prefer hospitals with a catheterization laboratory, patients with obstetrics con-
ditions significantly prefer hospitals with a neo-natal intensive care unit, and
patients with a diagnosis requiring imaging (defined to be either a neurological,
cardiac, or musculoskeletal diagnosis) prefer hospitals equipped with magnetic-
resonance-imaging machines.
It is worth mentioning that this model omits copayments that plans charge to
visit different hospitals. On the GIC, plans are differentiated in their premiums,
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their networks, and the copays that patients pay for a hospital admission across
plans, across hospitals, and over time (Prager, 2016). In practice, the demand
effects of these copays is fairly minor and, for my purposes, does not alter the
subsequent results in meaningful ways. However, in Appendix A.2, I report the
results of alternate hospital demand models that include these copays.
Following previous literature, I also assume there is no selection on unob-
servables in this model (that is, providers are not horizontally differentiated in
ways unobserved to the econometrician). Appendix A.3 addresses potential se-
lection concerns in more detail.
1.5.2 Demand for Physicians
I next turn to the results of the physician demand models for primary care
practices, cardiology practices, and orthopedic practices, which can be seen in
Table 7. Due to the large number of physician visits during my time frame, I run
the model on a random sample of 50,000 visits across the five years for each dif-
ferent specialty group. In order to further reduce the dimensionality given the
large number of physician practices, I limit the sample to only the largest 100
practices in each specialty (in terms of number of claims). The model includes
distance interacted with patient characteristics, physician practice characteris-
tics, as well as patient characteristics interacted with provider characteristics. It
also includes a full set of practice fixed effects for each specialty, as well as prac-
tice fixed effects interacted with RVU weights. Appendix A.2 shows additional
results that look at only the top 50 practices in each specialty, as well as models
assuming that patients choose only one physician per year (rather than make a
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separate choice for each visit).
Table 1.7: Results of Physician Demand Models
Variable PCP Practices Cardiology Practices Orthopedic Practices
Distance -0.1154∗∗∗ -0.1167∗∗∗ -0.2046∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0020) (0.0024)
Used Doctors 5.3061∗∗∗ 4.0696∗∗∗ 4.4516∗∗∗
(0.0188) (0.0179) (0.0221)
DistxFemale 0.0014∗∗∗ -0.0008 0.0002
(0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0009)
DistxAge -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.000) (0.0000)
DistxRVU 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.0010∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.000) (0.0001)
Practice FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 5,379,725 5,187,693 5,448,055
Pseudo R2 0.75 0.53 0.53
Results of physician demand models are for years 2009-2013. Excluded from tables are es-
timates for distance interacted with number of doctors, distance interacted with the share
of doctors who are of the specialty types being considered, and a full set of practice fixed
effects.
Consistent with the results of the hospital demand model, distance plays an
extremely important role in choosing physician practices. Across the three spe-
cialist groups, distance has a negative and significant effect on utility. While the
magnitude of the coefficient is similar for primary care physicians and cardiolo-
gists, it is more negative for orthopedists, suggesting that consumers do not like
traveling for orthopedic surgery.
Another important driver of choice, also similar to the hospital demand
model, is whether the patient had gone to the physician practice (at the par-
ticular location) in the past. For all three specialist groups, the coefficient on
“Used Doctor” is positive and significant. However, unlike the hospital demand
model, the magnitudes on these coefficients are extremely large, implying that
patients are willing to travel far greater distances to access the same physicians
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than they are willing to access the same hospitals. Indeed, the magnitude of
the coefficient is particularly high for primary care practices. The results imply
that on average patients are willing to travel approximately 48 miles extra to see
a primary care physician if they had seen that caregiver in the preceding year.
Patients are willing to travel about 37 miles to see a cardiologist if they saw that
same cardiologist in the previous year. However, patients in need or orthopedic
surgery are only willing to travel about 22 miles to see an orthopedist if they
saw that practitioner in the previous year.
While these magnitudes may seem high, particularly when compared to the
hospital results (where patients are on average only willing to travel an extra 13
miles to see the same hospital), it is worth noting that “primary care” includes
not only family practice physicians, but OG/GYN and pediatricians. Anecdotal
evidence suggests patients are extremely loyal to these types of specialists, par-
ticularly since patients tend to build relationships with these types of providers
from frequent use of routine care. Moreover, cardiologists tend to attract some-
what older and sicker patients (as shown in Table 3), who also require more
frequent care and heart monitoring. In light of this, the relative magnitudes be-
tween the coefficients also makes sense. Patients seem less willing to travel to
see the same orthopedists as they used previously, which could be due to the
fact that patients do not typically (with the exception of physical therapy or
rehabilitation) seek care from orthopedists for sustained periods of time.
The coefficient on distance interacted with RVU for all three specialty types
is positive, suggesting that patients are willing to travel further to see a physi-
cian if they require a more complicated procedure. In addition, for each of the
three specialty types, older individuals are less likely to travel to see a particular
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physician. This could be reflective of the fact that older individuals, conditional
on severity of procedure (which is captured by the RVU coefficient), are less
able to travel and therefore prefer physicians close to their homes. These results
are broadly consistent with the results on hospital care suggesting similarly that
older patients are less willing to travel for hospital care and that patients with
histories of chronic conditions are more willing to travel. For primary care prac-
titioners, women are more willing to travel, however there is no significant gen-
der difference in physician preference for cardiologists and orthopedists. This
is perhaps due to the fact OB/GYNs are included as part of the definition of
“primary care.”
1.5.3 Relation Between Negotiated Price and Network Utility
Having the estimates of hospital and physician demand in hand, I use the es-
timated parameters from the model to construct the measure of expected utility
for an insurance plan’s network, EUIjt, which is subsequently used as an input
in the plan demand model. Figures 6 and 7 plot the variation in expected utility
across households for select plans in the GIC between 2010 and 2013. In Figure
6, I plot a kernel density function for each of Harvard’s health plans: Harvard
Independence (its broad network plan) and Harvard Primary Choice (its nar-
row network plan). In Figure 7, I do the same for Fallon’s broad versus narrow
plans.
In each figure, the solid lines represent the insurer’s broad network prod-
uct and the dashed line represents the narrow network product. It is immedi-
ately clear from this series of charts depicted in Figure 6 that Harvard’s broad
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(a) Total (b) Hospitals
(c) General Practices (d) Cardiology Practices
(e) Orthopedic Practices
Figure 1.6: Expected Utility for Harvard Pilgrim’s Broad and Narrow Plans
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and narrow plans yield very similar expected utility values for consumers, even
across all provider types (hospitals and physician specialties). Panel (a) shows
the distribution of total utility for both hospitals and physicians. While the plot
for the broad network does skew slightly to the right to that of the narrow net-
work, the two graphs virtually overlay one another. Indeed, Harvard’s narrow
network, while narrower than its broad plan, still covers a large number of prac-
tices and hospitals, and is the largest narrow-network product on the GIC. Look-
ing at panel (b), which shows the utility distribution only for hospitals, EUIjtH ,
consumers appear to view both plans’ hospital networks quite similarly, de-
spite the fact that Harvard’s narrow network excludes Partners hospitals. When
translating to primary care practices (panel (c)) and cardiology practices (panel
(d)), however, the distribution for Harvard’s broad network does begin to skew
more rightward than the hospital distribution, implying that most of the dif-
ference in valuation between the two plans comes from the physician network.
However, these skews are still fairly minor. As depicted in Figures 4 and 5,
Harvard’s narrow plan is the only narrow network product to cover the physi-
cian practices affiliated with Atrius Health system, which draws a considerable
share of primary care patients. Therefore, it follows that consumers would value
Harvard’s two networks at a fairly similar level, given the significant overlap of
large-share providers in both plans.
Figure 7, however, which depicts the difference in utility between Fallon’s
broad network and Fallon’s narrow network tells a very different story. Look-
ing at panel (a), it is clear that the utility distribution for Fallon’s broad net-
work skews considerably rightward of Fallon’s narrow network, implying that
consumers value Fallon’s broad network significantly more than its narrow net-
work. Disaggregating these utility measures by provider type sheds more light
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(a) Total (b) Hospitals
(c) General Practices (d) Cardiology Practices
(e) Orthopedic Practices
Figure 1.7: Expected Utility for Fallon’s Broad and Narrow Plans
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on this. Panel (b) does reveal that consumers prefer the hospital network cov-
ered by Fallon’s broad network more than they do covered on Fallon’s narrow
network, and the difference is more apparent than the hospital utility differ-
ence between the two Harvard plans. However, most of the difference similarly
comes from variation in physician networks between the two plans. While the
hospital distribution only skews somewhat to the right, the physician distribu-
tion skew very much to the right, particularly for primary care and cardiology
practices. In fact, looking at panel (c), the maximum utility for Fallon’s broad
network is slightly above a value of 20, whereas the maximum for Fallon’s nar-
row network is around 35. Panel (d) shows that consumers value the orthope-
dic practices in Fallon’s broad network more than its narrow network as well,
though not by as much as they value the cardiologists and primary care physi-
cians. Again, this is likely due to the fact that PCPs and cardiologists develop
more close relationships with patients through repeated use than do orthope-
dists.
Taken together, these two figures clearly show that accounting for physician
services is an important part of consumer valuation of networks. While hospital
networks do play a role in consumer choice, preferences diverge more strongly
when considering the variation in availability of physicians between narrow
and broad network plans.
I next examine whether the preference for broad network plans translates
into higher negotiated rates for those providers. Figure 8 depicts the relation-
ship between demand and negotiated provider price for one of the insurers on
the GIC. Due to the fact that actual negotiated prices are displayed, I do not
display the names of the insurers in these figures. For the physician practices, I
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(a) General Practices (b) Cardiology Practices
(c) Orthopedic Practices (d) Hospitals
Figure 1.8: Insurer 1 Negotiated Price by Market Share, 2011
only display the negotiated prices for the largest 20 practices in Massachusetts.
The y-axis depicts the negotiated base rate (as computed in Section 4.4.1), where
the x-axis displays the predicted market share for those providers from the hos-
pital and physician demand models. Appendix A.1 shows additional figures
for a different insurer.
It is clear from the graphs that there is a distinct positive relationship be-
tween provider price and consumer valuation of a provider within the insurer’s
network. The relationship appears strongest for cardiologists, suggesting that
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it is likely that cardiology practices have the most leverage to negotiate higher
rates with insurers. However, primary care practices also exhibit a positive re-
lationship, as does the relationship between hospital price and demand. Ortho-
pedic practices do not appear to exhibit a positive relationship. These results
suggest that within specialty groups, including high-demand providers indeed
tends to translate into higher prices for medical care. These prices then, in turn,
translate into higher premiums for consumers. The inherent tradeoff for insur-
ers and employer in offering plan choice thus becomes clear: to offer a broad
network plan to consumers would yield greater consumer surplus through the
inclusion of high-valuation hospitals and doctors, but would also reduce sur-
plus through higher premiums. This tradeoff is explored more in the next sec-
tions.
1.5.4 Demand for Insurance Plans
Table 8 reports the results for the insurance plan demand model. I run the
model on the years 2010-2013. I omit 2009 as I cannot observe which members
were enrolled in the GIC prior to that year, and would therefore mismeasure
enrollee inertia. Further, due to the dimensionality of the data (approximately
200,000 GIC members per year multiplied by about 70 hospitals, 18 potential
diagnoses, 100 practices, and three different specialties), I only run the model on
a subset of 3,000 households across the four years of data. As I cannot observe
Unicare products in the data, I run each model on the set of enrollees in all
other GIC plans. Each of the models included a full set of plan fixed effects to
capture unobserved plan quality, as well as an interaction between premium
and age of the oldest household member in order to capture heterogeneity in
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price sensitivity among consumers. Each model included the expected utility
variable, EUIjt, computed in the previous section.
Table 1.8: Results of the Insurance Plan Demand Models
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Premuim ($00s) -1.04∗∗∗ -2.32∗∗∗ -2.50∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.39) (0.27)
PremiumxAge ($00s) 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Expected Utility (EUIjt) 0.45∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
Inertia Coefficient – – 4.57∗∗∗
– – (0.07)
Insurer FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 46,719 7,436 46,719
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.25 0.79
Results from insurance plan demand model for 2010-2013. For
2012, the GIC’s “premium holiday” was incorporated by pro-
viding individuals under 65 years old with a three month dis-
count. Column 1 includes results for the full sample but not
including the inertia coefficient. Column 2 includes results
for just the sample of new enrollees into the GIC. Column 3
includes the results for the full sample including the inertia
coefficient. The premium variable is monthly and reported in
hundreds.
Column 1 reports the results on the full sample across the four years, with
no inertia coefficient. Column 2 reports the results on a subsample across the
four years of only active enrollees who entered the GIC for the first time in
that given year (this is similar to Prager 2016). Column 3 (the preferred model)
reports the results on the full sample, including the inertia coefficient capturing
the value of being on the same plan in year t as in year t− 1. In all three models,
the premium coefficient is negative and significant, implying that households
dislike insurance plans with higher prices. Premium interacted with the age of
the oldest household member is positive across the three models, suggesting
that premium sensitivity decreases with age. This is an expected result, as older
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individuals tend to be sicker and have higher incomes, and therefore prefer
plans with the option value of broader networks. Finally, the expected utility,
EUIjt, coefficient is positive and significant for all three models, implying that
conditional on price and unobserved plan quality, households prefer plans with
broader networks of hospitals and physicians.
Although the directions of the coefficients in all three models are the same,
the magnitudes of the estimates are extremely informative. In the first column,
average premium sensitivity is quite muted, whereas the value of a network is
extremely high. In order to translate these utility parameters to willingness-to-
pay estimates, I approximate the value of particular plans by noting the average
differences in expected utility between their networks. As an example, the aver-
age difference between the expected utility of Fallon’s narrow network product
and its broad network for consumers currently enrolled in the broad network is
2.80 for individuals and 8.79 for families. The average age in the sample is 47.
This implies that, on average, individuals currently enrolled in Fallon’s broad
plan would need to be paid approximately $135 per month and families would
need to be paid $425 per month to move to the narrow plan. These estimates
are quite high, although it should be noted that Fallon’s narrow plan covers the
fewest providers of any network on the GIC. In 2011, it covered almost a third
of the hospitals in Massachusetts that were covered by Harvard’s narrow net-
work plan. Applying the same exercise for Harvard Pilgrim yields an average
difference in utility of 0.99 for individuals and 2.90 for families. This implies
individuals would need to be paid $45 to move from Harvard’s broad plan to
its narrow plan, and families would need to be paid $140 per month on aver-
age for the same switch. In 2011, the difference in premiums between the two
Fallon plans was $20 per month for individuals and $50 per month for families,
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whereas this difference was $30 and $75 for Harvard. These premium differ-
ences are considerably smaller than the differences in valuations for broad net-
works implied by the model results, suggesting the potential for bias in the form
of an underestimated price sensitivity parameter or an overestimated network
valuation.
In order to address this problem, I run the model in two alternate ways.
The first is by running it only on the sample of enrollees who are first-time GIC
members. By definition, inertia for this population is zero, as members had not
previously chosen any plan and are therefore making active choices. Among
these enrollees, the premium sensitivity coefficient drops considerably from -
1.04 to -2.32. The expected utility coefficient remains roughly the same. These
changes in magnitude suggest that enrollees choosing plans for the first time are
considerably more price sensitive than the overall population. Using the same
exercise as above, I find that individuals who enrolled in the GIC for the first
time who chose Fallon’s broad plan would need to be paid $142 per month to
move to Fallon’s narrow product, while families would need to be paid $242 per
month for the same move. For Harvard Pilgrim, these estimates are $27 and $98
per month, respectively. These estimates are considerably improved from the
first model, with the network valuation numbers matching Harvard Pilgrim’s
premium differences almost exactly, though still overestimating Fallon’s price
differences.
The third column estimates the model again on the full sample, but for all
enrollees who were observed to be in the sample in year t− 1, includes an indi-
cator for whether the household was on the same plan that year. This “inertia”
coefficient implies that, on average, a household would be willing to pay ap-
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proximately $272 per month to be on the same plan as they were on last year. In
other words, households would need to be paid $272 to switch from one plan
to another, conditional on the network, brand, and unobserved quality compo-
nents of those plans. Indeed, these switching costs are quite high, particularly
when compared with Handel’s estimate of approximately $170 per month and
Shepard’s estimate of $96 per month. However, it is worth noting that Shep-
ard’s estimate is for the individual market, where consumers tend to switch with
greater frequency than in employer market settings such as the GIC, and where
the out-of-pocket premiums for consumers is lower. Moreover, the estimate of
$272 reflects a household switching costs, whereas both Handel and Shepard’s
estimates are for individual premiums. Indeed, $272 is less than the price of
the average broad network family premium on the GIC. In Handel’s setting, the
average enrollee premium for the most generous PPO plan for an employee in
a middle-income tier is about $2,000 annually, implying that switching costs in
his setting exceed average premiums.18 Therefore, $272 is a reasonable estimate
for household switching costs in an employer setting.
The premium coefficient in this model is very similar to the model run on
just active enrollees, suggesting that the population of new GIC enrollees and
the full population (including those who switch plans) have similar premium
sensitivities. Using this model, individuals on Fallon’s broad plan would need
to be paid $50 per month to move to the narrow plan, whereas families would
need to be paid $166. For Harvard, individuals would need to be paid $19 to
move to the narrow plan, whereas families would need to be paid $54. These es-
timates seem much more reasonable, and particularly for Harvard, much more
closely match observed premium differences between broad and narrow plans.
18This is similar to results from Polyakova (2016), who finds switching frictions in Medicare
Part D to be about twice to four times as large as premiums.
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For these reasons, the preferred estimates used throughout the rest of the paper
are the ones from Column 3.
Appendix A.4 reports the results of additional plan demand estimates that
separate out the expected utility from hospital networks versus the expected util-
ity of physician networks. The results demonstrate the important of including
physician networks in a model of consumer demand. Indeed, it can be seen that
when physician networks are ignored, the premium coefficient is significantly
underestimated and the hospital network utility is significantly overestimated.
This is due largely to the absence of important heterogeneity in physician net-
works from the model, which drives consumer choice of plans. The implication
is that consumers may select into broad network plans not because they are
insensitive to price, as traditionally thought, but rather because they value re-
taining access to certain primary care physicians and specialists.
1.5.5 Fixed Cost Estimates
I next proceed to reporting the estimates of firm (employer/GIC and insurer)
fixed costs for introducing additional products to the market. I report estimates
of lower and upper bounds on GIC fixed costs over the years 2009-2013. In order
to do so I make several assumptions. First, I bound the list of potential products
the GIC can offer to any network that was offered by any insurer at any point
during the five-year sample. There are two reasons for making this assumption.
The first is that Harvard and Tufts both created new products in 2011 to offer on
the GIC that were not offered anywhere else in Massachusetts. This implies that
the GIC has enough leverage to induce insurers to create brand new networks.
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The second reason is that Massachusetts state law contains network adequacy
requirements that prevent networks from being too narrow, or from not serving
members in particular regions. As I do not observe these specific legislative
requirements, I instead assume that any network observed in the data must
have satisfied such laws and are therefore feasible potential networks. As an
example, if Fallon offered a particular network, I assume that Harvard Pilgrim
could have offered the exact same network and mimicked Fallon’s strategy. This
creates a possible 12 different products that any insurer could offer at any given
time, corresponding to 12 different hospital and physician practice networks.
A second assumption is that Neighborhood Health Plan and Health New
England could only offer their own particular networks. I make this assump-
tion to accommodate the fact that both insurers are only observed to have one
network in the entire sample and throughout all of Massachusetts. In addi-
tion, Health New England is a regional insurer, operating only in Western Mas-
sachusetts. Therefore, assuming that it could offer a broader network plan that
includes providers in Eastern Massachusetts would conflate fixed costs of of-
fering new plans with fixed costs of contracting with an entirely new set of
providers or operating in an entirely new region, which I want to avoid.
A third assumption is that at any given time, the GIC can offer as many
products as it wants (subject to the potential products available), however it
cannot offer two products with the same network.
Finally, I exclude the broad network plans offered by Harvard, Tufts, and
Health New England from the upper bound estimates. The reason for this is
that these are the three largest insurers in the GIC, each having considerably
higher market shares than the rest of the plans. Since any product the GIC may
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choose to add are narrow-network products, each attracting fairly low numbers
of enrollees, the best comparison for the upper bound are similar network prod-
ucts that have similar market shares on the GIC.
The fixed cost estimates are presented in Table 9. I present two sets of fixed
cost estimates: one assuming that all the costs of offering new products are
borne by the employer/GIC (i.e. equation 18), depicted in panel A, and the
other assuming that all the costs of offering new products are borne by the in-
surer (i.e. equation 19), depicted in panel B. The first set of estimates assumes
that if a product is currently not observed, it is due to the fact that the GIC
decided it would not increase net marginal social surplus, S(δJt; θ) to offer the
product, whereas if a product was offered, social surplus would be harmed by
removing it. The second set assumes that an insurer has full leeway to design
and offer products on the GIC; therefore if a product is not observed, it is due to
the fact that the insurer did not find it profitable to design this product, whereas
if a product was observed, the insurer would be less profitable by removing it.
The true estimate is likely to lie somewhere between the two set of assumptions.
The fixed cost estimates suggest that the GIC spends between $1.15 and $6.64
million a year on fixed costs for each plan offered. Though this estimate seems
high, it is actually quite a small fraction of the GIC’s overall net spending. When
net spending is defined as either premium revenue less medical spending (in the
case of self-insured plans) or 75% of premiums paid out to insurers (in the case
of fully-insured plans), the estimates of fixed costs fall between 0.12% and 0.70%
of total spending. Similarly, these bounds are approximately between 0.26% and
1.50% of the net social surplus (again, defined as total consumer welfare less
net spending). Therefore, relative to the overall budget that the GIC allocates
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towards health expenditures (nearly $1 billion per year), fixed costs associated
with managing multiple plans remains a small, but important component of its
objective function.
Table 1.9: Results of Fixed Cost Estimation
Lower Bound FCj Upper Bound FCj
Panel A: GIC Chooses Products
GIC/Employer ($Millions) 1.15 6.64
Share of Net Spending 0.12 0.70
Share of Net Surplus 0.26 1.50
Panel B: Insurers Choose Products
Insurer ($Millions) 1.99 3.00
Share of Fallon Profits 1.97 2.97
Share of Harvard Profits 1.23 1.86
Share of HNE Profits 4.73 7.14
Share of NHP Profits 2.07 3.12
Share of Tufts Profits 0.83 1.26
Obs. 124 21
Results from fixed cost estimation for 2009-2013. The “GIC/Employer” row re-
ports the results of fixed costs estimated for the GIC, while the “Insurer” row
reports estimates obtained by assuming the fixed costs are borne by the insurers.
The corresponding shares are also reported. For the upper bound, Harvard Inde-
pendence, Tufts Navigator, and Health New England are excluded due to their
large size.
The fixed cost bounds for insurers are slightly smaller than those for the GIC,
but within the same general range. The estimates range from approximately $2
to $3 million per product offered. Although this represents a fairly substantial
share of any individual insurer’s variable profits within the GIC, it is a fairly
small component relative to their overall statewide profits. Harvard Pilgrim
and Tufts, in particular, which are two of the largest insurers in Massachusetts,
see fixed costs at less than 2% of total profits for each, and a lower bound of less
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than 1% in the case of Tufts. These numbers are plausible relative to reported
administrative costs estimates by insurers in Massachusetts.19
Two caveats should be noted regarding these estimates. The first is that al-
though the lower bound has a fairly large sample due to the wide availability of
various product networks in Massachusetts, fairly few of these networks were
offered during my sample in the GIC. Therefore, the upper bound estimates
have a sample size of 21, which may affect the standard error estimates. Sec-
ond, and related, the low rate of offered products in the GIC be driving up the
estimates. Since there are only 8 products offered in a given year in the GIC, any
particular product removed, if it has a large enough market share, will cause a
large decrease in profits (or consumer surplus), which when averaged over a
small sample, may bias the estimates upward. I try to correct for this by omit-
ting products with large shares from the upper bound, but the range may still
be upwardly biased. While the upper bound is estimated less precisely than the
lower bound, its closeness in proximity to costs reported by insurers is cause to
believe that these estimates are reliable and useful for conducting counterfactual
exercises regarding network choice and product development.20
19In a 2010 hearing held in Massachusetts with the state’s major health insurers, at least one
plan identified its expenditure of costs and resources associated with implementing new prod-
ucts as varying between $1 and $3 million in total costs, which is nearly identical to the range of
estimates I am finding (Small Group Health Premiums in Massachusetts, 2010).
20A natural extension of this approach is to consider more employers and more market seg-
ments in Massachusetts (including the individual Exchange, CommChoice). If the fixed costs
of offering new products are similar across these segments and similar across employers, then
including such segments could increase my sample size and therefore more precisely estimate
an upper bound. Ongoing work investigates such markets and approaches.
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1.5.6 Model Fit
Costs, Premiums, Shares
I now report the fit of my model in predicting insurer costs, premiums, mar-
ket shares, and products offered. Figure 9 reports the observed total hospital
costs versus the predicted hospital costs for the year 2013, in millions of dollars.
The model fit for total hospital costs is very good, predicting total spend-
ing almost exactly for each insurer. Tufts and Harvard’s broad network plans
each spend approximately $25 - $30 million dollars per year, whereas the model
predicts they spend $21 million (for Harvard) and $29 million (for Tufts). The
model under-predicts each insurer’s spending by a small amount. This is likely
due to the fact that the prediction smooths over outliers that may drive up ob-
served insurer costs, such as patients in long-term care, patients in comas, etc.
Since the model aggregates each hospital diagnosis into 18 possible categories,
some of these extreme outliers will not be predicted accurately.
Figure 10 reports the model fit for premiums per-member-per-month for the
year 2013. The dark green, leftmost bar displays the observed premiums for
each insurer offered in the GIC, where second bar presents estimates for pre-
dicted PMPM premiums, assuming a fixed 10% markup over marginal costs
(the predicted premiums from equation 13). Here, the model predicts the GIC
plan premiums quite well. All of the broad network plans are predicted within
a few dollars of error. In addition, Harvard and Tufts’ narrow networks are
predicted quite accurately as well. The largest differences are with Fallon’s nar-
row network and Neighborhood Health Plan, which are under-predicted by
about $15. This could be due to the fact that while Harvard and Tufts are of-
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Figure 1.9: Model Fit for Hospital Costs, 2013
Figure 1.10: Model Fit for Premiums ($PMPM), 2013
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fered as self-insured plans–meaning the GIC sets its own premiums–Fallon and
NHP are both contracted on a fully-insured basis, meaning the insurers fully
set their own premiums, and therefore could potentially price their narrow net-
work products at a higher markup above marginal costs.
In order to investigate this further, I also report predicted premiums, but
assuming a Nash-Bertrand pricing model (equation 12) rather than a fixed
markup over marginal costs. In this scenario, represented by the third bar in
Figure 10, the model over-predicts the PMPM premiums for each insurer by
a considerable amount. Indeed, some premiums that were perfectly predicted
in the fixed-markup model are now almost twice as high. This suggests that
either the GIC has significant bargaining power against insurers such that they
can negotiate premiums down considerably from what would be predicted by a
Nash-Bertrand model, or that the MLR regulations bind for this market. More-
over, the relative differences between the plans within-firm have changed. Un-
der the observed prices, each insurer prices its narrow network approximately
20% under its broad network. Under Nash-Bertrand, both Harvard and Tufts
price their narrow network plans at 10% or less than its broad network. How-
ever, Fallon now prices its narrow network plan at about 20% less than its broad
network plan, matching the relative difference between products better than the
fixed markup model. This lends credence to idea that fully-insured products
might be pricing at closer to Nash-Bertrand, whereas self-insured products at a
fixed-markup over marginal costs. It is therefore possible that the true pricing
equation lands somewhere between fixed markups and Nash-Bertrand.21
Figure 11 reports the model fit for market shares in 2013. The bars represent
21Future iterations of this paper will explore alternative pricing models that differentiate be-
tween how the premiums of self-insured products and fully-insured products are set.
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Figure 1.11: Model Fit for Plan Market Shares, 2013
the observed market shares versus predicted market shares, assuming insurers
fixed markups over marginal costs. For the most part, the model predicts mar-
ket shares really well. The major difference comes from the fact that the model
slightly under-predicts the market share of Harvard broad and Tufts broad and
slightly over-predicts the market share of Tufts narrow. Harvards narrow plan
has an observed market share of 30% in 2013, while the predicted share is 25%.
Similarly, Tufts’ broad plan has an observed market share of 42% and a pre-
dicted share of 37%. Meanwhile, Tufts’ narrow plan has an observed share of
only 3%, but a predicted share of 6%.
Product Choice
I now describe the procedure used to implement the first stage of the model:
the endogenous product and network choice. In order to reduce the dimension-
85
ality of the computation, rather than having the GIC choose between a set of 12
potential narrow network products for every insurer, I restrict the GIC to choose
between offering 4 different networks for Fallon, Harvard, and Tufts. These are
a “very narrow” network, which is equivalent to the observed network of Fal-
lon Direct, a “narrow” network, which is equivalent to the observed network
of Tufts Spirit, a “medium network” equivalent to Harvard Primary Choice, or
a “broad” network, which covers each hospital and physician practice in the
market. For Health New England and Neighborhood Health Plan, I only allow
the GIC to choose to offer their observed network or not to offer these insurers
at all. This leaves a possible set of 14 products for the GIC to offer. I proceed
computing the equilibrium networks offered in a series of steps:
1. Construct a vector of 214 = 16, 384 possible equilibria combinations of
products offers
2. For each vector, compute the expected utility of the hospital and physician
networks for each member, EUijtH and EUijtS , and then a household util-
ity, EUIjt, for each offered product’s network using the estimates from the
provider demand model
3. Compute the predicted medical costs, mcIjt for each household if they en-
rolled in any of the offered products, using the negotiated price construc-
tion
4. Compute the expected market shares and premiums, sIjt and rIjt, for each
household in each offered product, using the results from the insurance
plan demand model and assuming a fixed markup over marginal costs
pricing equation
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5. Compute the estimated consumer surplus, CS(δJt), and total outlays for
the GIC under the current product offered
6. Subtract the midpoint of the fixed cost bounds from the GIC’s objective
function, Wt, for each product offered.
7. Repeat this procedure for each vector of possible equilibria, and take the
max of all the computed welfare functions.
I report the estimates of GIC’s network choices under various scenarios. The
first (the base scenario) assumes that if the GIC removes a particular plan from
its menu, enrollees would pay a switching cost and forced be forced to re-enroll
in a new plan. The second assumes that the GIC can modify the networks of
any product within-insurer without removing that product (and therefore with-
out consumers having to incur a switching cost). In other words, if the GIC
removes Harvard’s narrow network plan but replaces it with a network equiv-
alent to Tufts’ narrow plan, I assume this is equivalent to simply changing the
Harvard narrow network. Under this scenario, I assume if the GIC removes
one narrow product, but replaces it with two different narrow products (offered
by the same insurer), enrollees will be automatically re-enrolled to the product
with the closest network size. The third scenario assumes that there are no fixed
costs in offering additional plans. Finally, the fourth scenario assumes that the
GIC does not consider enrollee inertia/switching costs in its objective function.
In all scenarios, I make a “no uninsurance assumption.” That is, between all
the plans offered on the GIC, every single member must have access to a plan.
To do so, I leverage data on which available networks are currently offered in
which Massachusetts counties. I then assume that any counterfactual network
must be offered in the same counties as where those networks are currently
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observed. For example, if the GIC chooses to reduce Harvard’s narrow network
plan to be the size of Fallon’s narrow network plan, then the new network can
only be offered in counties in which Fallon’s plan is offered. Between all the
offered plans, individuals in all counties must be offered insurance.
Table 10 reports the equilibrium predicted products/networks offered from
the first stage of the model, where the GIC’s product choice is endogenized. Col-
umn 3 reports the observed products offered in 2013, Column 4 reports the pre-
dicted products offered under the base scenario, Column 5 reports equilibrium
products assuming enrollees get re-enrolled in the closest narrow plan of the
same insurer, Column 6 reports product choices assuming that the GIC has no
fixed costs for offering any additional plans, and Column 6 reports the equilib-
rium offered products assuming that the GIC does not consider enrollee inertia
as part of the total welfare function when making product choice decisions.
The predicted networks offered in Column 4 match the observed products
very well. It correctly predicts the fact that Harvard Pilgrim and Fallon offer
both a “narrow” and “broad” product, and also correctly predicts that HNE
and NHP continue to offer their respective networks. The only difference in
the predicted plans from the observed plans is the fact that the GIC chooses not
to offer Tufts’ narrow network plan. This is due to the fact that Tufts’ narrow
plan only had about a 3% market share, even after the premium holiday was
instituted in 2012. The model therefore has difficulty in rationalizing the GIC’s
choice of offering such a product, and instead predicts that the fixed costs of
offering the plan outweigh the possible price reductions and marginal social
welfare gains of offering it.22
22It may be the case that the GIC is more forward-looking than the static model I have de-
veloped predicts. If the GIC, in considering plan design decisions, weighs future social welfare
changes, this might explain its decision to offer Tufts’ narrow network plan, despite its initial
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Table 1.10: Model Fit: Equilibrium Products and Networks 2013
Insurer Network Observed Pred. Pred(NN Ch) Pred. (No FC) Pred. (No Inert)
Fallon Very Narrow x x x x
Fallon Narrow x x
Fallon Medium x x
Fallon Broad x x x x
HPHC Very Narrow x
HPHC Narrow x
HPHC Medium x x x x
HPHC Broad x x x x
HNE Narrow x x x x x
NHP Narrow x x x x x
Tufts Very Narrow x
Tufts Narrow x x
Tufts Medium x
Tufts Broad x x x x
Notes: GIC observed and predicted products offered under various model assumptions. “NN
CH” refers to the assumption that if a narrow network product is removed, the GIC would
automatically enroll consumers in the closest network plan by the same insurer (i.e. these
consumers would not exhibit any switching costs so long as another insurer was present). “No
FC” refers to a model without any fixed costs. “No Inert” refers to a model where the GIC does
not consider enrolle inertia when making product choice decisions.
The model likewise predicts plan choices pretty well when enrollees are al-
lowed to stay in narrow network plans that are altered. Interestingly, the GIC
continues to offer Harvard’s exact network under this scenario (the “medium”
network), but induces Fallon to switch from a “very narrow” to the same
“medium” network. The stems directly from the willingness-to-pay estimates
from the plan demand model, showing that most Fallon enrollees would be
willing to pay a significant premium in order to move away from its narrow
network (while the same is not true of Harvard).
To further investigate the role that fixed costs play for employer product of-
ferings, Column 5 reports the equilibrium products offered assuming that there
are no fixed costs. Unsurprisingly, this predicts that the GIC would offer every
poor performance. Indeed, this would also explain the very reason the GIC offered the premium
holiday as well. In the future, I will look at alternative models where I allow the GIC to have a
more dynamic objective function.
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available product on the market, as each would generate some welfare gains
and reduce costs. This suggests that fixed costs do play an important role in
keeping the GIC from offering multiple products.
Finally, to demonstrate the role that inertia plays in determining employer
product choices, I report the results of the equilibrium model assuming that
in choosing plans and networks, the GIC does not consider inertia in its over-
all objective function. In other words, the GIC accurately predicts consumer
enrollment patterns given the extent to which inertia exists in the market, but
when measuring consumer surplus, it considers inertia as irrelevant. In effect,
this would be similar to an assumption that if a plan is removed from the GIC
product line, the GIC would automatically reenroll all members of the removed
product into their preferred choice without having the consumer make an active
choice. In this model, the GIC only cares about enrollee welfare as it pertains
to the tradeoff between premiums and networks, not whether the individual
remains on the same plan as the previous year.
In this scenario, the model predicts that the GIC drops every single plan
with the exception of two Fallon plans (a “very narrow” network and a “nar-
row” network), HNE, and NHP. The reason for this is that Fallon is able to se-
cure better rates for Reliant Medical Group, the dominant medical practice on
the very narrow network, than both Harvard and Tufts if they offered the same
network. Fallon, in other words, has a comparative advantage, particularly in
Central Massachusetts due to its favorable rates with the medical groups in that
area. Therefore the largest cost savings come from moving consumers onto Fal-
lon’s plan. However, offering this plan by itself would leave a majority of con-
sumers at a huge welfare loss, since most do not live in Central Massachusetts.
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To counteract these welfare losses, the GIC would need to ensure that there
are providers located near a majority of its customers. NHP has a relatively
broad network compared to the other “narrow network” plans, while also hav-
ing lower prices than its competitors, particularly for Partners-affiliated hospi-
tals and medical groups.23 While its brand effects are lower than that of Tufts
and Harvard, its presence would still generate enough welfare gains through its
broad network and low prices to warrant it being offered as part of the GIC’s
product menu. Finally, the GIC continues to offer HNE, largely to satisfy the
“no uninsurance” assumption. This is due to the fact that neither Fallon nor
NHP cover the Baystate health system, the dominant system in Western Mas-
sachusetts. HNE, meanwhile, does offer comprehensive coverage in Western
Massachusetts and is able to negotiate favorable rates with Baystate.
Therefore, with no inertia, the GIC would only keep the minimum number
of plans necessary in order to ensure full coverage across Massachusetts, while
reducing costs by favoring the insurers able to negotiate low rates in each re-
gion. NHP, through being vertically integrated with Partners, is able to keep
prices low in Eastern Massachusetts; Fallon is able to keep rates low in Central
Massachusetts; and HNE is able to keep rates low in Western Massachusetts.
Under this scenario, approximately 70% of the market would enroll in NHP
compared to about 30% enrolling in Fallon or HNE (reflecting the fact that most
consumers live in Eastern Massachusetts). This suggests that while Harvard
and Tufts may be the dominant insurers on the GIC, they are likely rewarded
due primarily to inertia in plan choices, rather than an actual valuation of their
networks or brands, and that the high costs they charge may not be worth their
23This is largely due to the fact that in 2013, Partners Health system actually purchased NHP.
This explains the lower negotiated rate that NHP has with Partners physicians and hospitals
and its ability to reign in premiums.
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presence as part of the GIC’s menu. Indeed, assuming a world where this is no
welfare loss due to switching costs, the GIC would have little reason to offer
these products.
1.6 Counterfactuals
In the previous section, I showed that dominant plans are rewarded largely
due to plan inertia, implying that employers may be offering plans that may be
overpriced relative to how consumers value the networks of those plans. I now
use the results from the estimates above to conduct several policy counterfac-
tual analyses aimed at reducing these inefficiencies. In particular, I ask what the
effects on GIC plan choices would be following implementation of a “Cadillac
Tax” on expensive health plans. I also ask how high a tax would need to be in
order to induce the GIC to make changes in their product menu that may bring
about social surplus. The original tax, as written in the ACA, was scheduled to
begin in 2018, with a 40% levy on thresholds of $10,200 for individual plans and
$27,500 for family coverage. The tax has been delayed to 2020. Projecting this
back to 2013, and assuming an annual health care inflation of approximately
6%, leaves a 2013 value for single-premiums at approximately $6,600 per year. I
conduct a slightly modified counterfactual from the actual proposed tax, setting
the single-premium threshold at an even $6,000 per year, or combined with the
25% enrollee share of premiums on the GIC, $125 per-member-per-month.24 I
then run the equilibrium model as I did above through several different rates
charged beyond this threshold: 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80%. I then use the model
to predict counterfactual product offerings, networks, medical spending, pre-
24In practice, running the analysis assuming a threshold of $6,600 changes very little.
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miums, consumer welfare, and total welfare that result from the tax. The pre-
ferred specification used for all of these analyses is the scenario in which the
GIC does take into consideration enrollee inertia in its welfare calculus when
setting plans. However, I also allow the GIC to re-enroll consumers into narrow
network plans within the same insurer (Column 5 from Table 10).
Three assumptions are necessary to proceed with the analysis. First, I as-
sume that the tax is paid entirely by the employer and not by the insurer. The
rules of the excise tax are written such that plan sponsors are responsible for
the tax. As the GIC offers a mix of self-insured and fully-insured products, this
implies that insurers of the fully-insured plans bear the tax, while the GIC bears
the tax for the self-insured products. Since each of the products likely to be sub-
ject to the tax are the large, broad-network plans, and the GIC self-insures these,
I assume that tax is levied on the GIC rather than the insurer. Second, I assume
that additional costs from tax cannot be passed on to the employees through
higher premiums, higher enrollee-shares of premiums, or higher cost-sharing,
but mainly through product and network choice. The assumption about premi-
ums is likely valid, as most employers are prohibited from charging premiums
that are too high in excess of medical payments due to MLR rules. Simulat-
ing employer choice of offering higher cost-sharing (in the form of deductibles,
for instance) would require a model that incorporates enrollee response to de-
ductibles, which is not possible in my setting, since the GIC deductibles are the
same across plans, meaning there is no variation with which to estimate de-
mand.25 Finally, modeling enrollee-share of premiums involves estimating the
relative weights that the employer places on consumer welfare versus outlays
25Future iterations of this paper will look at other employers who offer plans with multiple
deductibles in order to model employee response to cost-sharing, and thus employer choice of
not only networks, but plan deductibles.
93
through medical spending and premiums. Future analysis will conduct this
counterfactual as well, and treat the enrollee-share of premiums as an equilib-
rium object.
The final assumption is for the consumer surplus measure. In the reported
estimates, I assume that when considering which plans consumers will enroll
in and which products to offer, the GIC takes inertia into account to accurately
predict market shares and to provide value to consumers that include their pref-
erence to stay on similar plans. However, from a government or public policy
perspective, it is unclear that inertia should be considered in measures of so-
cial welfare or whether it reflects passivity or inattentiveness. Therefore, when
evaluating the tradeoff between decreases in spending and consumer surplus, I
report surplus measures that set inertia to zero. These are similar assumptions
that have been made in the literature many times (Polyakova, 2016; Shepard,
2016; Handel & Kolstad, 2015; Abaluck & Gruber, 2016).
Formally, consumer surplus in counterfactuals will be given by the modified
equation:
CS ′(δJt) =
∑
I
1
αI
log
(
J∑
j
exp(−rIjtαI + EUIjtβ1 + ηj)
)
(1.24)
Overall social welfare then is giving by:
W ′ = CS ′(δJt)−
∑
I
∑
j
(1− τ)sIjtRIjt −
∑
j
FCj (1.25)
Table 11 reports the results of the counterfactual exercises. A 20% and 40%
tax above the $6,000, while binding for Harvard and Tufts’ broad plans, are not
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Table 1.11: Counterfactuals: Cadillac Tax 2013
Insurer Network Observed 20% 40% 60% 80%
Fallon Very Narrow x x x
Fallon Narrow
Fallon Medium x x
Fallon Broad x x x
HPHC Very Narrow
HPHC Narrow
HPHC Medium x x x
HPHC Broad x x
HNE Narrow x x x x x
NHP Narrow x x x x x
Tufts Very Narrow
Tufts Narrow x
Tufts Medium
Tufts Broad x x x
∆ Spending (PMPM) 14.61 29.20 -76.05 -76.05
∆ Spending (%) 0.04 0.08 -0.21 -0.21
∆CS(δjt) (PMPM) 0.00 0.00 -58.13 -58.13
∆CS(δjt) (%) 0.00 0.00 -0.47 -0.47
Notes: Counterfactuals of a proposed “Cadillac tax” on expensive health plans at vari-
ous rates past a $6,000 annual threshhold.
substantial enough to cause the GIC to alter its product line. Instead, the tax
merely causes a slight decrease in social welfare, as GIC spending goes up per
member as a result of the tax. A 60% tax, however, causes the GIC to alter its ex-
isting networks considerably. The first thing to note is that under a tax, the GIC
drops each of its broad network plans by every insurer. The reasoning behind
this is selection: if the GIC responded to the tax by dropping Harvard’s broad
plan but not Tufts, Harvard’s enrollees who lived closer to expensive physicians
and hospitals would simply switch to Tufts. While this strategy would allow
the GIC to save on annual fixed costs, the marginal costs (premiums paid to
insurers) would barely be affected and consumer welfare would decrease sub-
stantially by the loss of Harvard’s broad network plan. Therefore in order to
avoid the tax, the GIC would have to drop every broad plan.
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The second result is that the GIC moves to an equilibrium in which only
three products are offered. The new equilibrium products are the Fallon “very
narrow” network, the HNE network, and the NHP narrow network. These
products remain the same for any tax level set about 60%. It is interesting to
note why the GIC moves to this particular equilibrium rather than one in which
Harvard or Tufts offers narrow network plans instead of the Fallon, HNE, or
NHP. The reason is similar to that of the “no inertia” model stated above. In-
deed, the optimal strategy for the GIC under a scenario where the tax both binds
and is large enough to overcome substantial enrollee plan persistence would be
to offer the minimum number of plans necessary that just span all the counties
in Massachusetts. The HNE network offers access to Baystate Health in West-
ern Massachusetts, Fallon offers the best negotiated rates with Reliant Medical
group in Central Massachusetts, and NHP offers the best rates with Partners
in Eastern Massachusetts. Between these three networks alone, the GIC is able
to achieve the most savings in premiums. Although welfare gains could be
achieved by offering additional narrow network plans, these gains are not sub-
stantial enough to offset the fixed costs of doing so.
At the new equilibrium, I find that any tax rate above 60% decreases net GIC
spending by approximately $76 per member per month, or a reduction in spend-
ing of approximately 21%. Consumer surplus (less inertia) also decreases under
these scenarios, both from having a smaller choice set of plans (and less favor-
able insurer brands) and from having a smaller scope of providers to choose
from within these plans. However, the surplus loss is about $58 per member
per month (approximately a 47% decrease), less than the decrease in overall
spending that would result from the product switch. This suggests that a tax
can achieve social welfare gains of approximately $18 per member per month,
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though the tax rate would need to be quite high in order to achieve these gains.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I estimated a model of supply and demand for health insur-
ance plans in order to assess employer incentives to design and offer “narrow-
network” insurance plans to their enrollees. I find that despite the fact that con-
sumers in employer markets are commonly thought to be less price-sensitive
and more willing to pay for broad networks than consumers shopping among
individual Exchanges, much of the demand for broad-network plans derives
from enrollee inertia, or preference to remain on the same plan as the previous
year. This inertia not only explains why enrollees select into broad network
plans (which have been offered on the market for longer periods of time), but
employer choice of products offered as well, leading to increases in health care
costs in both hospital and physician markets. I find that a hypothetical “Cadil-
lac Tax” on plans in excess of the thresholds set by the Affordable Care Act will
offset this inertia and induce employers to drop their broad network products
in favor of limited network designs.
Overall, this paper contributes towards our understanding of what con-
sumers in employer markets value in their choice of plan, and how employers
select plan characteristics. While narrow networks grow more prevalent in the
individual exchanges, they have yet to gain a strong hold in employer markets,
where most people obtain their health insurance. Policymakers have been de-
bating whether such plans are viable in the employer market or whether their
widespread adoption would lead to substantial losses. Using detailed data on
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provider networks, the results of this paper suggest that moving towards nar-
row networks beyond the individual market would have the potential towards
bringing about social welfare gains, by achieving considerable reductions in
health spending that exceed the welfare loss of choice.
This leaves the question of how policymakers might incentivize the move
towards narrow networks. The Cadillac Tax is a step in the direction of in-
centivizing insurers to adopt more value-based design, but knowing how em-
ployers aggregate consumer preferences and how they select products for their
enrollees is of paramount importance to evaluating the effect of policy. By mod-
eling the employer choice under various scenarios and by estimating the fixed
costs of offering multiple plans, I am able to evaluate the likely impact of the
tax. I am also able to demonstrate how high a tax would need to be in order
to bring about changes in product portfolios, medical spending, and consumer
welfare.
There are some extensions that can be applied to this work. I only model
the plan offer decisions of one large employer. The effect of the “Cadillac Tax”
would differ across firms depending on the enrollee composition of those firms,
the size of the firms, and the bargaining power that the firms have over insur-
ers to set premiums. If, for instance, insurers have greater leeway to set high
premiums in other firms, then offering more choice may be an effective way to
combat the tax, through inducing insurers to compete for lower premiums. In-
corporating multiple employers with firm heterogeneity is a natural next step
for this paper
My model also abstracts from insurer-provider bargaining. One effect of
the tax might be to induce hospitals and physician practices to reduce their
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negotiated prices with insurers for fear of no longer being offered by the em-
ployer. Future work will incorporate a stage in the model where insurers and
physicians/hospitals bargain over negotiated rates, while simultaneously the
employer chooses a set of products endogenously. Finally, future work can also
incorporate non-network measures that employers might take in response to a
tax (including increasing enrollee premium contributions or cost-sharing).
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CHAPTER 2
HAS MEDICAL SPENDING BEEN WORTH IT? ESTIMATING QUALITY
ADJUSTED PRICE INDICES FOR COLORECTAL CANCER
TREATMENTS1
2.1 Introduction
In 2015, United States health care spending reached $3.2 trillion, or about
18% of GDP, about twice the share it was in 1980.2 Medical technology, broadly
defined as the products and services patients receive when treated, is widely
accepted as the engine behind such increases in medical spending. For exam-
ple, Newhouse (1992) estimated that approximately one-quarter to one-half of
the growth in medical costs in the United States between 1960 and 2007 was
due to changing medical technologies (Newhouse, 1992).3 A more recent study
attributed approximately a quarter to a half of the increase in health spending
since 1960 to technological change in the health care (Smith, Newhouse, & Free-
land, 2009).
Despite these increases, there is also evidence that medical care in the US
1THIS CHAPTER WAS COAUTHORED WITH CLAUDIO LUCARELLI AND SEAN
NICHOLSON
2See the National Health Expenditure Accounts from CMS:
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-
reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nationalhealthaccountshistorical.html
3Newhouse estimates the proportion of the growth in medical spending accounted for by the
aging of the population, improved health insurance based upon the RAND health insurance
experiment price elasticity, and rising income based on the RAND income elasticity. Medical
technology is the residual once the factors above have been accounted for. Finkelstein (2007)
argues that the aggregate, market-wide effects of health insurance on spending are larger than
those derived from individual choices in the RAND experiment. She estimates that about one-
half of the growth in US hospital spending between 1950 and 1990 was due to the spread of
health insurance, which may indicate that medical technology accounts for less than one-half of
the growth in medical spending
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has improved substantially over the past 30 years for certain health conditions
such as cardiovascular disease. For example, the life expectancy of a 45-year old
today is 4.4 years longer than it was in 1950 (Cutler, 2004).4 Murphy and Topel
(2006) estimate that the total rise in life expectancy in the US between 1970 and
2000 increased national wealth by $3.2 trillion per year, which is approximately
equal in value to one-half of GDP (Murphy & Topel, 2006).
An important policy issue, therefore, is whether the value of new medical
technology exceeds its cost. More generally, if new technologies are priced
higher than the technologies they replace and consumers value the superior
health outcomes that can now be produced, are medical prices rising or falling
once one correctly accounts for quality? If the government and private health
insurers believe new medical technologies are causing quality-adjusted prices to
increase, on average, they may make it more difficult for new products to reach
the market and/or reduce payment for new products, which would dampen
the financial incentives to innovate. Conversely, if public and private payers be-
lieve technology is helping drive down quality-adjusted prices, they are likely
to maintain or enhance incentives to innovate.
There are several important empirical challenges in measuring a medical
price index (Berndt et al., 2000). One challenge is that quantities change as new
goods displace old goods in the market. Therefore, a price index needs to allow
the bundle of goods to change over time as well as the weight on each com-
ponent in the bundle. Another challenge is that often transaction prices are not
observed. Most publicly available data on health care prices rely on “list prices,”
i.e. the prices that pharmaceutical firms, medical firms, physicians, or hospitals
4Cutler (2004) estimates that two-thirds of this increase was due to changing medical tech-
nologies, primarily for the treatment of cardiovascular disease. The remaining one-third was
due to behavioral changes.
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charge for a product or service. Health insurers usually receive discounts off
of list prices. In addition, due to health insurance, most consumers do not face
the full price of medical care and seek to consume beyond the point where the
marginal value of care equals the full price. Patients also rely on physicians to
provide information regarding the value of medical goods and services. The
implication is that consumer purchases in the medical market will not necessar-
ily reveal their marginal valuation of a good or service. Finally, prices increases
are often accompanied by quality improvements. Therefore, perhaps the great-
est empirical challenge for constructing meaningful health care price indices is
how to account for the changing quality of medical products and services. For
example, life expectancy and mortality rates are often used as proxies for qual-
ity, but in some medical settings improvements in the quality of life are more
important than the length of life. Information on such measures is often diffi-
cult to obtain.
Due to these considerable empirical challenges, there have been relatively
few studies of whether medical prices are rising or falling once one takes into
consideration the attributes of the new products and consumers valuations of
those attributes. Existing studies can be placed into three groups based on the
method used. One method to account for changing quality is to measure actual
changes or expected changes in health outcomes (e.g., life expectancy or remis-
sion of a depressive episode) due to the adoption of new medical technologies,
monetizing these improvements based on separate estimates from the literature
(e.g., $100,000 per year of life), and subtracting the value of the health gains
from the rising costs. Cutler et al. (1998) show that the life expectancy of heart
attack patients increased by eight months between 1984 and 1991. The value of
per-patient expected longevity ($11,100) increased three times more than treat-
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ment costs ($3,600) during this time period in real terms, which implies that the
quality-adjusted price index fell by about one percent annually (Cutler, McLel-
lan, Newouse, & Remler, 1998). Berndt et al. (2002) conclude that the real cost
of treating major depression decreased by about two percent per year between
1991 and 1996 once one takes into account the probability that a patients de-
pression goes into remission (Berndt, Bir, Busch, & Frank, 2002). Eggleston et
al. (2011) conclude that the cost of treating diabetes declined between 1999 and
2009 once one accounts for the value of reduced coronary heart disease mortal-
ity (Eggleston, Shah, Smith, & Berndt, 2011).
Two studies estimate hedonic price indices by regressing prices on objec-
tive measures of product attributes and time indicator variables. Cockburn and
Anis (2001) find that rheumatoid arthritis prices rose over time, even after ac-
counting for each drugs expected efficacy and toxicity (Cockburn & Anis, 2001).
Dunn (2012) reports that the prices of cholesterol drugs fell by 30 percent be-
tween 1996 and 2007 once one accounts for each drug’s expected change in a
patients bad and good cholesterol levels (A. Dunn, 2012). The two studies clos-
est to our approach also construct price indices, or the components of an index,
based on discrete choice demand models. Estimating a nested multinomial logit
model, Trajtenberg (1989) shows that the social returns to CT scanner innova-
tion exceeded the R&D costs, especially when the first products were introduced
(1972-1978) (Trajtenberg, 1989). Dunn (2012) uses a logit model to estimate pa-
tients demand for cholesterol drugs and concludes that quality-adjusted prices
fell by about 25 percent between 1996 and 2007, similar to the results from the
hedonic model.
The pharmaceutical industry is the source of considerable innovation in
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medical care. The pharmaceutical industry invests over $40 billion per year
in research and development, which represents about 16 percent of the indus-
trys revenue. Most new pharmaceuticals are priced higher than the treatment
methods they replace, and this has certainly been the case with colorectal cancer
drugs. The average price of providing a colorectal cancer patient with a 24-week
drug regimen increased from $127 in 1993 to $36,300 in 2005.5 There has been
substantial innovation in the treatment of colorectal cancer patients over the last
decade. Five new drugs were approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) for the treatment of colorectal cancer between 1996 and 2004, and these
drugs collectively had an 86 percent market share by the third quarter of 2005.6
We examine whether the substantial increase in spending associated with
pharmaceutical innovation in the treatment of colorectal cancer has been worth
it. Specifically, we estimate a price index for colorectal cancer drugs for each
quarter between 1993 and the first half of 2005 that takes into consideration
the quality (i.e., the efficacy and side effects as reported in clinical trials) of
each drug on the market and the value that oncologists attach to drug qual-
ity. We estimate a quality-adjusted price index using methods developed by
(Berry, 1994), (Berry, Levinsohn, & Pakes, 1995)and (Nevo, 2001, 2003). These
techniques have been used to estimate the welfare effects of new automobiles
(Petrin, 2002), computers (Song, 2007, 2008),breakfast cereal (Nevo, 2003), and
a host of other markets, but we are aware of only two studies applying such
discrete choice methods towards the construction of price indices in the phar-
maceutical market, as mentioned above. We improve on these studies both by
applying newer methods for demand estimation not used in prior work and
5Most colorectal cancer patients are treated with a combination of two or more drugs, which
we refer to as a regimen
6Market share data are from IntrinsiQ.
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in focusing on transaction-level data for physician purchases of pharmaceuti-
cals (A. Dunn, 2012). In addition to constructing price indices using hedonic
price regressions and logit demand models, we also estimate a full random-
coefficients model with consumer (physician) heterogeneity, and a pure char-
acteristics model of demand. The pure characteristics model, to our knowl-
edge, has only been applied empirically in a select few studies on computer
markets (Song, 2007, 2008; Nosko, 2014). We show that by shedding the id-
iosyncratic logit error term that is a workhouse of traditional demand models,
this model produces much more realistic substitution patterns as new colorectal
cancer treatments enter the market and replace existing regimens.
The first step in constructing the price index is to estimate oncologists de-
mand for colon cancer drug treatment regimens, which we argue is a function
of the observed and unobserved quality of each regimen, as well as the price a
physician must pay to acquire the regimen. An observation in this estimation is
the market share of each regimen for each quarter. The second step is to calcu-
late the equivalent variation (EV) between each adjacent pair of quarters. The
EV between period t − 1 and t is the change in spending required to achieve
physicians utility in period t relative to t−1, taking into consideration that both
the quality of the drug regimens on the market and the prices of those regimens
may have changed between these two periods. Positive values imply that the
value of the drugs is increasing over time by more than their prices, whereas
negative values imply the opposite. The third step is to translate the EV into
a quality-adjusted price index by calculating the change in drug prices that is
consistent with the welfare effect captured by the EV.
We generate several indices for purposes of comparison. First, we estimate a
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“nave” price index that merely reports the mean price of colon cancer regimens
in each quarter, relative to the first quarter of 1993, without any adjustments
for regimen attributes but allowing the market shares (or bundle weights) to
change. The naive index will be based on the prices physicians pay to acquire
each regimen and the market share of each regimen. Comparing the quality-
adjusted price indices to the naive index illustrates the importance of account-
ing for the changing quality of pharmaceutical products. Second, we estimate
a hedonic price index by regressing prices on product characteristics and quar-
ter indicator variables. This regression, which controls for changing product
attributes by means of a reduced form projection of markups on the characteris-
tic space, is the traditional method used to account for changing attributes and
the introduction of new goods. Third, we estimate a logit model of physician
utility maximization that takes into account the equivalent variation described
above. Fourth, we extend the logit model to incorporate physician heterogene-
ity in preferences for attributes of the treatment regimens by estimated a full
random-coefficients model. Finally, we estimate a pure characteristics model of
demand in order to test whether the price index changes when removing the id-
iosyncratic error term implicit in the logit and full random-coefficients models
and allowing for more realistic substitution patterns between products.
We find that the naive price index greatly overestimates the price increase.
While the quality-adjusted price indices show increases over the 13-year period
we study, these increases are far more modest than the naive index would sug-
gest. Specifically, while the (log) naive price index increases about 100% during
our sample period, the logit index increases by only 4.5% and the pure char-
acteristics model increases by about 18%. All of the new drugs in our sample
period are still under patent protection. Presumably consumers would capture
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more of the surplus once generic drugs enter the market.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Medical Treatment of Colorectal Cancer
Colorectal cancer is a good health condition for studying the welfare effects
of medical innovation because it is a common health condition, the majority of
patients today are treated with drugs that did not exist two decades ago, and
treatment costs are rising rapidly. According to the National Cancer Institute
(NCI), approximately 133,000 patients are diagnosed with colorectal cancer in
the United States per year, resulting in about 50,000 deaths annually from the
disease. This places colorectal cancer as the fourth most common cancer based
on number of new patients, after breast, prostate, and lung. It is estimated that
people born today will have a 4.5 percent chance of being diagnosed with col-
orectal cancer over their lifetime. According to the NCI, between 2005 and 2011
colorectal cancer patients had a 65 percent chance of surviving for five years.
The probability a patient will survive for five years ranges from 90 percent for
those diagnosed with Stage I cancer to 13 percent for those diagnosed with Stage
IV (or metastatic) cancer.7
Colorectal cancer is treated differently depending on the stage of the disease
at diagnosis. Most patients with a Stage I, II, or III disease at diagnosis will have
the tumor removed surgically, or resected, in a hospital. The National Com-
7Cancers are classified into four stages, with higher numbers indicating that the cancer has
spread to the lymph nodes (Stage III) or beyond its initial location (Stage IV).
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prehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) recommends that patients with Stage III
disease receive six months of drug treatment following the resection; they do
not recommend drug treatment for Stage I patients; and they recommend that
Stage II patients consider drug treatment after discussing the potential benefits
and side effects with their physician. Most Stage IV patients are treated with
drugs, either to shrink the tumor so that it can be resected, following a resec-
tion, or when the tumor is unresectable in order to lengthen and improve the
quality of life. In this paper we do not model the process by which a physician
and her patient decide whether or not to receive drug treatment; we examine
prescription drug choices conditional on the decision to receive drug treatment.
Treating colorectal cancer is expensive. Paramore et al. (2006) report that
between 1998 and 2004, which is part of the time period we study in this paper,
newly-diagnosed metastatic colorectal cancer patients in the United States re-
ceived $97,000 of additional medical treatment in the 13 months following their
diagnosis relative to a similar (based on age, gender, and geography) group
of people (Paramore, Thomas, Knopf, .s Cragin, & Fraeman, 2006). Most of the
spending occurred for hospital care ($37,400, on average), including the surgical
resection, and physician visits ($34,600), including drugs and their administra-
tion.
In this paper we present a price index for drug treatment only, not for the
total cost of treating colorectal cancer. We focus on drug costs because this is
where the treatment innovation has occurred starting in 1996, and drug inno-
vation has been the main driver of the subsequent increase in treatment costs
and improvements in health. In our data set, the average cost of providing six-
months of drug treatment to a colorectal cancer patient increased from about
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$100 in 1993 to over $36,000 in 2005 (see Figure 2). Hospital costs, on the other
hand, did not increase substantially during this time period for colorectal cancer
patients nor were there any surgical innovations that would have lengthened
life or improved the quality of life substantially.
About 95 percent of colorectal cancer patients who were treated with
drugs between 1993 and 1996 received a chemotherapy regimen called 5-
FU/leucovorin. This regimen was inexpensive because the patents on the
two component drugs (fluorouracil and leucovorin) had expired, so there were
many companies offering low-cost generic versions. Between 1996 and 2004,
five new drugs were approved to treat colorectal cancer. By 2005, these
drugs collectively captured about 80 percent of the market. Most of the new
drugs are biologics that target the inner workings of cancer cells, whereas
5-FU/leucovorin is a standard chemotherapy treatment that targets all fast-
growing cells. Although the new drugs extended life in randomized clini-
cal trials relative to chemotherapy and sometimes have less severe side effects
due to their targeted nature, they are also priced much higher than standard
chemotherapy drugs. Most colorectal cancer patients who are treated with phar-
maceuticals receive multiple drugs in the form of a regimen rather than a single
drug, similar to anti-retroviral “cocktail treatments for AIDS patients. For exam-
ple, the regimen with the greatest market share in 2005 contained four separate
drugs: bevacizumab, oxaliplatin, fluorouracil, and leucovorin. Most of our anal-
ysis in this paper, therefore, is conducted at the level of a regimen rather than
a drug. We describe the characteristics of the various drug regimens in greater
detail in the Data section.
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2.2.2 Physician Behavior and Modeling Approach
In most markets one can use prices to infer consumers willingness to pay for
products and services because consumers are well informed and face the full
price. Several features of the health care market create challenges for estimat-
ing and interpreting a quality-adjusted price index. Physicians (or sometimes
hospitals on behalf of their physicians) purchase oncology drugs from whole-
salers (who previously purchased them from drug manufacturers), administer
them to patients in their offices, and then bill the patients insurance company
for the drugs.8 Health insurers reimburse physicians for cancer drugs and the
time required to administer the drugs to patients, and control moral hazard
by requiring patients to pay a portion of the treatment cost and by restricting
(expensive) treatments to patients who are likely to benefit from them (e.g., re-
quiring a physician to receive authorization from the insurer before treating a
patient).9 Finally, patients rely on physicians to recommend a treatment. Thus,
colorectal cancer patients do not face the full price of drugs and rely on physi-
cians to articulate both the choice set and the attributes of the drugs in the choice
set. And physicians have an opportunity to exploit their informational advan-
tage and recommend particular drugs when the health insurers reimbursement
amount deviates substantially from physicians drug acquisition costs.
We model the choice of a colorectal cancer drug regimen from a physicians
perspective by positing that physicians choose treatments to maximize their
own utility. Our key assumption in interpreting the price indices is that physi-
8Based on data from IMS Health, 59 percent of colorectal cancer drugs in the third quarter of
2005 were purchased by physician offices/clinics and 28 percent by hospitals. The remainder
was purchased by retail and mail order pharmacies, health maintenance organizations, and
long-term care facilities.
9Medicare patients, for example, pay 20 percent of the price of drugs administered by physi-
cians if they have Part B coverage and no Medigap supplemental insurance.
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cians act as the social planner, trading off the full price of oncology drugs against
the financial value of the health benefits patients receive from those drugs. We
focus on a physicians choice because they are arguably the most knowledgeable
party. Physicians observe the full price of oncology drugs when they purchase
them from wholesalers and store them in their offices. Physicians should be
aware of the efficacy and safety of oncology drugs based on how the drugs per-
formed in randomized controlled trials during the approval process, as well as
by observing how their own patients respond to the drugs.
One criticism of our assumption is that physicians may, in fact, be insu-
lated from the price of oncology drugs because health insurers ultimately reim-
burse them for drug acquisition costs. Although physicians are eventually reim-
bursed, they do take temporary ownership of oncology drugs. As such, physi-
cians face the possible risk of not being reimbursed by health insurers and may
incur substantial carrying costs. For example, a physician who pays $50,000 for
the drugs in one patients regimen and experiences a three-month delay between
when she acquires the drugs and when her practice is reimbursed by a health
insurer would incur an inventory carrying cost of $625 at an interest rate of five
percent. Furthermore, if physicians care about patients out-of-pocket costs they
will internalize part of the price. Both carrying costs and patients out-of-pocket
costs, which are often a percentage of the price the insurer pays, increase with a
drugs price. Another criticism of our assumption is that if physicians earn prof-
its on oncology drugs and profits influence prescribing decisions, this might
bias the price and attribute estimates in our model. In the early 2000s, the fed-
eral government concluded that oncologists were earning profits on most oncol-
ogy drugs by acquiring them for less than the Medicare reimbursement amount
(General Accounting Office, 2001). At the time Medicare reimbursed oncologists
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95 percent of a drugs listed average wholesale price (AWP), whereas physicians
could acquire many drugs from wholesalers for substantially less than AWP.
Most private health insurance companies reimbursed physicians using a simi-
lar formula, so these profits occurred for all patient types 10 Most of these profits
were eliminated in 2005 when Medicare began reimbursing oncologists based
on a drugs actual average selling price (ASP) rather than its list price (MedPAC,
2006).
There is evidence that the profits oncologists earned on drugs did affect treat-
ment decisions, especially prior to 2004. These papers identify effects by exam-
ining variations in profits across oncology drug treatments due to geographic
reimbursement rules (Jacobson & Newhouse, 2006),or variation within treat-
ments over time due to the 2005 Medicare policy change (Jacobson, Earle, Price,
& Newhouse, 2010; andTom Y. Chang, Newhouse, & Earle, 2013), or the entry of
generic drugs (Conti, Rosenthal, Polite, Bach, & Shih, 2012). Our interpretation
of these studies is that the magnitudes of the effects are small. In Jacobson et al
(2006), for example, a one-standard deviation increase in reimbursement gen-
erosity is associated with an increase of about five percent in the cost of drug
treatment prescribed to colorectal cancer patients. .
One factor supporting our assumption that physicians act as the social plan-
ner is that health insurers have the incentive to encourage physicians to trade-
off the full price of drugs against patients health benefits, and the tools to do
so. When physicians use expensive drugs it forces a health insurer to charge
its customers higher premiums, but when patients receive treatments that im-
prove their health, the insurance plan becomes more attractive to prospective
10In the IntrinsiQ data set we use, Medicare patients account for about one-half of all colorec-
tal cancer patients who receive drug treatment
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enrollees. Therefore, insurers should set a patients drug co-insurance rate,
physicians drug profits, and its oversight policies (e.g., the criteria for pre-
authorizing a proposed oncology treatment) to encourage optimal drug treat-
ment decisions. Dunn (2012) and Cockburn and Anis (2001) make similar as-
sumptions that physicians and insurers act in the best interest of patients when
interpreting their medical price indices.
2.3 Models
2.3.1 Hedonic Price Regression
Hedonic price regressions were introduced by (Court, 1939) and formalized
by (Griliches, 1961) as a way to account for the new goods problem. In essence,
newer goods usually contain more desirable characteristics, and therefore, fail-
ing to account for the value of these characteristics will overstate the true change
in prices. The hedonic price regression is motivated by the “hedonic hypothe-
sis, which states that goods can be viewed as aggregations or bundles of lower-
order variables that the literature calls characteristics or attributes. These char-
acteristics are what consumers care about and are present in utility functions.
The hedonic function disaggregates the observed transaction prices into vari-
ables that affect the economic agents behavior. Court and Griliches proposed
estimating a surface that relates prices to product characteristics and time, and
then using the results to estimate price changes conditional on constant charac-
teristics.
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ln(pit) = βXjt +
∑
t
γtdt + jt (2.1)
where pjt is the price of regimen j in quarter t, xjt contains the attributes of
each regimen, including effectiveness attributes such as expected length of sur-
vival, time-to- progression, and response rate, as well as grade 3 and grade 4
side effects such as diarrhea, nausea, abdominal pain, vomiting, and neutrope-
nia, and an indicator of whether the regimen is a pill versus an infused drug.
The time indicators denote quarters, and the base quarter is the first quarter of
1993.
The price changes, which are obtained from the parameters of the above
model to form a price index, are:
PIt − PIt−1
PIt−1
= exp(γt − γt−1)− 1
and therefore,
PIt = exp(γt − γt−1)PIt−1
Although the parameters β in equation (1) have been referred to as “implicit
prices, the theoretical foundations of the hedonic surface are not clear. (Pakes,
2005) argues that in oligopolistic markets prices depend on both marginal costs
and markups, and therefore the hedonic price regression constitutes a reduced
form or projection of these markups on the characteristic space. In the industry
we study, given the high costs of R&D relative to marginal production costs,
markups should be large and Pakess insights are applicable. In other words,
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it is unclear ex ante whether a particular sign on β or γ should reflect demand
or supply factors. Suppose we observe prices rising from one quarter to the
next (i.e., the γ for that quarter is positive). This could either reflect increased
demand for colorectal cancer drugs or increased marginal costs, both of which
would generate higher markups.
The parameters, therefore, do not necessarily follow any restriction based
on economic theory; the β parameters may have the “wrong sign relative to
what one would expect. For example, if there is more entry of products into a
particular region of the attribute space that has more desirable characteristics
for the average consumer (e.g., survival), this will reduce the markups of these
products (so that prices might be lower due to competitive pressure rather than
higher due to higher demand), and allow products with less desirable charac-
teristics for the average consumer (e.g., worse side effects) to exploit monopoly
power among the consumers who do not experience the strong side effects. We
discuss the results of the hedonic price regression in the results section of the
paper.
2.3.2 Logit Model
Our second price index explicitly calculates welfare changes due to the in-
troduction of new products. This index is derived by estimating an equilibrium
model of colon cancer drug pricing. (Trajtenberg, 1990), who introduced the
idea, proposed a two-stage method to construct a quality-adjusted price index.
In the first stage one obtains the welfare changes from product innovation, and
in the second stage one builds the price index upon these welfare changes.
115
In this paper we specify a logit model, where physician demand for oncology
drugs has the following form:
uijt = −αpjt + βxjt + ξj + ∆ξj + ijt (2.2)
where pjt is the price of regimen j at time t, xjt are the observable attributes
of the regimen, ξj is the mean of the unobserved characteristics, and ∆ξj is a
time-specific deviation from this mean. ijt, which is an idiosyncratic shock to
preferences for regimen j, is assumed to follow a Type I Extreme Value distribu-
tion.11 The outside option (j = 0) in this paper includes off-label colon cancer
drug treatments, regimens with very small market shares, and regimens with
missing efficacy or side effect attributes.
Patients are assumed to be administered one regimen at a time, which max-
imizes their utility. This implicitly defines a region of the unobserved term for
which alternative j yields a higher utility than any other alternative k
Ajt = {it|uijt > uikt∀k 6= j}
We obtain the market shares for each regimen j by aggregating individual
preferences over the region Ajt:
Sjt =
∫
Ajt
dP ()
11In this model all the individual-specific heterogeneity is contained in the idiosyncratic shock
to preferences, and therefore, it suffers from the well-known independence of irrelevant alter-
natives criticism (see Nevo (2000) for a complete discussion of the limitations of this approach
(Nevo, 2000)). In addition, Petrin (2002) points out that the welfare calculations based on these
models depend heavily on the error term
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In this case, where  is assumed to be Type I Extreme Value, the integral can
be computed analytically as:
Sjt =
exp(−αpjt + βxjt + ξj + ∆ξj)
1 +
J∑
k=1
exp(−αpkt + βxkt + ξk + ∆ξk)
(2.3)
We define the mean utility level at time t as: δjt = −αpjt + βxjt + ξj + ∆ξj .
Thus, market shares can be written as the function of δjt:
Sjt =
exp(δjt)
1 +
J∑
k=1
exp(δjt)
The market shares predicted by the model are then matched with the ob-
served market shares sjt. Berry (1994) shows that δj can be uniquely identified
by inverting the market share function S−1(st) = δt. For the logit model, the
inversion yields
lnsjt − lns0t = −αpjt + βxjt + ξj + ∆ξj (2.4)
Because the unobserved drug regimen characteristics are likely to be corre-
lated with price, estimating the equation above requires instrumental variables.
We obtain our instruments by using the supply side market equilibrium con-
ditions. Because price is a function of marginal costs and markups, any ex-
ogenous variable that shifts marginal costs or markups should be a valid in-
strument. Bresnahan et al. (1997) use as instruments the plausibly exogenous
number of products in the market and the sum of observed characteristics of the
competitors, which measure how crowded and competitive the product space is
117
(Bresnahan, Stern, & Trajtenberg, 1997). These sets of instruments should affect
markups via changes in the competitive environment, and therefore should be
correlated with price but uncorrelated with unobserved characteristics.
However, product attributes do not vary much over time in our sample due
to infrequent product entry and exit. Therefore, our first-stage regressions using
these “BLP-style” instruments are generally weak, and the estimation results do
not differ measurably from standard OLS models. Therefore, we follow Nevo
(2000) and use “Hausman-style” instruments. Specifically, we construct two in-
struments with the lagged prices of other regimens. For the price of regimen j in
period t, one instrument is the average price in period t−1 of all other regimens
other than j. A second instrument is the average price in period t−1 of regimens
produced by firms whose drugs are not used in regimen j. The key identifying
assumption is that these instruments are uncorrelated with the current-period
demand shock, but are correlated with price of regimen j. For this to hold, we
require that the demand shock for regimen j in period t is uncorrelated with
the demand shock for regimen k in period t − 1, a condition likely to hold true
unless there exists a time-persistent market-level demand shock.
The logit price index is built based on changes in compensating variation
derived from the above model. The compensating variation provides a measure
of how much income could be taken away from (or given to) an individual to
leave her indifferent between facing the old choice set and the new improved
(inferior) choice set. Given the logit functional form, the compensating variation
is calculated as:
CVt =
ut − ut−1
α
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where ut is the unconditional indirect utility ut = maxjujt and α is the
marginal utility of income. (Small & Rosen, 1981) show that ut can be computed
as:
ut = ln
∑
j
exp(δj)
Trajtenberg (1990) shows that if the price change takes the form of a shift by a
factor of (1− µt) in the distribution of prices but the variance remains the same,
then the price index can be obtained as:
PIt = (1− µt)PIt−1
where:
µt =
CVt
CVt + p¯t
and p¯t is the average price in period t.
2.3.3 Full Random-Coefficients Model
The logit model, while easily computed and parsimonious, has some well-
known problems related to substitution patterns of new goods. In particular,
there is the famous “red bus, blue bus problem,” wherein when the price of one
good rises, consumers will tend to switch to other goods, regardless of their at-
tributes. The reason for this is embedded in the assumption of logit models that
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market shares are driven primarily by the mean utilities, δjt. This implies that
a new good entering the market will generate the same substitution patterns
towards it, regardless of the characteristics of existing products.
Because it is important to address the substitution pattern between a new
product and existing products when constructing the price index, we also esti-
mate a full random-coefficients model. The appeal of this model is that physi-
cians can differ in their tastes for colorectal cancer drug treatment character-
istics. Specifically, physicians can have different preferences regarding the ef-
ficacy and side effects measures reported from randomized clinical trials. Al-
lowing this realistic feature comes at the cost of increasing the computational
burden and introducing some simulation error. The benefit, though, is much
more reasonable substitution patterns that may affect welfare estimates.
Specifically, the utility function of the full random-coefficients model takes
the following form:
uijt = −αpjt + βxjt − αuvipjt + βuvixjt + ξj + ∆ξj + ijt (2.5)
where all of the variables and parameters are the same as in equation (2)
above, but now vi is an unobserved physician preference component, αu is the
parameter associated with individual physician price sensitivity, and βu is the
parameter associated with individual physician preference for drug attributes.
Using the Type I Extreme Value assumption for ijt, the predicted market
share equation now collapses to:
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Sjti =
exp(−αpjt + βxjt − αuvipjt + βuvixjt + ξj + ∆ξj)
1 +
J∑
k=1
exp(−αpkt + βxkt − αuvipkt + βuvixkt + ξk + ∆ξk)
(2.6)
=
exp(δjt − αuvipjt + βuvixjt)
1 +
J∑
k=1
exp(δkt − αuvipkt + βuvixkt)
(2.7)
where δjt = −αpjt + βxjt + ξj + ∆ξj .
Because equation (7) is a function of mean utilities, δj , and the random com-
ponents of the utility function , we cannot invert it to be a function solely of
observed market shares as in equation (3) above to yield the analytical form of
equation (4).
The parameters we need to estimate are θ = (θ1, θ2), where θ1 = (α, β) and
θ2 = (α
u, βu).
To do so, we first aggregate over individual preferences by drawing physi-
cian preferences, vi , from a standard normal distribution and approximating
equation (7) conditional on a starting value for δjt and the unobserved prefer-
ence parameters:
Sjt(δjt, α
u, βu) =
1
ns
ns∑
i=1
exp(δjt − αuvipjt + βuvixjt)
1 +
J∑
k=1
exp(δkt − αuvipkt + βuvixkt)
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) show that there exists a contraction map-
ping on the following equation:
δh+1jt (θ2) = δ
h
jt(θ2) + (ln(sjt)− ln(Sjt(δhjt, θ2))) (2.8)
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where h is the iteration of the contraction and sjt are the observed market
shares. Once we find δjt conditional on θ2, we can back out the unobserved
product quality, ξj , as follows:
ξj(θ2, sjt, P
ns) = δjt(θ2, sjt, P
ns)− βxjt + αpjt
We interact this unobserved product quality with our instruments Z and es-
timate the model using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The iden-
tifying assumption, which is similar to that of the logit model described above,
is that our instruments are correlated with drug prices but not with any unob-
served period-specific demand shocks. We then perform a non-linear search for
the values of θ that minimize the objective function, and these values represent
our estimates of the structural parameters of the model.
Specifically, our estimating equation is:
E[ξ(θ) ∗ Z] = 0
and our objective function is:
ξ(θ)′ZΦ−1Z ′ξ(θ)
where Φ−1 is a consistent estimate of E[ξ ∗ Z]. ].
Finally, we calculate the price index in a similar manner as with the logit
model above, with exception being that the index needs to be summed across
individuals in the model (i.e., the 100 simulated physicians). Therefore, using
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the parameters estimated above, we compute a compensating variation for each
individual i that takes the following form:
CVit =
uit − uit−1
αi
where αi = α + αuvi is the marginal utility of income for physician i and
uit = maxjuijt. Finally, the price index is computed as:
PIt = (1− µt)PIt−1
where:
µt =
C¯Vt
C¯Vt + p¯t
Here p¯t is the average price in period t and:
C¯Vt =
1
ns
ns∑
i
CVit
2.3.4 Pure Characteristics Model
While the full random-coefficients model mitigates some of the substitution
problems inherent in a logit model, it still relies on the assumption of the Type
I Extreme Value idiosyncratic error term, ijt. The presence of this term allows
the model to be solved and the mean utility levels, δjt, to be derived as a func-
tion of observed market shares. However, the error term is problematic when
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calculating welfare because it guarantees that regardless of product characteris-
tics, there exist certain consumers who would purchase any product (i.e., market
shares cannot be zero for any product regardless of its price and attributes). This
implies that product entry necessarily increases the utility of some consumer,
and therefore consumer utility will continue to increase as more products are
added to the product space.
Berry and Pakes (2007) show how this shortcoming can lead to biased wel-
fare estimates. They propose eliminating the idiosyncratic error term from the
model altogether, which alters the model so that it becomes purely a model
of “tastes for characteristics.” The randomness of choices comes from differ-
ent consumer sensitivity to price and heterogeneous product attribute prefer-
ences, as opposed to heterogeneity in the “tastes for products” models described
above. The benefit of estimating this model is that it generates more plausible
substitution patterns by eliminating the Type I error assumption.
The utility function is identical to that in equation (5) except the error term
is now dropped. Therefore, utility in the pure characteristics model becomes:
uijt = δ¯jt − αipjt + βixjt + ξj + ∆ξj (2.9)
where δ¯jt is the combination of all the attributes for which the parameters are
non-random (i.e., physicians agree on their valuations), and we call the param-
eters β. Note that all the heterogeneity now comes from the αi term, the price
sensitivity of physician i, and βi, the physician taste for attributes. For tractabil-
ity, we allow physicians to have different sensitivity to price and heterogeneous
preferences for just one non-price attribute: a patients expected response rate
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on a specific drug regimen, which is arguably the most important attribute for
most patients.
Following Berry and Pakes (2007) and Song (2008), we derive the market
share equation first by ordering the products such that product 1 has the lowest
price and product J has the highest price. That is:
p1 < p2 < ... < pJ
Given this ordering by price, consumer i will buy product j if and only if:
uijt > uikt
δijt − αipjt > δikt − αipkt
where δijt = δ¯jt + βixjt + ξj + ∆ξj . Thus we have the cutoff points:
αi <
δijt − δikt
pjt − pkt if pjt > pkt
αi >
δikt − δij
pkt − pjt if pkt > pjt
Therefore consumers i will buy good j if:
αi < min
k<j
δijt − δikt
pjt − pkt = ∆¯ijt
and
αi > max
k>j
δikt − δijt
pkt − pjt = ∆ijt
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and so the share for good j becomes:
sj =
∫
F (∆¯ijt|βi)− F (∆ijt|βi)1[∆¯ijt > ∆ijt]dG(βi)
where F (.|βi) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of αi conditional
on βi, and dG(βi) is the CDF of βi. For our model, we assume a lognormal
distribution on αi, so that log(αi) ∼ N(0, θ1) and a normal distribution on βi, so
that βi ∼ N(β2, θ2).
The parameters of the model to be estimated are θ = (β, β2, θ1, θ2). Note
that if there were only one random coefficient, for instance on price, then this
model would collapse to a vertical model (see Bresnahan (1987) and Lucarelli
& Nicholson (2009)). In a vertical model, the δjt can be derived analytically,
and thus estimating the model is relatively straightforward. However, with
the presence of two random coefficients, one can no longer back out the mean
utilities.
In addition, this model imposes a computational burden; dropping the id-
iosyncratic error term means that one is no longer guaranteed the existence of
a contraction mapping that can be used to estimate the full random-coefficients
model, as demonstrated by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). We therefore
follow Berry and Pakes (2007) and Song (2008) and use a three-step procedure
to estimate the model. We first re-estimate the full random-coefficients model
and rescale the logit error term by a factor that drives it toward zero. This brings
the mean utility closer to its true value in the absence of an error term. We then
use a combination of a fixed-point homotopy method and a Newton-Raphson
search. Details of the search procedure are available in Appendix B.1.
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2.4 Data
We use a number of different data sources to collect four types of infor-
mation: drug prices, regimen market shares, the recommended quantity/dose
of each drug used in each regimen, and regimen attributes from randomized
controlled clinical trials. Wholesalers purchase drugs from manufacturers and
then sell them to retail pharmacies, hospitals, physician practices, and other
customers. IMS Health records transactions between wholesalers and its cus-
tomers. Specifically, IMS Health collects information on the sales in dollars and
the quantity of drugs purchased by 10 different types of customers (e.g., hospi-
tals, physician offices, retail pharmacies) from wholesalers in each quarter from
1993 through the third quarter of 2005. Prices and quantities are reported sep-
arately by National Drug Classification (NDC) code, which are unique for each
firm-product-strength/dosage-package size. We calculate the average price
paid per milligram of active ingredient of a drug by averaging across the differ-
ent NDC codes for that particular drug. IMS Health reports the invoice price a
customer actually pays to a wholesaler, not the average wholesale price (AWP),
which often differs substantially from the true transaction price. We use nom-
inal rather than real prices because any deflator would itself be a price index,
and we do not want to build one index on top of another.
The price we calculate includes on-invoice discounts (e.g., for paying the
wholesaler promptly) but does not include any discounts or rebates a cus-
tomer may receive from a manufacturer after purchasing the product from the
wholesaler. Based on interviews with oncologists and an analysis reported in
Lucarelli, Nicholson, and Town (2010), we do not believe that manufacturers
offered substantial rebates during this period (Lucarelli, Nicholson, & Town,
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2010).12 In a recent paper Howard et al. (2015) agree that we do not believe that
rebates refunds from manufacturers to hospitals, physicians, pharmacies and
third party insurers are large in the market for new anticancer drugs (Howard,
Bach, Berndt, & Conti, 2015). Although we have information on 10 different
types of customers, we focus on the prices paid by the two largest customers -
hospitals and physician offices – because most oncology drugs are infused in a
physicians office or hospital clinic.
Most colon cancer patients who receive drug treatment are treated with a
regimen that contains two or more component drugs. The IMS Health data
contain information on market share by drug, but not market share for the com-
binations of drugs (regimens) actually used on patients. We rely, therefore, on
two different sources for regimen-specific market shares. IntrinsiQ is a com-
pany that provides information systems to oncologists to help them determine
the proper drug dosing for their cancer patients. As a result, IntrinsiQ collects
monthly data from its oncology clients on the types of drugs used for patients.
IntrinsiQ provided data on the proportion of colorectal cancer patients (of all
ages) treated with drugs who are treated with each regimen for each month
between January 2002 and September 2005.13
12For the five patent-protected colorectal cancer drugs in our study, these authors compared
prices that include discounts and rebates to the IMS prices that we use in this paper. They found
that prices from the two data sources were within two to four percent of one another, which is
consistent with no or small rebates/discounts. Although pharmacy benefit managers, or PBMs,
are able to negotiate price discounts for health insurers for many self-administered oral drugs,
PBMs are less effective at negotiating discounts on the physician-administered drugs that we
examine in this paper
13Because we observe the market shares of regimens among patients with colorectal cancer,
we do not need to worry about off-label use. Off-label use occurs when a physician treats a
colorectal cancer patient with a drug that has not been approved by the FDA to treat colorectal
cancer, or when a physician uses a drug approved for colorectal cancer on a patient with a
different type of cancer. In October 2005, seventy-six percent of patients being treated with
the four drugs approved solely for the treatment of colorectal cancer (irinotecan, oxaliplatin,
cetuximab, and bevacizumab) actually had colorectal cancer. That is, off-label use accounted for
approximately 24 percent of the quantities of these drugs.
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We derive market shares for the 1993 to 2001 period from the Surveillance
Epidemiology and End Results (SEER) data set, which tracks the health and
treatment of cancer patients over the age of 64 in states and cities covering 26
percent of the United States population.14 We calculate the proportion of col-
orectal cancer patients who are treated with each drug regimen in each quarter
based on Medicare claims data available in SEER. In October 2003, approxi-
mately 48 percent of all colorectal cancer patients treated with cancer therapy
drugs were 65 years or older.15 In the 1993 to 2001 period, when there were
relatively few treatment options for colorectal cancer, we include all regimens
that contain drugs that were explicitly approved by the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) for colorectal cancer and had a market share greater than two
percent. Market shares of all other drugs are combined into an outside option,
which in this early period will consist primarily of off-label drugs - drugs ap-
proved for conditions other than colorectal cancer that are used on colorectal
cancer patients.16 In the 2002 to 2005 period, the outside option includes off-
label drugs, regimens with less than one percent market share in the third quar-
ter of 2005 (the end of the sample period), and regimens with missing attribute
data.
Market shares for the 12 regimens in our sample and the outside option
are plotted in Figure 1. The regimens are also described more fully in Tables
1 and 2. Between 1993 and 1996, about 95 percent of colorectal cancer pa-
tients were treated with 5-FU/leucovorin, which at that time was generic, with
the remainder treated with off-label drugs or regimens with very small mar-
14SEER contains data on the incidence rate of cancer among the non-elderly, but only has
medical claims available for Medicare patients.
15Data from IntrinsiQ.
16Off-label use is more likely to occur if a patients initial treatment has been unsuccessful.
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ket share.17 Irinotecan (brand name Camptosar) was approved by the FDA for
treating colorectal cancer in 1996, and over the next several years the market
share of irinotecan (approved as a second-line treatment for metastatic colorec-
tal cancer patients who had already been treated with a different drug regi-
men) and irinotecan combined with 5-FU/LV grew at the expense of 5-FU/LV.18
Capecitabine (Xeloda), a tablet that produces the same chemical response as 5-
FU/LV, was approved for treatment of colorectal cancer in April of 2001 and was
administered as a standalone therapy or combined with irinotecan. All other
drugs for treating colorectal cancer in our sample are delivered intravenously
under the supervision of a physician or nurse.
Oxaliplatin (Eloxatin) was introduced in August of 2002, followed by cetux-
imab (Erbitux) and bevacizumab (Avastin) in February of 2004. By the third
quarter of 2005, two of the regimens created by these three new drugs (oxali-
platin + 5-FU/LV; and bevacizumab + oxaliplatin + 5-FU/LV) surpassed the
market share of 5-FU/LV, whose share had fallen to about 14 percent. The mar-
ket shares of several regimens change sharply in the first quarter of 2002 when
we use market share data from IntrinsiQ rather than SEER. One explanation for
these changes is that Medicare patients may be treated with different regimens
than non-Medicare patients. Another possible explanation is that the samples
used by IntrinsiQ and/or SEER may not be consistent.19 In order to smooth mar-
ket shares between the pre- and post-2002 periods, we apply a regimen-specific
factor to adjust the pre-2002 market shares based on the ratio of total (from In-
trinsiQ) to Medicare-only (from SEER) market shares for the four quarters of
2002, when the two data sets overlap.
175-FU contains the drug fluorororacil.
18Because it takes Medicare a while to code new drugs into their proper NDC code, for several
quarters a new drug will appear in the outside option.
19The SEER sample is drawn from locations representing 26 percent of the U.S. population.
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In order to calculate the price per regimen, we require information on the
quantity of each drug in a regimen. The National Comprehensive Cancer Net-
work (NCCN) reports the typical amount of active ingredient used by physi-
cians for the major regimens. We supplement this where necessary with dosage
information from drug package inserts, conference abstracts, and journal arti-
cles. Dosage information is reported in Appendix B.2. For example, the stan-
dard dosage schedule for the regimen with the second largest market share in
2005 is 85 milligrams (mg) of oxaliplatin per meter squared of a patients surface
area infused by IV on the first day of treatment, followed by a 1,000 mg infu-
sion of 5-FU per meter squared of surface area on the first and second treatment
days, and a 200 mg infusion of leucovorin per meter squared on the first and
second treatment days. This process is repeated every two weeks. We price
the regimens for a representative patient who has 1.7 meters squared of surface
area (Jacobson et al., 2006) weighs 80 kilograms, and is treated for 24 weeks.
Regimen prices are derived by multiplying the average price a customer paid
per milligram of active ingredient in a quarter by the recommended dosage
amounts for each drug in the regimen over a 24-week period.20
We obtain most of the attribute information for each regimen from the FDA-
approved package inserts that accompany each drug. These inserts describe
the phase 3 clinical trials that were conducted, including the number and types
of patients enrolled in the trials, the health outcomes for patients in the treat-
ment and control groups, and the side effects experienced by those patients.
Often there are multiple observations for a regimen, either because a manufac-
turer conducted separate trials of the same regimen, or because a regimen may
have been the treatment group in one clinical trial and the control group in a
20The regimens are priced using data for the contemporaneous quarter only.
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subsequent trial run by a different firm. In these cases we calculate the mean at-
tributes across the separate observations. Where necessary, we supplement the
package insert information with abstracts presented at oncology conferences
and journal articles.
The attribute information is summarized in Tables 1 and 2, organized ac-
cording to the year when each regimen was introduced. Table 1 shows three
measures of a regimens efficacy: the median number of months patients survive
after initiating therapy; the percentage of patients who experience a complete or
partial reduction in the size of their tumor (i.e., the response rate); and the mean
number of months (across patients in the trial) before their cancer advanced to
a more serious state.21 For all three of these measures, higher values are associ-
ated with superior health outcomes. We also record whether a regimen contains
the capecitabine tablet, which should make the administration of the regimen
more convenient for a patient, and whether the regimen is approved (and was
tested) as a second-line treatment. Efficacy measures for second-line regimens
will generally be worse than those for first-line regimens because the patients
cancer is likely to be more advanced at the beginning of the clinical trial and the
first treatment was not completely successful.
We also collected data on the percentage of patients in phase 3 trials who
experienced either a grade 3 or a grade 4 side effect for five separate condi-
tions: abdominal pain, diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, and neutropenia. These are
displayed in Table 2. Although many more side effects are recorded for most
regimens, these five were consistently recorded across the 12 regimens in the
sample. Side effects are classified on a standard one to four scale, with four
21Cancers are classified into four stages, with higher numbers indicating that the cancer has
metastasized beyond its initial location.
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being the most severe. Higher values for the side effect attributes should be as-
sociated with worse health outcomes although, as we will show later, regimens
that are more toxic are likely to be both more effective and have more severe
side effects.
New colorectal cancer regimens tend to be more efficacious than the existing
regimens, with side effect profiles that are sometimes more and sometimes less
severe than earlier regimens. Consider the new entrant in 1996, irinotecan +
5-FU/LV (third row of Table 1). Relative to patients who received 5-FU/LV
in a clinical trial (first row of Table 1), patients in clinical trials who received
irinotecan + 5-FU/LV lived 3.1 months longer, on average, had a 14.6 percentage
point higher probability of experiencing a reduction in the size of their tumor,
and experienced a two month delay in the time it took for the cancer to advance
to a more severe state. However, patients taking the new regimen were more
likely to experience four of the five side effects listed in Table 2
Oxaliplatin + 5-FU/LV, which was launched in 2002 (sixth row of Table 1 and
Table 2), is more efficacious and has fewer severe side effects than irinotecan +
5-FU/LV. Patients in clinical trials of the former regimen lived an average of 3.8
months longer, had a 10.7 percentage point higher probability of experiencing
a reduction in the size of their tumor, and experienced a 2.4 month delay in the
time it took for the cancer to advance to a more severe stage relative to the lat-
ter regimen. Oxaliplatin + 5-FU/LV patients are also less likely to experience
a grade 3 or 4 side effect for four of the five measures relative to irinotecan +
5-FU/LV. Finally, the arrival of bevacizumab + oxaliplatin + 5-FU in 2004 in-
creased the median survival time by about four months relative to oxaliplatin
+ 5-FU/LV, with substantial improvements with one side effect measure and
136
worse performance on the other four measures.
Two new second-line regimens entered the market in 2004 to compete
against the first second-line regimen (irinotecan) that was launched in 1996.22
Cetuximab + irinotecan has a substantially better response rate than irinotecan
administered by itself, although median survival is shorter. The new regimen
also is superior to irinotecan on all five of the side effect measures.
The log of the naive price index is plotted in Figure 2. Note that prices are rel-
atively stable in the pre-1998 period where 5-FU/LV dominated the market and
all other brands were considered into the outside option. Then share-weighted
prices began to rise in 1998 when irinotecan was introduced, and then continued
to increase until the 2005 period. This is further documented in Table 1, where it
can be seen that the 2005 price of irinotecan was considerably higher than that of
5-FU/LV, and that this continued to be the case again in 2001 when capacitabine
was introduced, and again in 2004 when Avastin came on the market.
2.5 Results
Table 3 reports the results of the hedonic price regression. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the price a customer paid for regimen j in quar-
ter t. Regimen attributes are included as well as a full set of quarter indicator
variables. The coefficient on one of the efficacy measures, the tumor response
rate, is positive and significant, while the coefficients on the other two measures,
survival months and time to progression, are negative. For the response rate, a
22Regimens that include the tablet, capecitabine, are chemically equivalent to regimens that
include 5- FU/LV.
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one percentage point increase in the tumor response rate is associated with a
51.6% increase in the price of a regimen. Evaluated at the mean regimen price
in the sample ($21,113), this implies an increase of $10,894. Physicians are thus
implicitly valuing gains in response rates quite highly.
Table 2.3: Results of the Hedonic Model
Variable (Parameter) (Standard Error)
Efficacy Measures
Survival Months -0.216 0.040
Response Rate 0.516 0.023
Time to Progression -1.231 0.148
Side Effects Measures
Diarrhea 0.032 0.015
Nausea 0.060 0.054
Abdominal Pain 0.461 0.033
Vomiting 0.040 0.081
Neutropenia -0.072 0.006
Tablet -0.094 0.169
Constant 1.171 0.677
Obs. 208
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
models include quarter fixed effects. Dependent
variable is the log of price physicians paid for chemo
treatments in a quarter.
The negative coefficients on the other two measures seem to indicate that
physicians assign negative valuation to those attributes. However, as discussed
above, coefficients in hedonic models do not necessarily hold their expected
signs. The degree of competition in this case could differ across the attribute
space. For instance, there could be greater differentiation and less competition
with the response rates attribute relative to survival months and time to pro-
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gression. Indeed, it is quite plausible that at any given point in time, there could
be more differentiation on certain attributes than others, as pharmaceutical and
biotech firms design their products and construct clinical trials that will define
attributes years before the products are approved and marketed.
Similarly, four of the five side effects measures are positive, implying that
physicians place higher value on drugs that cause side effects. This could sim-
ply indicate that physicians place less value on the side effects of drugs than on
the efficacy measures, and therefore their signs should hold no economic mean-
ing. For instance, if a physician prescribes anti-vomiting or anti-pain medication
along with colorectal cancer treatments, that physician would likely downgrade
the importance of these attributes, even potentially yielding a positive sign (note
that the estimates are much more insignificant than the efficacy measures). In
addition, the sign on neutropenia is negative and significant. This makes sense,
given that neutropenia is a much more severe side effect than the other four
measures, and this would likely imply that physicians place a greater impor-
tance on mitigating it relative to the other side effects. A third potential expla-
nation is that physicians simply place more value on efficacy than is suggested
by the Phase 3 clinical trials. This could happen if physicians use the drugs dif-
ferently in practice due to learning about patient-drug matching. Since newer
drugs tend to have greater side effects, this would explain the positive coeffi-
cients.
Figure 3 plots the log hedonic price index using the methods described above
(the quarter 1993 is omitted). The pattern of the hedonic index is dramatically
different from the naive price index, which emphasizes the importance of con-
trolling for product attributes. Prices were relatively stable between 1993 and
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1996 when the only regimen approved for colorectal cancer treatment was 5-
FU/LV and the components of this regimen were no longer patent protected.
After this, the hedonic index drops by about 20 log points with the introduc-
tion of the two irinotecan-based therapies, which were priced at about $16,000
at the time of introduction. Over the next six years, prices remained relatively
stable, then spiked by about 30 points with the introduction of bevacizumab
(Avastin) based regimens. Since then, prices remained stable towards the end
of the sample period.
In the first column of Table 4 we report estimated coefficients from the OLS
logit model without instrumenting for price; the second column reports results
of the IV logit, which addresses the endogeneity of prices; the third column re-
ports the coefficients from the full random coefficients model (“BLP”) that both
instruments for price and incorporates physician heterogeneity in drug prefer-
ences. These results follow closely with Song, Lucarelli, and Nicholson (forth-
coming), with the exception of the “full model.” (Song, Lucarelli, & Nicholson,
2016). Rather than add a random coefficient for only the logprice, we include
an additional random coefficient on the response time variable in order to allow
heterogeneity in physician preferences for efficacy measures. This also allows
for a more direct comparison to the pure characteristics model, where we also
place a random coefficient both on price and response rate. Comparing the price
coefficients between the column 1 and columns 2 and 3 confirms that there is a
positive correlation between a drugs price and demand shocks, and that the
instrumental variables mitigate the problem of price endogeneity. The price co-
efficient changes from -0.690 in the OLS logit to -2.15 in the IV logit, and -2.78
in the full random-coefficients model. The coefficient is significant in all three
models.
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Table 2.4: Results of the Logit and Full Models
Variable (OLS Logit) (IV Logit) (BLP)
Price -0.690 -2.150 -2.783
(0.124) (0.461) (0.739)
Constant 2.196 7.537 9.478
(0.606) (1.621) (4.229)
Efficacy Measures
Survival Months 0.086 -0.421 -0.447
(0.056) (0.124) (0.145)
Response Rate 0.166 0.913 1.149
(0.071) (0.240) (0.345)
Time to Progression -0.335 -2.070 -2.839
(0.242) (0.610) (0.926)
Side Effects Measures
Diarrhea 0.024 0.072 0.123
(0.022) (0.034) (0.065)
Nausea -0.137 -0.065 -0.085
(0.077) (0.109) (0.147)
Abdominal Pain 0.135 0.806 0.962
(0.076) (0.223) (0.294)
Vomiting 0.166 0.245 0.337
(0.117) (0.164) (0.236)
Neutropenia -0.008 -0.109 -0.152
(0.010) (0.033) (0.051)
Random Coefficients
αu (logprice) 0.342
(0.135)
βu (Response Rate) -0.094
(0.064)
Obs. 208 208 208
Adj R2 0.771 0.684
GMM Obj. 6.88x10−9
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All mod-
els include quarter fixed effects. Dependent variable for
the logit models are the logarithm of the market share of
a regimen minus the logarithm of the market share of the
outside option.
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Again, the signs of the efficacy measures look counterintuitive in all of these
models. In the IV Logit and full models, only the response rate coefficient is
positive, which is the same pattern observed in the hedonic model. This might
suggest that physicians place a greater demand on response rate than the other
efficacy measures. It is also possible that the three variables are correlated with
one another, which would dampen the effects of some of the measures.
Regarding the side effects measures, in all models the coefficients are posi-
tive for diarrhea, abdominal pain, and vomiting, while negative for nausea and
neutropenia. This is an improvement relative to the hedonic model, where 4 of
the 5 measures were positive. In particular, it seems that physicians place a sig-
nificant negative weight on the neutropenia side effect measure, which again, is
one of the most severe side effects of colorectal cancer treatments.
Turning to the random coefficients from the BLP, there is a positive and sig-
nificant value for the standard deviation on price, αu, and a negative but in-
significant coefficient on the standard deviation on response rate, βu. This is
suggestive of the fact that colorectal cancer treatments that are similar prices are
closer substitutes than ones that have significantly different prices. Moreover,
the average price coefficient is higher in magnitude than in the IV logit model,
suggesting that physician heterogeneity for price sensitivity does play a role in
selecting the regimen for a particular patient.
Although the full model incorporates some degree of heterogeneity in pref-
erences, the model is still plagued by the inclusion of the idiosyncratic error
term, which ensures that each regimen that entered the market would generate
non-zero market shares regardless of whether it was in the quality space. This
tends to produce inflated estimates of welfare gains due to product innovation.
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Table 5 presents the results of the pure characteristics model of demand, which
drops this error term. In this model, consumers agree on the rankings of product
quality but differ in their willingness-to-pay for different quality levels.
Table 2.5: Results of the Pure Characteristics Model
Variable (Parameter) (Standard Error)
Constant 4.012 1.737
Efficacy Measures
Survival Months -0.155 0.042
Response Rate 0.418 0.084
Time to Progression -1.066 0.285
Side Effects Measures
Diarrhea 0.060 0.025
Nausea -0.014 0.145
Abdominal Pain 0.331 0.174
Vomiting 0.135 0.188
Neutropenia -0.067 0.008
Random Coefficients (θ)
log(αi) ∼ N(0 ,θ1) 0.067 0.017
βi ∼ N(β2, θ2) 0.057 0.011
Obs. 208
GMM Obj. 3.709
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
models include quarter fixed effects. Dependent
variable is the log of price physicians paid for chemo
treatments in a quarter.
The standard deviation of the price coefficient, θ1, is 0.067 and statistically
significant, implying that there is heterogeneity in physician preferences for reg-
imens of different prices. Unlike the BLP model, however, the variance of the
response rate coefficient, θ2, is also positive and significant, with a value 0.057,
implying that physicians also value response rate differently, even conditional
on their αi. Indeed, it appears that what was previously captured by the id-
iosyncratic error term is now being captured by these random coefficients in the
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pure characteristics model, ensuring much more flexible substitution patterns.
The coefficients on the efficacy and side effects measures are the same sign as
in the OLS, IV Logit, and BLP models. In addition, the efficacy measures all
remain statistically significant, as do the abdominal pain and neutropenia side
effects measures.
The log price indices for the four models are plotted in Figure 3. During the
initial period before irinotecan was introduced, the indices are relatively flat and
look fairly similar to the naive and hedonic indices, as would be expected. The
index from the logit model increases slightly, by about 10 percentage points in
1997, and gradually declines back to its original value throughout. In general, it
is a pretty stable index. This is likely due to the fact that substitution patterns in
the logit model guarantee that elasticities are increasing in prices, so that when
the price of a more expensive good increases, there will be more substitution
away from it than when the price of a cheaper good increases. The full model
corrects for this by allowing individuals to substitute towards products they
consider similar if they have a strong taste for those products. Therefore, physi-
cians might be more likely to stay with Avastin, one of the more expensive drugs
on the market, if they are more sensitive to its efficacy improvements and less to
price. Indeed, looking at the BLP index, we can see that it is also relatively sta-
ble during the initial period, then drops a bit after irinotecan is introduced, but
finally steadily increases beginning in around 2002 when the oxaplatin-based
regimens are introduced, followed by the bevacizumab regimens.
Finally, looking at the pure characteristics model, it is obvious that the effect
of dropping the idiosyncratic error term is to essentially “load” all of welfare
changes onto the observable characteristics of the model. Notably, while the
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logit and BLP models are essentially identical until irinotecan was introduced in
1996, the pure characteristics model sits below these price indices. This is due to
the fact that during this initial period, only one regimen (5-FU + LV) dominated
the marketplace, and its price gradually declined during those initial years.
Given that no other regimens were present and that all other quality measures
of this regimen remain unchanged during this period, the pure characteristics
model interprets this as a large welfare increase, thereby decreasing the quality-
adjusted price. Note, however, that when oxaplatin was introduced in 2002, the
pure characteristics price index spiked above the other quality-adjusted indices,
and continued to expand higher than the other indices through 2005. This is re-
flective of the fact that the logit and BLP indices attributed a significant portion
of the welfare gains of oxaplatin and bevacizumab regimens to the error term.
As the pure characteristics model shows, however, this had the effect of damp-
ening the quality-adjusted prices due to an inflated estimate of welfare gains
due to their introduction. This effect is a significant one: between 1993 and
2005, the logit index implies that log prices rose by about 5 percent, while the
pure characteristics price index rose by about 18 percent.
The four price indexes depicted in Figure 3 (in addition to the nave index)
assume that physicians act as the social planner, and trade off the full price of
drug treatments against the financial value of patients health benefits from those
treatments. If, however, health insurers do not create the optimal incentives for
patients and physicians or if physicians exploit their information advantage to
capture profits on drug treatments at the expense of patients health outcomes,
these indexes may not accurately measure changes in social welfare. In a sepa-
rate paper, Lakdawalla et al. (2015) use the same data to present a price index
for colorectal cancer drug treatment that does not rely on physicians valuations
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Figure 2.3: Quality Adjusted Price Indices
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of the drug attributes (Lakdawalla et al., 2015). Specifically, they use the per-
formance of the drugs in randomized clinical trials, reported here in Table 1
and Table 2, and the observed market shares to calculate a patients expected
quality adjusted life years (QALYs) between 1998 and 2005. Applying a value
of $100,000 per QALY based on the published literature, they then subtract the
change in monetized expected health gains from the change in the drug treat-
ment costs, which is similar to the method used by Cutler et al. (1998) for heart
attack treatment and Eggleston et al. (2011) for diabetes treatment. Lakdawalla
et al. (2015) find that this quality-adjusted price index, which imposes a value
per QALY and forecasts QALY changes based on differences between drugs in
survival and side effect incidence, increased by $1,400 over this time period,
versus the nave increase of $36,000 in the per-patient average drug treatment
cost. That is, a price index that does not rely on physicians subjective valuations
is essentially flat, much as the four indexes depicted in Figure 3.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate a series of quality-adjusted price indices for col-
orectal cancer treatments. In particular, we compute a naive price index that
does not adjust for improving attributes, and compare it with a hedonic price
index, a logit index, a full model index, and a forthcoming pure characteristics
index. Indeed, we do see that adjusting for quality and substitution between
new goods matters for properly tracking prices, as each price index generates
substantially smaller price increases than the naive index. Moreover, properly
accounting for substitution patterns matters towards generating accurate wel-
fare estimates, implying that the method of constructing price indices matters
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significantly for assessing the value of new pharmaceuticals. While the naive
index shows a dramatic increase over the 13-year period, the quality-adjusted
indices increase only slightly, with the largest increase being approximately al-
most 20 points over the sample period (compared with an about 100 point in-
crease for the naive index).
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CHAPTER 3
MENTAL HEALTH MANDATES AND JOB TRANSITIONS
3.1 Introduction
A majority of Americans receive their health insurance through an employer.
55.1% of the U.S. population had employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) in 2011,
compared with a total of 63.9% enrolled in private insurance plans overall.1
These plans are primarily regulated at the state level. For instance, states imple-
ment their own community rating laws, which prohibit insurance companies
from varying premiums for eligible groups by health status or other factors. As
of January 2012, 18 states and the District of Columbia have implemented some
form of community rating restriction.2 Other states provide premium subsidies
to certain groups. The Health NY program, for example, provides subsidies to
small businesses (50 employees or less) within New York State in which 30% of
employees earn wages of less than $40,000.3
Many states now have also implemented benefit and provider mandates,
which require that group health insurance plans include minimum levels of cer-
tain insurance benefits. These include maternity coverage, mental health parity,
eating disorders, substance abuse, infertility treatment coverage, and others.
The first of such mandates was passed in 1956 and required dependent cov-
erage for handicapped children in Massachusetts. By the late 1990s, there were
over 1,000 active state benefit mandates (Jensen & Gabel, 1992). Today, the num-
ber of mandates varies by source. The National Conference of State Legislatures
1http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf
2http://www.statehealthfacts.org
3http://www.dfs.ny.gov/website2/hny/english/hnyecsm.htm
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(NCSL) estimates more than 1,900 mandates, while the Council on Affordable
Health Insurance (CAHI) estimates approximately 2,271 mandates (Council for
Affordable Health Insurance, 2012; National Conference on State Legislatures,
2011). Figure 1 shows the breakdown of benefit mandates by state, estimated
by CAHI, for 2012 (Council for Affordable Health Insurance, 2012). It is evi-
dent from the figure that benefit mandates are prevalent today, but to varying
degrees. While Idaho only had 13 benefit mandates passed as of 2012, Rhode
Island had approximately 69. The degree to which certain states pass these poli-
cies in response to macroeconomic conditions (policy endogeneity) will be ex-
plored later in this paper (see section 4).
Figure 2 shows CAHI estimates of benefit mandates by year from 2004
through 2010 (2004 was chosen as it was the earliest the data was made pub-
licly available). Indeed, the number of total mandates in the United States has
risen considerably, from 1,823 in 2004 to 2,271 in 2012. Note in particular that
the number of mandates continued to rise after the 2007 recession and in after
the implementation of 2010’s Affordable Care Act. Regardless of which source
is used, it is clear that the number of mandates continues to rise in the United
States.
The implementation of these mandates is an important national issue. Sup-
porters argue that mandates provide much-needed benefits to individuals who
otherwise would not have access through the private market. Their costs would
be partially subsidized by individuals within the group who purchase these
plans yet do not necessarily require the benefit. In other words, mandates are
a form of preventing adverse selection. These added benefits might result in
increased utilization for specific health benefits, and therefore increased health
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Figure 3.1: Number of Benefit Mandates By State, 2012
outcomes. However, this benefit might also impact the labor market. A man-
date for a specific type of health insurance might lead to an increase in overall
labor supply among individuals who value the benefit, as their search costs
would be decreased. Therefore, after passage of particular mandates, we might
expect to see diminished job turnover and increased job duration. In addition,
a healthier workforce might result in added productivity for the firm, which
would increase profits.
Opponents, however, argue that mandates could generate moral hazard
problems, where consumers over-utilize newly offered coverage, leading to
market inefficiency. In addition, this could then further raise costs for insur-
ers, which would induce higher premiums for employers and employees. In
turn, mandates could result in large displacement effects, where employers
drop coverage altogether, hence reducing the probability that an individual be-
come insured at all (Jensen & Gabel, 1992; Sloan & Conover, 1998; M. K. Bun-
dorf, Henne, & Baker, 2007). According to CAHI, “Mandated benefits currently
increase the cost of basic health coverage from slightly less than 10% to more
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Figure 3.2: Number of Benefit Mandates by Year, 2004-2012
than 50%, depending on the state, specific language, and type of health insur-
ance policy” (Council for Affordable Health Insurance, 2012). This might also
lead employers to reduce their labor demand, hence hiring fewer employees, or
may result in employers reducing the hours of their employees so as to not be
forced to offer health insurance coverage. The theory behind benefit mandates
and labor market outcomes will be discussed further in the next section (see
section 2).
In this paper, I investigate the labor market effects of a particular kind of
mandate: mental health parity. Mental health parity–the requirement that in-
surers in a particular state provide benefits for mental illness equivalent to that
of comparable medical and surgical benefits–has been growing in popularity
since the late 1990s. Indeed, states continue to pass legislation requiring com-
prehensive coverage of mental illness today, despite an already passed federal
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legislation in 1996 and subsequently in 2008. New York States, for instance,
passed legislation in 2006, known as “Timothy’s Law”, designed to offer men-
tal health parity.4 As recent as July 2013, New Jersey held hearings to discuss
adding more comprehensive benefits to its already existing state parity law.5
An analysis of mental health parity is of special interest to policymakers
and various stakeholders, especially considering the growing number of peo-
ple with mental health disorders. A recent report from the Utah Department
of Human Services, for example, found that in 2012, less than 31% of those in
need of mental health treatment actually received services (Utah Department
of Human Services, 2012). Part of this is due to lack of mental health cover-
age, as Utah lacks mental health parity (and is still debating whether to accept
the Medicaid expansion offered by the Affordable Care Act).6 Many argue that
mental health parity is a step forward in providing needed benefits to those
with serious mental health conditions (McGuire & Montgomery, 1982; Barry &
Busch, 2007; Busch & Barry, 2008; Lang, 2013; Cseh, 2008), while critics note the
potential cost increase on employers (Council for Affordable Health Insurance,
2012; Matthews, 1999; American Benefits Council, 2007). However, while there
have been many papers citing the effects of mental health parity on insurance
coverage and outcomes, literature on the effects on the labor market have been
sparse. Most recently, Attila Cseh analyzed the effects of state parity mandates
on a variety of labor market outcomes, including levels of employment, hours,
and wages (Cseh, 2008). However, this analysis is limited in that it only looks
at levels of employment, masking any effects on labor market flows. In addi-
tion, it can only identify effects of parity on employment for all individuals,
4http://www.timothyslaw.org/
5http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/07/nj lawmakers discuss retooling mental health coverage laws.html
6http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/us/mental-health-cuts-in-utah-leave-some-
feeling-adrift.html?partnerr¯ss&emcr¯ss& r0¯
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where there might be amplified effects for individuals seeking mental health
treatment. Finally, its analysis concludes with states that have passed parity in
2002, whereas numerous states (including large ones, such as New York and
Oregon) have passed mental health parity since.
I contribute to the literature by analyzing the effect of mental health parity
legislation on both levels of employment and worker flows. In particular, I use
restricted-access longitudinal data from the Medical Expenditures Panel Survey
(MEPS) to look at the effects of parity on transitions between jobs and transitions
from employment to unemployment among people who have sought mental
health treatment or have been diagnosed with a mental health disorder. The
MEPS is a public-use dataset that contains national employment, health insur-
ance, and health expenditure data. The restricted-access data also contains state
identifiers, allowing me to exploit the state variation in mandate passages.
An analysis of worker flows in addition to levels of employment is impor-
tant in that simply analyzing the levels could be masking the transition effects
imposed by health coverage mandates. In particular, many have argued that
health coverage offered through an employer could contribute significantly to
a phenomenon known as “job lock,” where employees do not leave their cur-
rent occupations for other jobs they might otherwise take for fear of losing their
comprehensive health benefits.
I find that the passage of state mental health parity laws did cause a signif-
icant decrease in job separations for the employed population diagnosed with
a mental health disorder. The effect is strongest for job to job transitions, and
weaker for employment to unemployment transitions. However, I argue that
the increased length-of-stay in employment is not indicative of “job lock,” but
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rather a decrease in involuntary separations due to a treatment effect, and a de-
crease in voluntary separations due to the added value of having the benefit.
In other words, after the passage of mental health mandates, individuals with
mental health disorders are able to work at their jobs for longer periods of time,
presumably without a mental health incident that would result in job loss or
without seeking other jobs with more comprehensive coverage. To investigate
this further, I look at the effects of parity on mental health utilization, which I
proxy by looking at total and out-of-pocket mental health expenditures. I find
an increase in mean total expenditures, but no increase in out-of-pocket expen-
ditures, further suggesting a treatment effect. I find similar effects following the
passage of the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, a federally man-
dated mental health parity law enacted in 2008 and implemented in 2009. This
suggests that mental health parity may be a good policy in promoting increased
health access, and ultimately improving worker health and productivity at their
jobs.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the
background on mental health parity legislation, the theory and literature on
mandates, mental health parity, and employment, and offers a simple model of
job transitions following the passage of a mandate. Section 3 describes the data
and identification of parity legislation dates. Section 4 describes the effects of
mandates on job flows. Section 5 discusses the results and possible extensions.
Section 6 concludes.
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3.2 Background
3.2.1 Mental Health Parity Legislation
Benefits for mental health illness have been provided by insurers since the
1970s. However, the passage of laws requiring insurers to provide benefits for
mental illness were primarily known as “minimum mandated benefits,” laws,
requiring some coverage for mental illness, though often not comprehensive.
These laws also had lower lifetime expenditure limits, higher deductibles, and
higher co-payments or coinsurance rates. Mental health “parity” legislation,
conversely, requires that all insurers within a given state provide coverage for
mental health equivalent to that of medical and surgical coverage. This implies
a significant increase in the level of benefits mandated.
The first major push towards widespread parity was the 1996 Mental Health
Parity Act (MHPA).7 This act equated aggregate lifetime limits and annual lim-
its for mental health benefits to that of physical conditions. However, the effect
of this legislation on increasing access to care has been dubious. One limitation
is that it only provided parity for annual and lifetime limits, but not for cost-
sharing, coinsurance and other benefits. It also did not mandate that health in-
surance plans provide mental health benefits, but rather that those that already
did provide some level of coverage expand to match those annual and lifetime
limits. There were also many exempted groups, including small-firms with less
than 25 employers. Hence, the effect of the legislation was widely considered to
be minimal (Gitterman, Sturm, Pacula, & Scheffler, 2001).
7http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/mentalhealthparity/
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Since 1996, many states have begun individually passing more comprehen-
sive legislation. These laws did not necessarily offer mental health “parity,”
however the popularity of parity mandates did grow, particularly in the late
1990s and early 2000s. There are four major groups of mental health laws, with
varying degrees of benefits. These are the following:
Minimum Mandated Benefits. Minimum mandated benefits require that insur-
ers within a state provide some mental health coverage in their plans, particu-
larly in the group and individual insurance markets. However, these benefits
need not be very comprehensive, nor do they need to be equal to that of com-
parable medical and surgical benefits. For instance, Illinois currently has a min-
imum mandated benefit that requires a minimum of 45 inpatient days and 35
outpatient days only for serious mental illnesses, and more limited coverage of
other mental health disorders.
Mandated if Offered Benefits. Mandated if Offered benefits require parity in
coverage, but only if an insurance plan already offers mental health coverage.
Unlike Mental Health Parity, these types of laws do not actually require that
insurers provide any coverage for mental health coverage at all. An example is
Arizona, which currently has a ”Mandated If Offered” law in place for broad-
based mental health disorders.
Mandated Offering Benefits. Mandated offering benefits require each insur-
ance plan to offer the option of mental health coverage that is equal to that of
medical and surgical benefits (i.e. parity), though it does not require the pur-
chaser to take such insurance. Alabama currently has a mandated offering ben-
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efit for serious mental illnesses.
Mental Health Parity. Mental health parity is the more comprehensive form of
mental health benefit, and the focus of the analysis of this paper. It requires that
each insurance plan with in a state provide benefits for mental health coverage
that is equal (in terms of generosity, co-payments, coinsurance, visits, etc.) to
that of medical and surgical coverage offered by the plan.
Figure 3 shows the number of states passing mental health parity, as well
as other forms of mental health benefits between 1999 and 2010. It is clear that
between 1990 and 1996, only three states had passed a parity mandate (though
more states had passed other types of mental health benefits). The number of
states then dramatically increases, with 7 states enacting parity mandates in
2000 alone. After 2002, there was a brief break in the passage of parity mandates,
though this resumed as states like New York, Oregon, and Ohio began passing
parity mandates in the mid-2000s. Table 1 further shows the specific states that
passed parity mandates, as well as other kinds of mental health benefits, and
the years of legislative activity.
Though many policymakers and advocates welcome the passage of this type
of legislation as improving access to necessary benefits, other policymakers,
state officials, employers and insurance plans have cited the extremely high
cost of parity (Council for Affordable Health Insurance, 2012; Matthews, 1999;
American Benefits Council, 2007). The National Center for Policy Analysis, in
an open letter, wrote, “While it could help some patients, it would drive up
the cost of health insurance and force more people into the ranks of the unin-
sured” (Matthews, 1999). CAHI mentioned, “mental health parity mandates,
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Figure 3.3: Number of States Passing Mental Health Parity Laws, 1996-2010
which require insurers to cover mental health care at the same level as physical
health care, have a much greater impact on the cost of premiums than would
mandates for inexpensive procedures which few people need” (Council for Af-
fordable Health Insurance, 2012).
These concerns became particularly important as the United States govern-
ment prepared to pass the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of
2008. This was a much more comprehensive act than its predecessor in 1996, re-
quiring parity in deductibles, copayment, coinsurance, out-of-pocket expenses,
limits on visits, limits on treatment, and limits on days of coverage.8 However,
it still exempts many smaller employers and still does not mandate the coverage
of a full spectrum of illnesses (the illnesses covered is still left to the discretion
of the states).
8http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/mentalhealthparity/
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Table 3.1: States Passing Mental Health Benefit Mandates
MH Parity Min. Benefit Mandated Offering Mandated if Offered
Arkansas (1997) California (1974) Arizona (1998) Alabama (2001)
California (1999) Colorado (1992) Indiana (2000) Georgia (1998)
Colorado (1997) District of Columbia (1999) Kentucky (2000) New York (1999)
Connecticut (1999) Florida (1992) Nebraska (2000) Utah (2001)
Delaware (1998) Hawaii (1998) Ohio (1985)
Hawaii (1999) Illinois (1991)
Iowa (2005) Kansas (1998)
Illinois (2001) Massachusetts (1996)
Louisiana (1998) Michigan (2000)
Maine (1995) Mississippi (2002)
Maryland (1996) Nevada (2000)
Massachusetts (2000) Oregon (2000)
Missouri (1999) Pennsylvania (1999)
Montana (1999) South Carolina (1995)
New Hampshire (1995) Tennessee (1999)
New Jersey (1999) Wisconsin (1998)
New Mexico (2000)
New York (2006)
North Carolina (2007)
Ohio (2006)
Oklahoma (1999)
Oregon (2005)
Rhode Island (1994)
South Dakota (1998)
Vermont (1997)
Virginia (1999)
Washington (2005)
West Virginia (2002)
Texas (1997)
Notes: Dates of passage are taken from a variety of sources. Primarily, I use the dates reported
by the National Alliance for Mental Illness (NAMI), National Conference for State Legislatures
(NCSL), and published literature, including Lang (2013), Cseh (2008), and Buchmueller (2007).
Where discrepancies exist, I refer to primary source, legislative documents directly from states
3.2.2 Theory and Literature on Mandates, Parity and Employ-
ment
The theory of benefit mandates and the labor market extends from an anal-
ysis conducted by Larry Summers in 1989 (Summers, 1989). In it, he argues
that mandated benefits for employers, be they health benefits, unemployment
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insurance, or others, increase the cost of labor to employers, thus shifting the la-
bor demand curve down. However, mandated benefits also increase the value
of a job for workers, and thus simultaneously shift out the supply curve. The
amount of the shifts depend on the cost of the mandate to employers and the
employee valuation of the benefit he or she receives from the mandate. For in-
stance, if the value of the benefit to the worker is exactly equal to the cost of
the mandate to the employer, then in equilibrium employment will remain con-
stant. However, the new equilibrium wage will be lower than in the equilibrium
prior to the passage of the mandate. In fact, it will be lower by the exact cost of
the benefit. This phenomenon is depicted in Figure 4.
As is seen in the figure, the new equilibrium labor supply (at the point E’)
remains unchanged (from point E), however the wage has declined. In the case
where employees value benefits less than the cost to the employer, the supply
curve would shift out to a lesser degree than the shift in labor demand, thus
resulting in decreased labor supply and diminished wages. Conversely, if em-
ployees valued the benefit more than the cost to employers, we would expect to
see an increase in employment.
Regardless of employee valuation of the benefit, however, employers can
achieve a new equilibrium by reducing the wages of their employees who take
up the benefit. Being that this is the case, then it is necessary to ask why gov-
ernments would mandate benefits at all. That is, employers should be indifferent
between voluntarily providing these benefits with reduced wages and not.
In actuality, firms do not voluntarily offer benefits for several reasons. One of
these reasons is the possibility of adverse selection. For example, firms that offer
benefits for mental health services might be concerned that this policy will only
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Figure 3.4: The Effect of Mandated Benefits When Cost to Employers is Equal
to Value of Consumers
attract employees with mental health disorders, which may decrease overall
productivity and therefore lead to reduced profits. Another possibility is moral
hazard. Generally, firms are uncertain about a priori employee valuation of ben-
efits. Therefore mandating mental health services, for example, might engender
increased utilization of mental health services, which would then lead to higher
expenditures by their employees and a greater cost burden for firms. This has
led many critics (see introduction above) to speculate that some firms, particu-
larly small firms, would drop insurance coverage altogether, leading more indi-
viduals into the ranks of the uninsured. (Matthews, 1999; Goodman & Mitchell,
2002a, 2002c, 2002b).
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If firms are reluctant to offer these benefits on their own, then there are many
reasons why governments might want to mandate certain health benefits. One
is paternalism: there is a sense of fairness that comes with ensuring that individ-
uals are provided with a certain minimum level of benefits. Many, for instance,
consider health insurance to be a basic human right that should be afforded to
each individual. Moreover, the scenario depicted in Figure 4 works under the
assumption that individual employees are rational and value benefits accord-
ingly. However, governments may believe that many individuals undervalue
certain benefits–such as mental health services–and would therefore need to be
protected against unexpected losses. Finally, there could be positive external-
ities associated with many of these mandates. For example mandating health
insurance benefits might, in the long-run, decrease overall health expenditures
in the United States as less individuals would rely on emergency room use.
They might also actually increase worker productivity.
There has been a considerable amount of literature on the effects of benefit
mandates on a wide variety of outcomes, particularly aiming to test whether
the labor market consequences predicted by theory match the evidence. Most
of this literature has focused on the effect of benefit mandates on the incidence
of insurance coverage. This literature set out to test the theory posed by man-
date critics that state mandates cause rises in uninsurance rates. In a seminal
1992 paper, Jonathan Gruber investigated the claim that state-mandated bene-
fits caused employers to drop health insurance. He found that that inclusion
of five high-cost mandates at the time (continuation coverage, alcohol, drug
abuse, mental health minimum benefits, and chiropractic services) had little ef-
fect on employer-sponsored insurance coverage (Gruber, 1992). Kaestner and
Simon (2002) similarly found no effect of mandates on the probability of having
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employer-sponsored insurance, whether including all mandates or just high-
cost ones.
Other studies, however, have shown different–and more negative–effects
of mandates on insurance coverage. Sloan and Conover found that higher
numbers of mandated benefits increased the probability that an individual was
uninsured within the state of the mandate (Sloan & Conover, 1998). Jensen
and Gabel also used data on firms in the late 1980s to estimate the decision
of small firms to offer health insurance. They observed that a large percent of
uninsurance among sample businesses in the late 80s was attributable to state-
mandated benefits (Jensen & Gabel, 1992).
However, employers may respond to benefit mandates in ways that do not
involve dropping coverage. Some of these involve either reducing employ-
ment or dropping wages, as predicted by the Summers model discussed above
(Baicker & Chandra, 2006). In a 1994 paper, Gruber investigated the labor mar-
ket effects of a particular set of federally and state-mandated benefits: those
that comprehensively covered childbirth. He found that the inclusion of such
mandates caused employers to shift costs to women of childbearing age in the
form of reduced wages, but consequently had little effect on employment at the
extensive margin (i.e. there was little change in labor demand) (Gruber, 1994).
That is, those who were benefiting (or most likely to benefit from) the particular
mandate were paying a premium for that benefit. This perfectly matched the
theory depicted in Figure 4. Similarly, Thurston (1997) found that a mandatory
employer provision of health insurance in Hawaii caused the Hawaiian indus-
tries most affected by the mandate to experience slower wage growth to other
Hawaiian industries (Thurston, 1997). Kaestner and Simon, however, found
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no significant wage-shifting in their analysis of a wide variety of mandates, in
contrast with Gruber and Thurston (Kaestner & Simon, 2002).
There are other labor market margins on which employer could react to the
added cost of a mandate as well. For instance, instead of reducing employment
or wages, employers could simply reduce the hours of their employees (or only
hire part-time workers) so as to exclusively attract employers that would not
have to be covered by health insurance. Indeed, Baicker and Chandra find ev-
idence that rising health insurance premiums significantly decrease working
hours, and raise the probability of being employed part-time (Baicker & Chan-
dra, 2006, 2005). This is a particular concern with the Affordable Care Act, as
many critics have postulated that the added costs of the comprehensive reform
to employers would result in a reduction in full-time employees.9 However, re-
cent analysis has pointed out that this has not yet been the case. Dubay et al.
in particular, use the Massachusetts health reform in 2006 to study employment
growth, finding that there were no significant negative trends to either full-time
or part-time employment after the reform took place (Dubay, Long, & Lawton,
2012).
There have also been studies done on the effects of various benefit mandates
on utilization and outcomes. Bundorf, Henne and Baker, for example, have esti-
mates the effects of infertility treatment regulations on utilization and outcomes
of infertility treatments and found that use is significantly greater in states that
have implemented these mandates (M. K. Bundorf et al., 2007). That is, they
found evidence of significant moral hazard in response to these mandates.
9http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324694904578601922653718606.html
and http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/03/the-new-economics-of-part-time-
employment/
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The evidence on the effects of mental health parity, in particular, on various
outcomes has been mixed. McGuire and Montgomery found that initial “mini-
mum mandated benefits” in the 1970s resulted in increased utilization, approx-
imating a 10-20% increase in psychiatric services. (McGuire & Montgomery,
1982). McGuire also found that early mental health mandates resulted in the
reduction of stigma associated with seeking mental health coverage. In esti-
mating the effects of mental health parity legislation, Buchmueller et al. found
that despite increases in states with mandated benefits, parity legislation only
affects about 20% of workers due to the self-insurance restriction due to 1974’s
ERISA laws (T. C. Buchmueller, Cooper, Jacobson, & Zuvekas, 2007). Barry and
Busch found that parity reduces the financial burden on families of children
with mental health disorders (Barry & Busch, 2007). Barry, Frank and McGuire
concluded that comprehensive parity would have little impact on total spend-
ing (Barry, Frank, & McGuire, 2006). Despite this positive evidence, however,
Bao and Strum (2004) have found that parity has no effect on perceived gen-
erosity or quality of coverage (uhua Bao & Strum, 2004). However, Shinogle
and Salkever (2005) found the opposite using cross-sectional firm data: they
found that mental health parity legislation increased mental health generosity
offered by firms (Shinogle & Salkever, 2005).
Some recent literature re-examined the older evidence on the effects of men-
tal health mandates. In particular, Busch and Barry (2008) found that, once con-
trolling for firm sizes and mental health status, mental health parity mandates
were found to have a significant effect on utilization of mental health services,
especially among people with mental health disorders (Busch & Barry, 2008).
In a very recent study, Lang (2013) found that mental health parity mandates
significantly decreased suicide rates in states (Lang, 2013).
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Despite all this evidence, the effect of mental health parity on the labor mar-
ket has gone relatively understudied. Cseh recently used the Annual Supple-
ment to the Current Population Survey (CPS) to study the effects of parity on
employment levels, wages, and hours, finding no significant effects in any of
the labor market categories (Cseh, 2008). However, this analysis is limited in
several ways. First, there may be masked labor market effects not picked up by
employment levels. For instance, a mandate may have an effect on job flows,
such as workers transitioning from old jobs to new jobs, which would have in-
significant effects on overall employment levels. Second, the use of the CPS does
not allow researchers to focus on the population most affected by mental health
parity: those with mental illnesses. Third the CPS can only identify whether in-
dividuals transitioned from employment to unemployment (or vice versa), but
not whether individuals transferred from one job to another. Fourth, Cseh’s
analysis stops at states that have passed parity laws in 2002, though many have
since done so (including New York State, Oregon and Ohio).
Therefore, it is natural to look at the effects of mental health parity on job
flows. In particular, there is a wealth of literature on the effects of health insur-
ance and mandates on a phenomenon known as “job lock”–where employees
remain in jobs longer than they would otherwise like due to a fear of losing com-
prehensive benefits. Madrian (1994) found that access to employer-sponsored
health insurance decreased the voluntary turnover rate by 25%. (Madrian,
1994). Gruber and Madrian (1997) found that mandates providing continua-
tion coverage after job separation led to an increase in the number of individ-
uals who separate and the total time spent jobless, though at least some of this
time is spent in productive search (Gruber & Madrian, 1997). Most recently,
Garthwaite et al. (2013) found an immediate increase in job search behavior
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following the disenrollment of approximately 170,000 Tennessee residents from
public health insurance in 2005 (Garthwaite, Gross, & Notowidigdo, 2013).
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Individual-Level Data
Individual-level data comes from the Household Component of the 1996-
2010 Medical Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS). The MEPS full-year consoli-
dated data files contains monthly information on detailed health insurance cov-
erage (including source of coverage, i.e. private, Medicare, Medicaid, employer,
etc.), as well as periodic (5 rounds over 2 years) data on employment status,
job switching, health expenditures by source (hospital, inpatient, outpatient,
etc.) and payer (out-of-pocket, Medicare, Medicare, etc.), and individual demo-
graphics (firm size, age, education, race, etc.). There are approximately 30,000
individuals sampled on a nationwide basis each year. It is a semi-rolling-panel,
in that it follows individuals for two years on a rolling basis. Each individual
is observed for 5 rounds over the course of two years, and those individuals
are asked the same employment and health insurance questions each round.
Therefore, I am able to see job turnover for a particular individual within this
two-year period by comparing individual employment data between rounds. In
addition, the MEPS contains several component and event files each year that
can be merged onto the full-year consolidated data file: inpatient, outpatient,
prescription drugs, office-based visits, and emergency room. These event files
contain information on individual medical care utilization and expenditures for
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particular sources and particular conditions. The conditions are identified by
three-digit ICD-9 codes within each event file.
Using these ICD-9 codes, I am able to identify individuals who sought med-
ical care particularly for mental health services, either as an inpatient, outpa-
tient, office-based visit, emergency room, or whether an individual got a pre-
scription for mental health drugs. I use three-digit codes ranging from 290-319,
which are consistent with the mental health disorder definitions used by other
datasets such as the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS), Na-
tional Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NHAMCS), and National
Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS). For the purposes of this paper I classify
individuals as having sought medical care for mental illness if they were asso-
ciated with any of the aforementioned condition codes. Using the merged files,
I am thus able to estimate not only the proportion of individuals nationally that
sought medical care services and can be identified as having a mental health
disorder, but also expenditures by payer (private insurance, public insurance,
out-of-pocket, etc.) specifically for these mental illnesses.
In this way, the MEPS presents a distinct advantage for the analysis of the
effects of mental health parity mandates. Though most analyses of the effect
of mandates on the labor market use the Current Population Survey (CPS), the
CPS is limited in its ability to identify utilization, expenditures, and the popu-
lation most affected by mandates (i.e. mental health disorders). Furthermore,
a distinct advantage of the MEPS is that I can not only identify when an in-
dividual transitioned from employment to unemployment, but I can actually
identify whether an individual switched jobs, i.e. when an individual’s primary
job changes from one reported in the previous round.
170
In addition, I am able to identify the reason an individual changed a job,
which is how I define “voluntary” versus “involuntary” transitions. The MEPS
provides a variable which asks why an individual changed jobs between rounds
of the panel, and the respondent is allowed to provide a variety of reasons.
Here, I define ”voluntary” transitions as those transitions involving “quitting,”
most of which come from the category “quitting to take another job.” I define
involuntary transitions as responses including having the ‘job end,” being “laid
off,” or having an “illness or injury.”
A limitation of the MEPS that has prevented this sort of analysis in the past
is that the public-use files, though a precise source of household medical expen-
ditures, are nationally representative and do not contain information about ex-
penditures or utilization at the state level. The restricted-access MEPS, however,
allows me to merge in state identifiers and state-level weights to the public-use
files for the 29 most densely populated states. I currently have access to this
restricted-level data from 1996 through 2010, therefore I am able to match in-
dividuals to their respective states. Hence, I am able to see state variation in
insurance and employment and expenditures.
For the purposes of my analysis, I restrict the sample to individuals in either
full-time or part-time employment and have been flagged as previously having
a mental health disorder. In subsequent specifications, I also limit the data to
individuals who have employer-sponsored-insurance and stratify the data by
firm size, as this allows me to see the effects on individuals affected by the man-
date. I only limit the analysis at 2007, so as to not pick up any potential effects of
the Great Recession, which began in December 2007, which may bias the results.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for my sample for both the entire pop-
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ulation in the data and for the “mental health” population. It is of note that
my main dependent variables of interest (job separation and Employment to
Employment transitions) are both higher for the mental health population than
they are for the population as a whole. In addition, employment is slightly
lower among the mental health population than the population as a whole. This
lends legitimacy to the argument that the mental health population might have
costs that inhibit them from staying in a particular job for a long time and that
the addition of mandates might reduce those costs, thereby reducing both vol-
untary and involuntary turnover rates. It is also of note that the mental health
population tends to be disproportionately female, to be non-Hispanic white,
and to have fewer advanced degrees than the population as a whole.
3.3.2 Mental Health Parity
The variable of interest in this paper is whether a state has passed mental
health parity legislation. Mental health parity refers to a state-level mandate
that insurance companies provide mental health benefits to group plans equal
to the level of coverage provided for medical and surgical inpatient and outpa-
tient plans (i.e. if a particular plan provides 30 days of inpatient care, then so
must the plan provide 30 days of inpatient care for mental health disorders, etc.).
I obtained dates of passage of mental health legislation primarily from several
different sources, including The National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI),
the National Conference on State Legislatures (NCSL), and published sources
(National Alliance on Mental Illness, 2009; National Conference on State Leg-
islatures, 2011; Barry & Busch, 2007; T. C. Buchmueller et al., 2007; Gitterman
et al., 2001; Lang, 2013; Cseh, 2008). The NAMI keeps detailed records of state
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Whole Population Mental Health Population
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
Total MH Expend. 1497.140 4507.152 1497.140 4507.152
OOP MH Expend. 312.689 907.760 312.689 907.760
Age 34.038 22.358 41.549 20.446
Separated from Job 0.366 0.481 0.429 0.494
E to E Transition 0.203 0.402 0.227 0.419
Mental Health Disorder 0.133 0.339 x x
Employed 0.663 0.472 0.592 0.496
ESI 0.487 0.499 0.538 0.499
Any Ins 0.842 0.365 0.889 0.313
Married 0.391 0.488 0.397 0.489
Female 0.523 0.500 0.616 0.486
Less than HS 0.386 0.487 0.367 0.482
HS Grad 0.226 0.418 0.186 0.389
Some College 0.145 0.352 0.185 0.389
Bachelors or Higher 0.243 0.429 0.185 0.389
Non Hisp White 0.561 0.496 0.701 0.458
Non Hisp Black 0.167 0.373 0.124 0.329
Hispanic 0.273 0.445 0.175 0.380
N=331,853 N = 53,394
Notes: Columns 2 and 3 are the means and standard deviations of per-
tinent variables for the entire dataset from 1996 through 2007, excluding
encrypted states (those my data cannot identify). Columns 4 and 5 are
the means and standard deviations of pertinent variables for the mental
health population from 1996 through 2007, excluding encrypted states.
For Total MH Expenditures and OOP MH Expenditures, Columns 2 and
3 are identical to 4 and 5, as these expenditures only exist for the “mental
health” population.
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mental health parity laws based on state statutes, House and Senate bills. They
also distinguish between the type of mandate passed (minimum mandated ben-
efit, comprehensive parity, etc.) as well as provide estimates years of passage.
The NCSL similarly provides information on years of passage of mental health
legislation by type of mandate.
There are, however, many challenges to obtaining precise dates of passages
for mental health legislation. One challenge is that mandates legislation is
amended frequently at the state level, either by changing the included condi-
tions covered by the mandate, altering the copayment and coinsurance require-
ment, or changing the groups affected by the legislation. Hence, there is con-
siderable heterogeneity making it difficult to characterize mental health parity.
In particular, some states have passed comprehensive parity legislation, mean-
ing all group plans within the state are required to provide equal coverage of
a broad range of mental health disorders, without exemption of any significant
policy group. Other states have passed more broad-based parity, which include
equal coverage of a broad range of diseases, but many include some limitations
or exemptions, in particular restrictions on co-payments or costs. Most states
have passed some form of limited parity, which provides coverage equal to that
of medical benefits, but for a limited set of diseases. These are generally re-
stricted to “serious” mental illnesses, including schizophrenia, schizoaffective
disorder, psychotic disorders, bipolar disorder, major depression, panic disor-
der, and obsessive compulsive disorder. Unlike most broad-based and compre-
hensive parity mandates, these do not require coverage for substance abuse.
In addition, these laws may impose limits on this coverage based on time or
finances (i.e. they may impose cost-sharing requirements).
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There is also heterogeneity in whether the legislation mandates coverage or
mandates an offer of coverage, as described in section 2. Any legislation man-
dating coverage requires that employees of the group plan purchase mental
health insurance. However, some parity legislation, i.e. “mandated if offered”
laws, require equal coverage of mental health disorders only if the insurance
plan already provides some level of mental health coverage. Other legislation,
i.e. “mandated offering,” requires only the offer of coverage, but does not re-
quire employees to actually purchase.
Finally, there are many state mandates which do not offer mental health par-
ity in the sense of providing equal coverage, but do require certain minimum
mandated benefits. These plans require the purchase of some level of mental
health coverage, but this coverage is usually limited and not equal in benefit
levels to that of the provided medical care.
For the purposes of this paper, l only classify a state having passed mental
health parity legislation if it had enacted legislation requiring equal coverage of
mental health benefits before the year 2007 (the strongest mandates available).
That is, I include states that provided comprehensive, broad-based or limited
parity. I do not include states that had “mandated offering” or “mandated if
offered” laws, nor do I include states that provided “minimum mandated ben-
efits” as opposed to parity. Where differences in classifications existed between
the sources mentioned above, I use primary-sources (legislative documents) to
settle the discrepancies.
175
3.4 Methods and Results
3.4.1 The Effect of State Mental Health Parity on Employment
and Job Transitions
The basic model is a difference-in-differences framework:
yist = β0 + β1Mst−1 + β2Xist + τt + δs + ist (3.1)
Here, the variables are defined as follows:
yist is an indicator for whether individual i is employed in state s at time t
OR individual i switched jobs in state s in between time t and time t + 1. For
the transition analysis, my dependent variable is whether an individual ever
transitioned between t and t+ 1 in his or her time in the panel.
Mst−1 is an indicator for whether state s had passed mental health parity
legislation by time t − 1. I use time t − 1 in the model, as these refer to the
passage dates of the mandates. Most parity laws, however, take a year to go into
effect. Therefore mandates passed in time t− 1 are likely to take effect in time t,
where the effects would be seen.
τt is a set of year dummies and
δs is a set of state fixed effects.
Xist refers to a set of observable covariates. These include age and its square,
indicators for education groups, indicators for race, an indicator for female, an
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indicator for married, an interaction term of female and married, an indicator
for whether the employee was part-time worker (working less than 35 hours
per week).
I estimate the model above using a linear probability model to determine
the effect of having passed mental health parity legislation on the probability of
being employed and having switched jobs. The estimator, β1, is the difference-
in-difference estimator that is identifying this effect.
A negative estimate on β1 would imply that individuals with mental health
conditions are less likely to separate from their jobs or be employed in states
that pass mental health parity legislation than in states that do not pass legis-
lation. Looking at the model in section 2.3, this would identify the scenario in
case 1 (the individuals who, following parity, obtain more comprehensive men-
tal health coverage, thus reducing transitions). A positive coefficient would
identify the scenario in case 2 (individuals who, following parity, move to more
attractive jobs, thus increasing transitions). Table 3 shows the results of this
model on both employment and job separations. Column 1 in Panel A shows
the effect of employment conditional on the mental health population (i.e. those
flagged as having a mental health disorder). Consistent with prior literature,
mental health parity appears to have a very tiny and insignificant effect on em-
ployment, even limiting to the mental health population.
Column 2 shows the effects on job separations conditional on mental health
and employed populations. Panel A shows the effect on total job separations
(i.e. transitioning from employment to either employment at another current-
main-job or unemployment or out-of-labor-force). The effect of mental health
parity here is negative, though insignificant. However, Panel B, which shows
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Table 3.3: The Effect of State Mental Health Parity on Job Transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employed Separation Separation Separation
(ESI) (Unins)
A: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Total Separations
MH Parity Passed 0.004 -0.019 -0.036∗∗ 0.038
(0.008) (0.015) (0.017) (0.052)
Obs. 42468 25553 13632 2273
B: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: E to E Transitions
MH Parity Passed x -0.037∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.026
x (0.011) (0.017) (0.052)
Obs. x 25553 8046 2273
C: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: E to U Transitions
MH Parity Passed x 0.004 0.003 0.030
x (0.012) (0.013) (0.042)
Obs. x 25553 13632 2273
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state year level shown in parentheses. All
models include state and year fixed effects. Column 1 is conditional on population of
everyone diagnosed with a mental health disorder. Column 2 is conditional on the mental
health population and anyone who was employed. Column 3 is conditional on the mental
health, employed, and population of individuals with employer-sponsored insurance. In
panel B, this is further reduced to those with full-year ESI. Column 4 is conditional on the
mental health, employed, and full-year uninsured population.
*Significant at the 10% level, **Significant at the 5% level, ***Significant at the 1% level
the effects exclusively on employment to employment transitions shows signif-
icant effects of mental health on job switching. The implication here is that the
passage of mental health parity legislation reduces job switching by about 3.7
percentage points. Panel C shows the effect of parity exclusively on employ-
ment to unemployment/out-of-labor-force transitions. Here, I see a very small
and insignificant effect.
The negative effect of mental health parity on job transitions is consistent
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with case 1. In order to explore this further, column 3 of Table 3 looks at the
effects of parity mandates conditioned on the mental health employed popu-
lation who also previously held employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) at their
job. For panel B, since I are looking exclusively at employment to employment
transitions, I limit this further to only look at individuals who had ESI for the
duration of their time in the panel (two years). If the observed reduction comes
primarily from individuals gaining job security or a possible treatment effect of
the mandate, then this should then be more pronounced in the insured popula-
tion.
Indeed, this is what is shown in column 3. A mental health parity mandate
caused a significant decline in overall job separations (panel A), that is now sig-
nificant and more negative than job separations in column 2. For employment-
to-employment transitions (Panel B), there is also a highly negative and signif-
icant effect of parity mandates. For employment-to-unemployment transitions
(Panel C), the effect is still small and insignificant.
As a further specification check, column 4 of Table 3 looks at the full-
year uninsured population. For overall separations (Panel A), the sign is
now reversed, implying that mandates cause an approximate 3.8 percentage
point increase in job separations. However, the estimate is insignificant. For
employment-to-employment transitions among the mental health, employed,
and uninsured population (Panel B), the sign is still negative, but consider-
ably smaller than for the insured population, and also insignificant. Finally,
for employment-to-unemployment transitions, the sign is more positive than
the insured population, yet still insignificant.
Columns 3 and 4 confirm that the effects of parity mandates are much larger
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for the insured population, lending legitimacy to the claim that mental health
mandates might reduce unnecessary job turnover. We would expect the unin-
sured population to have either positive or small effects following the passage
of mandates, since they are mostly unaffected by the benefits unless they obtain
insurance. The one mechanism through which the uninsured could be affected
by mandates is if they switch to a job that offers benefits following the passage of
the mandate. This, however, does not seem to be the case given the estimates in
Table 3. It is also useful to decompose the effects of mandates as being either vol-
untary or involuntary transitions. Our model predicts that effect of mandates
on involuntary transitions should be negative, however mental health parity
could theoretically either increase or decrease voluntary transitions. A decrease,
as observed in Table 3, could occur if mandates reduce voluntary turnover for
those individuals who do not already have comprehensive mental health cov-
erage, and that would have taken other jobs previously to get these benefits.
However, it could also theoretically increase voluntary turnover for individu-
als who previously held mental health coverage if the widespread prevalence
of mental health benefits following a mandate allowed individuals to take new
jobs they otherwise would not have (a reduction in “job lock”). Unfortunately,
I am unable to identify the type of benefits individuals have and thus whether
individuals previously had mental health coverage. However, an analysis on
whether individuals simply have ESI coverage is revealing.
To see the effects on voluntary and involuntary transitions, I turn to Table
4. Column 1 shows the effect of mental health parity on involuntary transitions
for the mental health employed population. The effects of parity on total job
separation, employment to employment transitions, and employment to unem-
ployment transitions are all small and insignificant. However, looking at Col-
180
umn 2, which limits the population to those who previously held ESI, shows
different results. The effect of mental health parity on total involuntary job sep-
arations (Panel A) and employment to unemployment transitions (Panel C) for
this population is also small and insignificant (Panel A). However, the effect on
employment to employment transitions (Panel B), shows a negative and signifi-
cant decline in involuntary transitions of about 1.2 percentage points due to the
passage of mandates.
Table 3.4: The Effect of State Mental Health Parity on Job Transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Involunt. Sep. Involunt. Sep. Volunt. Sep. Volunt. Sep.
(ESI) (ESI)
A: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Total Separations
MH Parity Passed -0.004 -0.000 -0.012 -0.020
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
Obs. 25553 13362 25553 13632
B: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: E to E Transitions
MH Parity Passed -0.009 -0.012∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.023∗∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011)
Obs. 25553 8046 25553 8046
C: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: E to U Transitions
MH Parity Passed 0.005 0.011 0.003 0.005
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Obs. 25553 13362 25553 13362
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state year level shown in parentheses. All
models include state and year fixed effects. Columns 1 and 3 are conditional on population
of everyone diagnosed with a mental health disorder and employed. Columns 2 and 4 are
conditional on the mental health and employed population as well as those with employer-
sponsored insurance. In Panel B, this is further reduced to those with full-year ESI.
*Significant at the 10% level, **Significant at the 5% level, ***Significant at the 1% level
Similarly, looking at Column 3, there is a negative and insignificant effect
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of parity on total voluntary separations (about 1.2 percentage points, Panel A). I
once again see a small, positive and insignificant effect on employment to unem-
ployment transitions (Panel C). However, I observe a decline in voluntary em-
ployment to employment transitions of about 1.9 percentage points, which is a
significant result (Panel B). Note that this is among the mental health employed
population. Looking at Column 4, which again conditions in the full-year ESI
population, I see a stronger negative effect of employment to employment tran-
sitions (mandates cause a 2.3 percentage point decline in job switching). This
is consistent with the theory that both voluntary and involuntary transitions
would decline among the insured population (case 1 in section 2.3). Indeed, es-
pecially among the employment to employment transitions, I observe that about
one third of the decline in total separations comes from involuntary transitions
and the two thirds from voluntary transitions.
The fact that job separations, particularly involuntary separations, decline
following the passage of a mandate suggest the possibility that mandates are
having a treatment effect. That is, individuals who previously did not have
mental health coverage but now do increase utilization of mental health ser-
vices, become healthier, and become more productive in the workforce. Al-
though I so far have not been able to test the effects of mental health parity on
health outcomes, I use mean health care expenditures among the mental health
population as a proxy for utilization and test the model above on this dependent
variable.
Table 5 shows these results. Columns 1 and 2 show the effects of mental
health parity mandates on mean real total mental health expenditures for the
mental health employed population and mental health employed population
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with ESI coverage. These estimates reveal that mean expenditures for mental
health services among workers in states that have passed parity mandates have
been between $250 and $300 higher than those in states without mandates. As
a falsification test, I also included the effect of parity in mean real out-of-pocket
(OOP) expenditures by the same population, as the goal of mental health par-
ity is to reduce such expenditures among the employed and insured, having
private insurance take up more of the burden. Indeed, the rise in OOP expen-
ditures in states that have passed parity mandates has been negligible and in-
significant, confirming that the increase in expenditures is likely due to private
insurance–an anticipated effect of the mandates. This also further supports the
theory that the reduction in involuntary turnover among this population is due
to increased use of mental health services.
Table 3.5: The Effect of State Mental Health Parity on Mental Health Expendi-
tures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Exp. Total Exp. OOP Exp. OOP Exp.
(ESI) (ESI)
Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Total Separations
MH Parity Passed 257.698∗ 300.847∗∗ 3.358 4.126
(135.101) (137.926) (32.943) (41.587)
Obs. 19012 10163 19012 10163
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state year level shown in parenthe-
ses. All models include state and year fixed effects. Columns 1 and 3 are conditional
on population of everyone diagnosed with a mental health disorder and employed.
Columns 2 and 4 are conditional on the mental health and employed population as
well as those with employer-sponsored insurance.
*Significant at the 10% level, **Significant at the 5% level, ***Significant at the 1% level
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3.4.2 The Effect of the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Eq-
uity Act on Employment and Job Transitions
To test the effects of the federal parity law in 2008, I restrict the sample to the
years 2006 through 2010, and employ a similar framework to that of equation
(6):
yist = β0+β1NMst−1+β2I{t >= 2009}+β3NMst−1I{t >= 2009}+β4Xist+τt+δs+ist
(3.2)
yist is an indicator for whether individual i is employed in state s at time t
OR individual i ever switched jobs in state s in between time t and time t+ 1.
NMst−1 is an indicator for whether state s did not pass mental health parity
laws in time t− 1
I{t >= 2009} is an indicator for whether it is year 2009 or 2010
τt is a set of year dummies and
δs is a set of state fixed effects.
Xist are the same covariates as the state model.
In this mode, β3 is our parameter of interest. Since the 2008 law mandates
mental health parity, it would primarily apply to those states that had not yet
passed mental health parity legislation. Further, the law went into effect in 2009,
which is why our variable of interest interacts the years 2009 or 2010 with these
states that had not yet passed parity legislation. Similar to the specification in
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section 4.1, a negative sign on β3 would imply a reduction in job transitions,
consistent with case 1 of the model in section 2.3. A positive sign would iden-
tify a positive transition effect for individuals with mental health conditions in
states that had not yet passed parity legislation, consistent with case 2 of the
model.
Table 6 shows the results of the effect of the federal law. Overall, the esti-
mates are similar to those in Table 3, however much of the significance is lost
(likely due to small samples of job separations in the 5 year window). Column
1 shows that the job separations for the mental health, employed population. It
implies that the federal legislation caused a decline in job separations by about
2.1 percentage points, though this estimate is insignificant (Panel A). Job transi-
tions, however, declined by about 2.6 percentage points (Panel B), and is a sig-
nificant estimate. Employment to unemployment transitions (Panel C) is again
small and insignificant.
Column 2 again limits the population to the population of those that had
ESI. Here, total job separations was small and insignificant (Panel A), as was
the estimate for employment to unemployment transitions (Panel C), however
transitions from employment to employment went down by approximately 3.8
percentage points, a significant estimate (Panel B). Column 4 provides the effect
on the uninsured population for comparison. All the estimates are insignificant,
though this could be due to the small sample size of the employed, uninsured
population in this subset of years.
The negative estimates as a result of the Federal law are encouraging in light
of the state estimates. In particular, I am looking at an entirely different group of
states for these estimates (the treatment group is the group of states that had not
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Table 3.6: The Effect of Federal Mental Health Parity on Job Transitions
(1) (2) (3)
Separation Separation Separation
(ESI) (Unins.)
A: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Total Separations
MH Parity Passed -0.021 -0.008 0.022
(0.017) (0.022) (0.070)
Obs. 11230 5760 1227
B: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: E to E Transitions
MH Parity Passed -0.026∗∗ -0.038∗∗ 0.073
(0.013) (0.015) (0.067)
Obs. 11230 5760 1227
C: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: E to U Transitions
MH Parity Passed -0.010 0.018 -0.027
(0.016) (0.019) (0.056)
Obs. 11230 5760 1227
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state year level shown in parentheses. All
models include state and year fixed effects. Column 1 is conditional on the mental health
population and anyone who was employed. Column 2 is conditional on the mental health,
employed, and population of individuals with employer-sponsored insurance. In panel B,
this is further reduced to those with full-year ESI. Column 3 is conditional on the mental
health, employed, and full-year uninsured population.
*Significant at the 10% level, **Significant at the 5% level, ***Significant at the 1% level
passed mandates previously. Therefore, if we believed the negative estimates
in Table 3 to be associated primarily with characteristics of the states that had
passed mandates, then the fact that the effects of the Federal law are similarly
signed as the state mandates on an entirely different group of states suggest
that the mandates are having an effect. The next section further explores some
additional robustness checks.
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3.4.3 Additional Robustness Checks
One possibility often unexplored in the mandates literature is to use firm
size as a potential control. The reason for this is that 1974’s Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) exempts firms that self-insure from state-
level regulation.10 Though I cannot perfectly identify firms who self-insure in
the individual-level MEPS, it is well-known that very large firms predominantly
self-insure. In 2010, firms with 1,000 employees or more had 83.6 percent of their
enrollees in very small plans, contrasted with 12.5 percent of enrollees being in
self-insured plans in small firms (25 or less) (Crimmel, 2010). Thus, large firms
serve may serve as an adequate control sample for the effect of mandates within
a particular state.
In addition, many mental health parity laws (and other benefit mandates)
exempt very small firms for fear of imposing too large a cost burden and reduc-
ing the firms’ probability of offering insurance at all to their employees. Unfor-
tunately, state mandate laws are heterogeneous in specifically the small-groups
that are exempt. Nevertheless, looking at small firms might also serve as an
adequate control on the effects of mental health parity.
To that effect I ran model (6) on individuals who in the panel worked for
small firms, which I defined as having between 1 and 24 employees, medium
firms, which I defined as having 25 to 99 employees, and large firms, which
I defined as having 100 or more employees. I expect to see the largest results
occur in the medium sized firms. The results of this are detailed in Table 7.
Column 1 of Table 7 shows the effect on job separations for small firms for the
10http://www.dol.gov/compliance/laws/comp-erisa.htm
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mental health employed population. The effect on total separations (Panel A) is
extremely small and insignificant, as is the effect on employment to unemploy-
ment transitions (Panel C). However, the effect on employment to employment
transitions (Panel B) is negative and significant. Column 2 shows the effect of
parity on medium-sized firms. The effect on total separations here is extremely
significant and negative. In fact, it appears as though parity mandates here lead
to a decline in job separations of approximately 5.2 percentage points. Note that
this is a larger effect than the one observed in Table 3, which confirms our the-
ory. The effect is also negative and insignificant for employment to employment
transitions (Panel B). The effect on employment to unemployment transitions
(Panel C) is still small and insignificant. Finally, Column 3 of Table 7 shows
the effect on separation for large firms. There are negative and insignificant re-
sults in total separations (Panel A) and employment to employment transitions
(Panel B), though as expected these are smaller in magnitude than the effects on
the medium sized firms.
Indeed, I do see the largest effect for medium-sized firms, as expected, sug-
gesting that these parity laws do have an effect. Although I do see some sig-
nificant results in the small firm and large firm categories, this could be due to
imperfect identification of the small firms that mental health parity laws exempt
in certain states and possibly picking up large firms that do not self-insure.
Another potential concern with the estimates presented in Table 3 is the
possibility of policy endogeneity. While state fixed effects should pick up
most state-specific characteristics, there could still be characteristics of states
or macroeconomic conditions that correlate heavily with the passage of parity
laws, biasing the estimates. To investigate the possibility of such policy endo-
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Table 3.7: The Effect of State Mental Health Parity on Job Transitions by Firm
Size
(1) (2) (3)
Separation Separation Separation
(1-24 Employees) (25-99 Employees) (100+ Employees)
A: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Total Separations
MH Parity Passed -0.001 -0.052∗∗ -0.030∗
(0.019) (0.024) (0.018)
Obs. 12023 7176 9580
B: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: E to E Transitions
MH Parity Passed -0.048∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗
(0.018) (0.021) (0.017)
Obs. 12023 7176 9580
C: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: E to U Transitions
MH Parity Passed 0.013 -0.021 -0.008
(0.017) (0.022) (0.017)
Obs. 12023 7176 9580
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state year level shown in paren-
theses. All models include state and year fixed effects and are conditional on the
population of individuals with a mental health disorder and employed. Col-
umn 1 is also conditional on those working for small firms (1-24 employees).
Column 2 is also conditional on those working for medium firms (25-99 em-
ployees). Column 3 is conditional on those working in large firms (100 or more
employees).
*Significant at the 10% level, **Significant at the 5% level, ***Significant at the
1% level
geneity, I test whether the results in Table 3 are sensitive to the inclusion of state
by year unemployment rates. I obtain these official unemployment from the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics (BLS).11 In addition, I add the state by year proportion
of individuals with a mental health diagnosis as controls in the model to test
for the possibility that parity mandates are legislated due to a high presence of
11http://www.bls.gov/lau/
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people with mental health disorders in the region. The results are presented in
Table 8.
Column 1 of Table 8 shows job separations for individuals with a mental
health condition who were employed, controlling for state by year proportions
of people with mental health conditions. This control appeared to have very
insignificant effects on the estimates, as the coefficients in all three panels are
nearly identical to those in Table 3, column 2. The same is true of Column 2,
which limits the population to those with ESI (and those with full-year ESI in
the case of panel B).
Columns 3 and 4 control for state by year unemployment rates. Column 3
presents the results for the mental health, employed population (analogous to
Column 2 of Table 3). Controlling for unemployment rates appeared to have
reduced the estimate of total job separations (Panel A) from -0.019 to -0.010
(Panel A). However, it appears as though most of this comes from employment
to unemployment transitions (Panel C), as this estimate increased from 0.004 to
0.009. Employment to employment transitions (Panel B) only changed slightly,
remaining largely negative and significant, implying mandates caused about a
3.6 percentage point decline in job switching.
Column 4 limits this again to the ESI population. Again, it appears as though
including unemployment rates reduced the estimate of overall job separations
(Panel A) and that this mostly came from the employment to unemployment
transitions (Panel C). Employment to employment transfers remained relatively
unchanged, still with a negative and significant estimate.
This demonstrates that, to the extent that broader macroeconomic trends had
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Table 3.8: Endogeneity Checks: The Effect of State Mental Health Parity on Job
Transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Separation Separation Separation Separation
(ESI) (ESI)
A: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Total Separations
MH Parity Passed -0.020 -0.037∗∗ -0.010 -0.025
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017)
Mean MH Yes Yes No No
Unemp. Rate No No Yes Yes
Obs. 25553 13362 25553 13632
B: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: E to E Transitions
MH Parity Passed -0.037∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Mean MH Yes Yes No No
Unemp. Rate No No Yes Yes
Obs. 25553 8046 25553 8046
C: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: E to U Transitions
MH Parity Passed 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.011
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Mean MH Yes Yes No No
Unemp. Rate No No Yes Yes
Obs. 25553 13362 25553 13362
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state year level shown in parentheses. All
models include state and year fixed effects. Columns 1 and 3 are conditional on popu-
lation of everyone diagnosed with a mental health disorder and employed. Columns 2
and 4 are conditional on the mental health and employed population as well as those with
employer-sponsored insurance. In Panel B, this is further reduced to those with full-year
ESI. Columns 1 and 2 also include the state-year proportion of individuals with a mental
health condition as a control. Columns 3 and 4 include the state-year unemployment rates
as a control.
*Significant at the 10% level, **Significant at the 5% level, ***Significant at the 1% level
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an effect in parity states, this was mostly seen in employment to unemploy-
ment transitions, which were largely insignificant in Table 3. The effects on job
switching, however, remained relatively unchanged, suggesting the validity of
the results in Table 3, and implying a direct effect of mental health parity legis-
lation.
3.5 Discussion
The results on employment levels presented in this paper (Table 3) are
broadly consistent with prior literature that has shown no significant effect of
mental health parity on employment. This paper extends the literature by pre-
senting evidence on the effect of parity in job flows instead of levels. This has
not been explored in prior literature, likely due to the lack of available longitu-
dinal data with employment, health insurance and expenditure variables, and
with state identifiers.
The results above suggest that mental health parity mandates have caused a
decline in job separations, particularly employment to employment transitions
among the population of workers with mental health diagnoses. These effects
are more pronounced among the insured population, suggesting that the de-
cline is due to either a treatment effect of the mandates that result in a decline
in involuntary transitions or that the presence of new mental health coverage
prevents job transitions to other employers who would have offered the benefit.
The effects are also strongest among individuals who worked for medium-sized
firms, also suggesting an effect of the mandates, as state laws and ERISA legis-
lation would have exempted many small and very large firms.
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The positive effect on mental health expenditures has not been seen much
before in the literature. Part of the reason for this could be that most literature
on the effect of parity on utilization was conducted in the early 2000s, before
many of the newest mandates were passed. However, the more likely reasons
include the fact that most literature on the subject has not limited the popula-
tion to those with a mental health diagnosis (and therefore focused primarily
on overall expenditures–not just on mental health services). However, some
recent papers have found this result before. In particular, Busch and Barry re-
cently found that by conditioning on the population of individuals with a men-
tal health condition, there is indeed a significant utilization effect of parity man-
dates (Busch & Barry, 2008).
There are several potential extensions for this paper. First, I am interested in
the utilization effects of mental health parity. One way that I proxy for utiliza-
tion is by using mental health expenditures, but one could also simply look at
the number of visits rather than expenditures. In addition, I cannot currently
identify whether individuals currently hold mental health coverage or not. Ob-
taining data that shows a breakdown of the benefits individuals previously held
would provide for cleaner identification of the decline in job transitions and sep-
arations.
Another issue is the definition of mental health legislation, described in sec-
tions 2 and 3. There is considerable heterogeneity in the types of mandates
passed, as described above. They could vary in comprehensiveness of the bene-
fits, in populations affected, and in the “type” of mandate (i.e. parity, minimum
mandated benefit, etc.). In this paper, I considered only the effect of the most
comprehensive and costly mandate, i.e. mental health “parity.” However, a fur-
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ther step would be to distinguish between the types of mandates and services
covered in particular states. An even more detailed analysis would also involve
distinguishing between different types of mental health disorders among indi-
viduals in the MEPS, and matching those to the legislative requirements of the
mandates. For example, if one state mandates coverage for schizophrenia, one
could only flag individuals with a mental health disorder in that state if those
individuals had an ICD-9 code for schizophrenia.
Another issue is the lack of clean identification of firms who self-insure (and
hence are exempt from mandates due to ERISA laws). As mentioned above, I
am so far controlling for these firms using large-firms (which mostly self-insure)
as a proxy. However, this is an imperfect measure, and using employer data to
assess whether firms self-insure would be another step for a future draft.
The policy endogeneity of the mandates themselves is another issue that
could be further explored. Controlling for state unemployment rates and the
proportion of individuals with a mental health diagnoses are good tests for this.
However, in the event that there are still unobserved characteristics influencing
the passage of mental health mandates, then it is unlikely that mental health par-
ity in particular would be singled out as the exclusive mandate passed by the
state, especially considering its perceived cost to employers. It is more likely
then that these factors would engender the passage of groups of mandates in
addition to mental health parity. Therefore, another extension of this paper
would be to control for the number of mandates each state has passed in or-
der to minimize this potential source of endogeneity. Another option would
be to instrument for mental health parity passage with the political affiliation
within a state (perhaps the fraction Democrat within a state, as Democrats are
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traditionally pro-mandate).
Another potential extension would be to look at the effect of mental health
mandates on other outcomes, such as overall health outcomes and wage effects.
This would provide a useful analysis of not only whether mandates are induc-
ing a utilization effect that results in increased job duration, but also whether
these effects can be seen in worker productivity. Wages would also serve as a
useful means of separation voluntary and involuntary transitions: if workers,
pre-mandate, change jobs for lower wages, it would be further evidence that
they are giving up preferred jobs for those that offer benefits.
A final extension for future work would be to use employer data (such as the
MEPS Insurance Component) to check whether mandates are binding (by iden-
tifying which firms already offered mental health benefits prior to the passage
of mandates) and by assessing whether employers restructure their benefits in
response, rather than shifting wages. This employer-level analysis has never
been performed with regards to any mandate in the United States before, and
would likely be an interesting topic.
3.6 Conclusion
The analysis presented in this paper suggest that mental health parity re-
duces job separations, particularly employment to employment transitions.
Typically, declines in job to job transitions are considered as evidence of in-
creased “job lock,” though that is not necessarily the case here. About a third
of the decline seen in this paper is due to a fall in involuntary separations, sug-
gesting a treatment effect of mandates. Individuals suffering from mental health
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disorders receive comprehensive mental health coverage, which allows them to
treat prior illnesses, and remain in their jobs longer. This is further supported
by an increase in expenditures for mental health services following the passage
of mandates, which do not occur in out-of-pocket expenses. There is also an
observed decrease in voluntary transitions. However, this is likely due to indi-
viduals receiving more comprehensive benefits and no longer needing to seek
jobs that offer mental health coverage. All of this suggests that mental health
parity mandates are good policies for aiding the labor market outcomes of those
with mental health conditions. Treating prior illnesses could decrease the costs
of having a mental illness, increase worker productivity and aid in the overall
welfare of this population.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
A.1 Additional Figures
(a) Harvard / Tufts Broad (b) Harvard Narrow
(c) Fallon Narrow (d) Health New England Narrow
Figure A.1: Hospital Networks by Plan, 2011
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(a) Harvard / Tufts Broad (b) Harvard Narrow
(c) Fallon Narrow (d) Health New England Narrow
Figure A.2: Primary Care Practice Networks by Plan, 2011
(a) Harvard / Tufts Broad (b) Harvard Narrow
(c) Fallon Narrow (d) Health New England Narrow
Figure A.3: Cardiology Networks by Plan, 2011
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(a) Harvard / Tufts Broad (b) Harvard Narrow
(c) Fallon Narrow (d) Health New England Narrow
Figure A.4: Orthopedic Networks by Plan, 2011
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(a) General Practices (b) Cardiology Practices
(c) Orthopedic Practices (d) Hospitals
Figure A.5: Insurer 2 Negotiated Price by Market Share, 2011
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A.2 Additional Provider Demand Specifications
Table A.1 presents the results for alternate hospital demand models. Specifi-
cally, each model incorporates more flexible distance coefficients interacted with
county identifiers in Massachusetts. This is done in order to allow patients
to react differently to distance traveled to a particular hospital depending on
where in Massachusetts they reside. Coefficients are for Barnstable county (the
omitted variable), Worcester (Central Massachusetts), Hampden (Western Mas-
sachusetts), and Suffolk (Eastern Massachusetts). The distance coefficients are
negative and significant in all reported counties. Notably, patients are far less
reactive to distance in Barnstable, Hampden, and Worcester than they are in Suf-
folk. The parameter estimate ranges from -0.204 in Hampden County to -0.250
in Worcester. However, the coefficient surges to -0.350 in Suffolk county, indi-
cating that patients are far less willing to travel in metropolitan Boston (which
is part of Suffolk county) than they are in other regions of Massachusetts, where
they are more likely to drive by car in order to find a hospital. The estimates
imply that consumers in Barnstable are willing to travel an additional 13 miles
on average in Barnstable in order to access a hospital they have used before. In
Suffolk, however, they would only be willing to travel an additional 8 miles to
access a previously used hospital.
Both models reported in Table A.1 also include a “copay” variable, which
refers to the out-of-pocket amount that a patient has to pay when they are ad-
mitted as an inpatient to a particular hospital. In column (1), I exclude all ob-
servations where patients are either admitted through the hospital’s emergency
room or admissions resulting from a hospital transfer. This is done for two rea-
sons. The first is that ER and transfer admissions may not necessarily reflect pa-
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Table A.1: Results of Alternate Hospital Mod-
els
Variable (1) (2)
Distance -0.2171∗∗∗ -0.2379∗∗∗
(0.0122) (0.0079)
DistancexWorcester -0.0334∗∗∗ -0.0287∗∗∗
(0.0054) (0.0041)
DistancexHampden 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0091∗∗
(0.0048) (0.0037)
DistancexSuffolk -0.1346∗∗∗ -0.1612∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0109)
Used Hospital 2.8474∗∗∗ 2.8324∗∗∗
(0.0438) (0.0299)
Copay -0.0001∗ -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001)
DistxFemale -0.0048∗∗∗ -0.0021
(0.0017) (0.0013)
DistxAge -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0000)
DistxChronic 0.0234∗∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.018)
DistxSpecialty 0.0326∗∗∗ 0.0454∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0023)
DistxAcademic 0.0186∗∗∗ 0.0259∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0018)
CardiacxCathLab 0.6072∗∗∗ 0.2523∗∗∗
(0.1180) (0.0603)
ObstetricsxNICU 3.9403∗∗∗ 3.6289∗∗∗
(0.2797) (0.2200)
ImagingxMRI 0.0832 0.1268
(0.1242) (0.0790)
Hospital FE Yes Yes
ER & Transfers No Yes
Obs. 1,021,481 1,949,285
Pseudo R2 0.52 0.54
Results from hospital demand model from years
2009-2013. Omitted distance category is for the
Barnstable county. “Copay” refers to the plan-
specific copayment amount in dollars for a partic-
ular hospital visit. “Chronic” refers to having a
chronic condition, “Specialty” refers to being a spe-
cialty hospital. Omitted from the table are distance
terms interacted with each of 18 CCS diagnosis cat-
egories, a full set of hospital fixed effects, hospi-
tal fixed effects interacted with disease weights, as
well as other patientxhospital interaction variables.
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tient choice of a hospital. Faced with an emergency, a patient may be taken to the
closest hospital rather than the hospital of his or her choice. The second reason
is that the copayments are typically different for hospital admissions through
the ER and transfers rather than voluntary admissions. Therefore, observations
that pick up transfers might register a copay amount that is not reflective of the
full amount. Indeed, column (1) shows that the coefficient on copay is negative
and somewhat significant. The result is similar in magnitude to Prager (2016),
though somewhat smaller. In column (2), where I include the full sample of
admissions (including ER and transfers), the coefficient on copay reduces effec-
tively to zero and becomes insignificant.
Table A.2 presents the results of alternate physician demand models for pri-
mary care practices, cardiology practices, and orthopedic practices. There are
two main differences in the specifications here than the specification laid out
in Table 7. First, much like with Table A.1, I allow the distance coefficient to
vary with the county in Massachusetts. The pattern of the coefficients across the
three specialties follows very closely with the pattern observed in the alternate
hospital demand models. Indeed, consumers seem much less willing to travel
in Suffolk County than in other counties in Central and Western Massachusetts.
This difference, however, is far less pronounced among primary care physicians
(where the distance coefficient is very similar regardless of whether the patient
is in Worcester, Hampden, or Suffolk) than it is for cardiology practices and
orthopedic practices.
The other difference in these specifications is that, rather than having the
observations be at the patient-visit level, I assume that each patient makes only
one choice of physician each year and can only visit that physician. In order to
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Table A.2: Results of Physician Demand Models with Single Provider Choice
Variable PCP Practices Cardiology Practices Orthopedic Practices
Distance -0.1031∗∗∗ -0.0928∗∗∗ -0.1353∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0029) (0.0029)
DistancexWorcester -0.0237∗∗∗ -0.0239∗∗∗ -0.0248∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0022)
DistancexHampden -0.0436∗∗∗ -0.0031 0.0044∗
(0.0044) (0.0020) (0.0026)
DistanceXSuffolk -0.0519∗∗∗ -0.0932∗∗∗ -0.0634∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0053) (0.0046)
Used Doctors 4.9617∗∗∗ 3.7307∗∗∗ 4.0130∗∗∗
(0.0189) (0.0163) (0.0189)
DistxFemale -0.0008 0.0005 0.0014
(0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0010)
DistxAge 0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
DistxRVU 0.0002 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Practice FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 4,603,357 4,595,697 4,311,426
Pseudo R2 0.74 0.56 0.53
Results of physician demand models are for years 2009-2013, where patients are assumed to make
one selection of provider each year. Excluded from tables are estimates for distance interacted
with number of doctors, distance interacted with the share of doctors who are of the specialty
types being considered, and a full set of practice fixed effects as well as practice fixed effects
interacted with RVU weights.
do so, for each patient i in each year t, I only include the physician d that the
patient visits the most frequently throughout that year (within each specialty
group). I then aggregate the RVU weights, r, of all the procedures that patient i
seeks from physician d in year t. In essence, this is meant to reduce the impact of
the logit shocks across physician visits. Since patients are highly likely to visit
the same physicians that they have seen before (Table 3), it is not necessarily
the case that each physician visit is a separate choice that patients are making.
Rather, it may be more appropriate to think of patients as choosing a physician
every year given their anticipated health requirements (RVUs) for the year.
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The results in A.2 shed light on the effect these specifications have on the pa-
rameter estimates. The most notable difference is that the coefficients on “Used
Doctors” is reduced across all three specialties. This indeed implies that the
logit shocks across visits played a role in blowing up the physician inertia co-
efficients. In Table 7, the estimates implied that, on average, people would be
willing to travel approximately 48 miles to see the same primary care physician
they have seen in the past (and approximately 37 miles for a cardiologist and
22 miles to see an orthopedist). Here, patients in Worcester would on average
be willing to travel 39 miles to see the same primary care physician, but only
32 miles in Suffolk. Similarly, cardiology patients would be willing to travel 31
extra miles in Worcester, and only 20 extra miles in Suffolk, whereas orthope-
dic patients would be willing to travel 25 extra miles in Worcester and 20 extra
miles in Suffolk.
While these inertia coefficients seem somewhat more dampened than in Ta-
ble 7, some of the other coefficients have changed in these alternate specifica-
tions as well. For instance, distance interacted with the indicator for female
loses its significance in this model, while the distance interacted with RVU coef-
ficient loses its significance in the PCP model. Moreover, the distance interacted
with age coefficient flips signs in the PCP model.
Table A.3 presents the results of the same models, however run only on the
top 50 physician practices of each specialty instead of the top 100. The results
are largely similar to those in the model with the top 100 practices. The distance
coefficients and physician inertia coefficients are somewhat dampened across
all three specialties, but broadly consistent. For primary care physicians, an
average patient in Worcester would be willing to travel an additional 42 miles to
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see the same provider they have seen in prior years, whereas patients in Suffolk
would be willing to travel an additional 35 miles. Indeed, these are similar to the
implied estimates when including the top 100 practices. However, in this model,
the distance interacted with female coefficient returns to being negative and
significant, as in Table 7. Moreover, the distance interacted with RVU coefficient
also regains its positive and significant value.
Table A.3: Results of Physician Demand Models with 50 Practices
Variable PCP Practices Cardiology Practices Orthopedic Practices
Distance -0.0776∗∗∗ -0.0870∗∗∗ -0.1153∗∗∗
(0.0056) (0.0028) (0.0029)
DistancexWorcester -0.0332∗∗∗ -0.0231∗∗∗ -0.0274∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0019) (0.0021)
DistancexHampden -0.0450∗∗∗ -0.0033∗ 0.0051∗
(0.0049) (0.0018) (0.0027)
DistanceXSuffolk -0.0572∗∗∗ -0.0823∗∗∗ -0.0903∗∗∗
(0.0054) (0.0051) (0.0043)
Used Doctors 4.7412∗∗∗ 3.5708∗∗∗ 3.8179∗∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0169) (0.0200)
DistxFemale -0.0028∗∗ 0.0009 0.0012
(0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0009)
DistxAge 0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
DistxRVU 0.0003∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Practice FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2,344,464 2,367,615 2,285,786
Pseudo R2 0.78 0.55 0.54
Results of physician demand models are for years 2009-2013, where patients are assumed to make
one selection of provider each year. Model includes top 50 practices, as opposed to top 100. Ex-
cluded from tables are estimates for distance interacted with number of doctors, distance inter-
acted with the share of doctors who are of the specialty types being considered, and a full set of
practice fixed effects as well as practice fixed effects interacted with RVU weights.
In all, these checks suggest that the model reported in Tables 6 and 7 are
fairly robust to alternate specifications, and that the results of the insurance de-
mand models and supply side do not change by a significant amount due to
differing provider specifications.
218
A.3 Selection on Unobservables in the Provider Demand Mod-
els
A concern with multinomial logit demand models of the type presented in
Section 4.1 is that they may suffer from a problem with selection on unobserv-
ables. Due to the fact that the models condition on the hospital and physician
networks of each patient i at time t, NijtH andNijtS , the expected utility of a par-
ticular provider network, EUIjtH and EUijtS , is calculated assuming that there
is no selection in the plan choice stage. This assumption may be violated, how-
ever, if individuals select into narrow network plans differentially from broad
network plans for reasons unobserved by the econometrician (such as an aver-
sion to high-cost providers, including Partners hospitals and Atrius physicians).
If such selection were a major concern, this would bias EUIjt, and therefore sub-
sequently bias the parameter estimates from the plan demand stage. Indeed,
there is literature that such discrete choice models are prone to incorrect pre-
dictions when hospitals are exogenously removed from a patient’s choice set
(Raval, Rosenbaum, & Wilson, 2017).
I present here some reduced form evidence suggesting that such selection
is not a major concern in my setting. Figure A.6 displays the share of indi-
vidual choices of hospitals and doctors for individuals only in narrow network
plans that are accurately predicted by a model of provider demand run only
on individuals in broad network plans. The logic is that if unobserved selection
into narrow network plans were a big concern, we would expect a model of
choice only run on patients in broad network plans to significantly misrepre-
sent the choices of patients with reduced choice sets. According to the figure,
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Figure A.6: Share of Actual Choices Accurately Predicted, by Specialty
however, the logit model predicts the choices of narrow network patients quite
well. For general practitioners (primary care physicians), the model accurately
predicts about 60% of individual choices, and over 70% of the choices in the
Tufts and Harvard narrow networks, in particular. The model also predicts hos-
pital choices quite well, with a particularly good fit for patients in Health New
England. The model does slightly worse for orthopedic surgeons, predicting
about 55% of choices overall, and does worse still for cardiologists, with about
40% of choices predicted.
In addition, Figure A.7 plots the actual market share of selected medical cen-
ters versus the predicted market share among only narrow network patients.
For the most part, the model predicts these market shares very well. For the
hospitals in the metropolitan Boston area (Tufts, Beth Israel, and Boston Med-
ical Center), the model seems to have some trouble predicted accurate market
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shares in 2009, but then converges for every year after 2010. This is likely due
to small sample sizes of hospital admissions among narrow network patients,
which is particularly true in 2009 (prior to the introduction of the Tufts and
Harvard narrow plans). Despite this, the model seems to predict the market
share patterns across time very well, although it predicts a less steep decline in
2013 for Beth Israel (panel b) than the observed share. Finally, the model does
extremely well in predicting the market shares of the Berkshire and Baystate
medical centers, both of which are located in Eastern Massachusetts.
Taken together, these figures imply that selection is likely not a major con-
cern in my model. Indeed, the predicted market shares for hospitals in the
Boston area (which contains the highest number of academic medical centers
and high-cost physicians excluded in narrow network plans) for the most part
track nicely with the observed shares, despite some difficulty in 2009. The hos-
pitals in Eastern Massachusetts are predicted with much better accuracy. Fu-
ture work will explore the sensitivity of the provider demand results to alter-
nate specifications, including more flexible semiparametric and nonparametric
models.1
1An additional option I am exploring is to model a random coefficient with an assumed dis-
tribution directly in the choice model, which may capture additional unobserved heterogeneity.
This would be in the spirit of Polyakova (2016) and Ho et al. (2017) (Ho, Hogan, & Morton,
2017).
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(a) Tufts Medical Center Share (b) Beth Israel Hospital Share
(c) Boston Medical Center Share (d) Lahey Hospital Share
(e) Berkshire Medical Center Share (f) Baystate Medical Center Share
Figure A.7: Observed versus Predicted Hospital Shares for Narrow Network
Patients
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A.4 Additional Plan Demand Estimates
Table A.4 shows the results of additional plan demand specifications that
demonstrate the importance of including physician networks in the model. The
first three columns all present estimates without the inertia coefficient, while
columns 4-6 present estimates that include this coefficient. Within each set, the
first column (i.e. columns 1 and 4) present results only focusing on hospital
utility (EUIjH), the second column (i.e. columns 2 and 5) present the results in-
cluding both hospital utility and the utility for the combined physician network
(EUIjS), and the third column (i.e. columns 3 and 6) present results separat-
ing the physician networks into the three distinct specialties (the most granular
specification).
Looking at columns 1-3, it is clear that moving from a model with only hos-
pital networks to a model that includes physician networks has a significant
effect on the estimated parameters. Between columns 1 and 2, the premium
sensitivity parameter nearly triples in magnitude, from -0.198 to -0.582. Be-
tween columns 2 and 3, this parameter remains basically unchanged. More-
over, the household expected utility for the plan’s hospital network decreases
significantly, from 9.544 to 1.892 between columns 1 and 2, and then to 1.394
in column 3. Turning to columns 4-6, the magnitudes of the premium coeffi-
cient again increases considerably, moving from -0.198 in column 1 to -1.355 in
column 4 as the inertia coefficient is included. Between columns 4 and 5, the pre-
mium coefficient increases in magnitude once again as the physician networks
are included, and the inertia coefficient drops slightly from 4.620 to 4.576. These
results demonstrate not only the importance of including inertia to accurately
estimate consumer price sensitivity, but also that responsiveness to premiums is
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Table A.4: Results of the Alternate Plan Demand Models
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No Inertia Inertia
Prem ($00s) -0.198∗∗∗ -0.582∗∗∗ -0.573∗∗∗ -1.355∗∗∗ -1.713∗∗∗ -1.763∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.069) (0.069) (0.123) (0.126) (0.126)
EUIjH 9.544∗∗∗ 1.892∗∗∗ 1.364∗∗ 7.076∗∗∗ 2.522∗∗ 1.266
(0.816) (0.621) (0.590) (1.006) (1.010) (0.967)
EUIjS 0.444∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.027)
EUIjPCP 0.177∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗
(0.028) (0.031)
EUIjCAR 0.243∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.131)
EUIjORS 0.949∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.085)
Inertia Coefficient 4.620∗∗∗ 4.576∗∗∗ 4.572∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.073) (0.073)
Insurer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 46,719 46,719 46,719 46,719 46,719 46,719
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.78 0.79 0.79
WTP Hosp $182 $12 $9 $20 $6 $3
WTP Phys $91 $20
WTP PCP $19 $5
WTP CAR $12 $6
WTP ORS $51 $11
FE $711 $240 $242 $80 $64 $61
WTP Tot $888 $341 $331 $99 $89 $86
Inertia $341 $267 $260
Notes: Columns 1-3 are results for models without the inertia coefficient.
Columns 4-6 include these coefficients. EUIjH refers to the household’s expected
utility for the hospital network, EUIjPCP refers to the utility of the primary care
network, EUIjCAR refers to the utility of the cardiology network, and EUIjORS
refers to the utility of the orthopedic network. “WTP” refers to “willingness-to-
pay” for Harvard Pilgrim’s broad hospital and physician networks over relative
to its narrow network (that is, the willingness to pay for the additional expected
utility). “FE” refers to the dollarized willingness-to-pay for Harvard’s broad plan
over its narrow plan not captued by the expected utility variable. “WTP Tot”
refers to the sum of the willingness to pay for the extra utility and the fixed effect.
The premium variable is in hundreds of dollars.
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also significantly affected by including physician networks in the model. In par-
ticular, this suggests that by ignoring physician networks, previous models may
have been significantly underestimating the extent to which consumers respond
to prices in the market. Taken together with the significant, positive estimates
on physician network utility, the results imply that consumers may select into
broad network plans for two primary reasons. First, they place an extraordinary
value on being in the same plan they were in previously. Second, consumers are
not necessarily insensitive to price when choosing their plans, as is widely be-
lieved about consumers in employer-sponsored-plans, but rather are extremely
inertial to their physicians, and are therefore willing to pay significant amounts
to retain access to physicians they have used in the past.
Translating these parameter estimates into “willingness-to-pay” (WTP) esti-
mates helps shed light on this phenomenon as well. The bottom panel of Ta-
ble A.4 reports estimates for implied willingness-to-pay for Harvard Pilgrim’s
broad network relative to its narrow network, as well as dollarized values of
the inertia coefficient (switching costs) and the portion of WTP for Harvard’s
broad plan not captured by the network utility (this latter amount is given by
the difference in Harvard’s broad plan fixed effect over Harvard’s narrow plan,
“FE”). In column 1, the estimates imply that individuals, on average, would be
willing to pay about $182 per month to move from Harvard’s narrow network
to its broad network for hospitals alone. Not only is this amount extremely high
relative to the actual premium differences between Harvard’s broad and nar-
row plans (about $30 per month on average for individuals), but the difference
in fixed effect estimates amounts to about $711. Therefore, in a model with-
out physician networks, consumers are on average willing to pay about $888 to
move from Harvard’s narrow to broad plan.
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Moving to column 2, consumers are now on average only willing to pay
about $12 per month to move from Harvard’s narrow hospital network to its
broad hospital network. They are, however, willing to pay about $91 per month
to move from its narrow physician network to its broad physician network.
Moreover, the fixed effect estimates drops significantly from $711 to $240, ren-
dering a total WTP of $341. It is clear that this is much improved from the esti-
mates implied by column 1, as both the total willingness-to-pay and the amount
unexplained by networks is considerably reduced.
In column 4 (the model with the inertia coefficient included, but excluding
physician networks), consumers are willing to pay an average of $20 per month
to move from Harvard’s narrow network to its broad network. They are also
willing to pay about $80 to move plans for reasons unexplained by the hospital
networks, yielding a total of about $100 per month. In column 5 (which includes
physician networks), the WTP for hospital networks decreases to a mere $6 per
month, with the WTP for physician networks equaling about $64 per month,
for a total of about $90 per month. It is clear that these estimates are much more
reasonable than in columns 1-3, and much more closely approximate the differ-
ence in actual premiums between the two plans. Moreover, the switching cost
estimate decreases from $341 in column 4 (when physician are not included) to
$267 in column 5 (when physicians are included). This suggests that not only
does including physicians capture some of what was previously attributed to
the fixed effect, but also by increasing the magnitude of the premium sensitivity
parameter and decreasing the magnitude of the inertia coefficient, the model
with physicians clearly captures some significant heterogeneity driving patient
choice of plans that was previously interpreted as a high switching cost.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
B.1 Estimating the Pure Characteristics Model
The pure characteristics model described in section 3.4 is notoriously dif-
ficult to estimate. The challenge stems from the absence of the idiosyncratic
error term, ijt, present in both the logit and random-coefficients models. In the
previous models, the error term ensured that the market share function was a
smooth function of the regimen characteristics, which allowed for easy integra-
tion. Without the error term, there is no longer a guaranteed contraction map-
ping that can be used to equate the predicted and observed market shares, and
hence back out the mean utility, δj . We, therefore, resort to alternate methods of
estimating the mean product quality as described by Berry and Pakes (Berry &
Pakes, 2007). Our methods also follow closely that of Minjae Song (Song, 2007,
2008).
As in Berry & Pakes 2007 and Song 2007, the estimation procedure proceeds
in three steps. The first step is to bring the mean product quality closer to the
true product quality by use of a contraction mapping, as in BLP. Recall the utility
function in BLP is:
uijt = −αpjt + βxjt − αuvipjt + βuvixjt + ξj + ∆ξj + ijt (B.1)
In principle, then, the utility function from the pure characteristics model is
a limiting case of the utility function from the random coefficients model as ijt
approaches zero. We thus begin by implementing the BLP contracting mapping
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with a scaling factor applied to the error term that gradually proceeds to zero.
The market share in this model collapses to:
Sjt(δjt, α
u, βu) =
1
ns
ns∑
i=1
exp[(δjt − αuvipjt + βuvixjt)µ]
1 +
J∑
k=1
exp[(δkt − αuvipkt + βuvixkt)µ]
(B.2)
where µ is the scaling factor and gradually grows larger in the estimation
routine. In practice, as µ grows larger, the exponential function rapidly blows
up, resulting in incalculable or missing mean values. We iterate on µ and pro-
ceed slowly until the point that we can no longer compute a δj . The closes δj we
obtain using this scaled share function brings us closer to the true mean value
from the pure characteristics model, and we hence use this value as the starting
point for the next part of the procedure.
The second step is an element-by-element fixed-point homotopy method.
This goal of this inversion is to find a mean utility value, δj , to satisfy the fol-
lowing equation:
|Sjt(δj, δ−j, θ)− sjt| < tol (B.3)
The difficult is that this inversion is not guaranteed to be a weak contraction
mapping. Therefore, both Berry & Pakes, and Song, combine this element-by-
element inversion with a homotopy method using the following:
δ′j(t) = (1− t)δ0j + tδj, j = 1, ..., J (B.4)
where δ0j is an initial guess for the mean value, δj is the current iteration
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of the mean value, and t is between 0 and 1. As Song points out, when t = 1,
this collapses back to the strict element-by-element inverse, which is not guar-
anteed to contract. However, when t < 1, there is a strict contraction mapping
guaranteed, albeit the fixed point the model converges to may not necessarily
be the true value of the pure characteristics model, δj . Therefore, much like the
first step of the procedure in which the BLP contraction is implemented with
a scaling factor to bring the value of δj closer to the true value, the homotopy
method is implemented with a value of t that is strictly less than 1, but repeated
while approaching one very slowly. Following Berry & Pakes, and Song, we be-
gin with t = 0.99 and increase by 0.0025, with the element-by-element mapping
repeating at least 50 times before altering the value of t.
The final step is to use the Newton-Rhapson search method. This occurs
when the element-by-element inversion in equation (B.3) is not satisfied after an
iteration of the homotopy search, yet all the predicted market shares are non-
zero. This implies the true value of δj has not been found yet, but since the
current predicted market shares are non-zero, an alternate, more rapid search
method for smooth functions can be implemented. While both Berry & Pakes,
and Song had to rely on the Newton method in their simulations of the pure
characteristics model, our implementation rarely relied on this method, with the
homotopy method approaching the true δj and satisfying equation (B.3) most of
the time.
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B.2 Additional Tables
Table B.1: Composition and Dosages of Chemotherapy Drugs
Regimen 1st Drug 2nd Drug 3rd Drug 4th Drug
5-FU + LV 425 mg of 5-Fu/m2/day 20 mg of LV/m2/day
for days 1-5, for days 1-5,
every 4 weeks every 4 weeks
Irinotecan 125 mg of irinotecan
(Pfizer) per week/m2 for 4
weeks, every 6 weeks
Irinotecan 180 mg of irinotecan/m2 1,000 mg of 5-FU/m2 200 mg of LV/m2
+ 5-FU/LV on day 1, every 2 weeks on day 1 and 2, on day 1 and 2,
every 2 weeks every 2 weeks
Capecitabine 2,500 mg of capecitabine
(Roche) per m2/day for days
1-14, every 3 weeks
Capecitabine 70 mg of 2,000 mg of capecitabine
+ Irinotecan irinotecan/m2/week, per m2/day for days
every 6 weeks 1-14, every 3 weeks
Oxaliplatin 85 mg of oxaliplatin 1,000 mg of 5-FU/m2 200 mg of LV/m2
(Sanofi) per m2 on day 1, on day 1 and day 2, on day 1 and day 2,
+ 5-FU/LV every 2 weeks every 2 weeks every 2 weeks
Oxaliplatin 130 mg of oxaliplatin 1,700 mg of capecitabine
+ Capecitabine per m2 on day 1, per m2/day for days
every 3 weeks 1-14, every 3 weeks
Cetuximab 400 mg of cetuximab
(ImClone) per m2 on day 1; then
250 mg/m2 once a week,
every 6 weeks
Cetuximab 400 mg of cetuximab 125 mg of irinotecan
+ Irinotecan per m2 on day 1; then per week/m2 for 4
250 mg/m2 once a week, weeks, every 6 weeks
every 6 weeks
Bevacizumab 5 mg of bevacizumab 85 mg of oxaliplatin 1,000 mg of 5-FU/m2 200 mg of LV/m2
(Genentech) per kg, every 2 weeks per m2 on day 1, on day 1 and day 2, on day 1 and
+ Oxaliplatin every 2 weeks every 2 weeks day 2, every 2
+ 5-FU/LV weeks
Bevacizumab 5 mg of bevacizumab 180 mg of irinotecan 1,000 mg of 5-FU/m2 200 mg of LV/m2
+ Irinotecan per kg, every 2 weeks per m2 on day 1, on day 1 and day 2, on day 1 and
+ 5-FU/LV every 2 weeks every 2 weeks day 2, every 2
weeks
Bevacizumab 7.5 mg of bevacizumab 130 mg of oxaliplatin 1,700 mg of
+ Oxaliplatin per kg, every 3 weeks per m2 on day 1, capecitabine/m2/day
+ Capecitabine every 3 weeks for days 1-14,
every 3 weeks
mg=miligram of active ingredient; m2=meter squared of a patient’s surface area; kg=kilogram of a patient’s weight.
Source: National Comprehensive Cancer Network, Colon Cancer, Version 2.2006; package inserts.
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